ing, no treatment had been administered to Mrs. Seivert on the occasion of this visit, her ailment was diagnosed by plaintiff in error and every assurance given that she was prepared to treat her and would give the treatment and a time fixed when the first treatment should be administered. A fee was charged and paid for the diagnosis and consultation. We think it clear that plaintiff in error did by this act profess to treat the physical ailment of another, and that the verdict of the jury was proper. Plaintiff in error insists that the statute was not violated for the reason that Mrs. Seivert was suffering from no ailment whatever and merely pretended that she had an ailment. There is nothing in the record which justifies this contention, even conceding that it would be a sufficient defense. For anything that appears in this record the diagnosis of plaintiff in error may have been correct. The judgment of the municipal court is affirmed. THE CHICAGO TITLE AND TRUST COMPANY, Admr., Appellant, vs. THE CHICAGO AND Eastern Illinois RailROAD COMPANY, Appellee. Opinion filed October 26, 1912. APPEALS AND ERRORS—when finding by Appellate Court is conclusive against recovery for a personal injury. A finding by the Appellate Court, in its judgment reversing a judgment in a personal injury case, that the defendant was not guilty of the negligence charged against it is conclusive of that fact so far as the Supreme Court is concerned, and as there could be no recovery under such circumstances the judgment of reversal is proper. APPEAL from the Branch "B" Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN GIBBONS, Judge, presiding. JOHN C. TRAINOR, for appellant. CALHOUN, LYFORD & SHEEAN, (E. H. SENEFF, of counsel,) for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court: John Reilly secured a judgment in the circuit court of Cook county against the appellee for personal injuries. Branch "B" of the Appellate Court for the First District reversed this judgment without remanding and with a finding of fact under section 120 of the Practice act. The case is brought to this court by appeal on a certificate of importance. The finding of fact by the Appellate Court is as follows: "And the court, upon the allegations and proofs in the record in this cause contained, finds that the appellant, the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company, is not guilty of the negligence charged against it by the said John Reilly in his declaration." This finding is a part of the final judgment of the Appellate Court and is binding upon this court. The only question for our determination under this situation is whether the Appellate Court has properly applied the law to the facts found by it, or, in other words, whether the judgment entered by the Appellate Court is supported by and in accordance with the facts so found. It is apparent that if appellee was not guilty of the negligence charged against it there can be no recovery. If appellee was not guilty of the negligence charged it cannot be contended that the Appellate Court misapplied the law to the facts, as under such circumstances no other judgment than one of reversal could be rendered. This question has been decided so frequently that we do not deem any citation of authority necessary. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. SADIE K. DUNSHEE, Appellee, vs. JOHN Dunshee, Appellant. Opinion filed October 26, 1912. CONTRACTS-a contract to devise or convey property must be absolute in its terms. A contract, made without adequate consideration, to devise or convey farm land provided the promisee would make a success of farming it and no unknown cause should turn up to prevent, is too vague and uncertain to be capable of specific enforcement if the promisor fails to make the devise or conveyance, and is not such a contract as will bar the right of the promisor's widow to take half of the land, under the statute, after renouncing the will of her husband, which devised the land to the promisee, there being no acts on her part constituting an estoppel. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Carroll county; the Hon. O. E. HEARD, Judge, presiding. HENRY MACKAY, for appellant. FRANKLIN J. STRANSKY, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court: Robert Dunshee died testate on March 2, 1910, at his home in Carroll county, Illinois, leaving surviving him his widow, Sadie K. Dunshee, but leaving no children or descendants. By his last will and testament, executed January 26, 1910, he bequeathed to his wife $1000 in lieu of her award and devised to her 320 acres of land in fee simple, together with the undivided one-half of the stock thereon. The remainder of his real estate, amounting to about 900 acres, was devised to various relatives. To his nephew, John Dunshee, the appellant, he devised 207 acres of land known in the family as the Smith farm. In August following the death of Robert Dunshee and the probate of his will the widow filed her renunciation, and elected to take, in lieu of her dower in the estate of her husband, one half of all the real and personal property which should remain after the payment of the debts. Thereafter she filed this bill for partition, setting up the death of her husband, the execution and probate of his last will and testament, together with her renunciation, and praying for a division and partition of the Smith farm between herself and the appellant. Appellant filed his answer and a cross-bill, in both of which he set up that in his lifetime Robert Dunshee had contracted with appellant, both in writing and verbally, that if appellant would leave his home in the State of Kansas and come to Carroll county, Illinois, and reside on the place known as the Smith farm and make a success of farming it, at the death of Robert Dunshee it should be the property of appellant; that relying on the written statements and representations so made to him he sold his property in the State of Kansas and moved with his family to said farm, where he has resided since that time, and that he claimed said premises to be his by virtue of said promises and the full performance of the contract on his part. The cross-bill prayed that the appellant be decreed to be the owner of the premises in fee, divested of any claim of said Sadie K. Dunshee. The issues were joined and the cause referred to the master in chancery to take the proof and report the same without his conclusions. A number of questions have been raised by the parties in reference to the procedure adopted upon the hearing and as to the competency of some of the testimony taken, but in the view we take of the case we will not pass on those questions. The evidence discloses that for some time prior to November, 1907, the appellant, John Dunshee,. resided with his family near Douglas, in the State of Kansas. He had been engaged in farming at that place with rather indifferent success. The only property which he appears to have owned at that time, aside from a few head of horses and cows and some farming machinery, was some land in the State of Texas. On November 11, 1907, Robert Dunshee wrote appellant and his wife a letter, apparently in answer to letters which had been received from them. After giving them some information about the condition of affairs. in Illinois and the doings of his various relatives, he refers to a request which had been made to him by the wife of appellant to loan them money with which to buy "Mrs. Wright's place." After explaining to them that his money was all loaned out he addressed himself directly to appellant, and told him that the Smith farm, which he referred to as containing 210 acres, was in the possession of a tenant under a lease which would expire in about two years. He described the farm and the extent of the operations of the tenant and the prospects for making money on it. He then advised appellant to sell his Texas land some time in the following summer or fall and come to Illinois and take this farm. The letter then contains this statement: "If you make a success at farming it, unless some unknown cause should turn up, after my death to be your home,— that is, if you, John Dunshee, makes a success farming it. Please don't say anything about this what I have written to you. Now please write me what you will do about it. If you can't sell your farm I will try and set you up and you can pay me as Slager has." Slager was the tenant then in possession of the farm. Appellant testifies that in due time he wrote to his uncle and accepted his proposition. Only one other letter written by Robert was introduced and it contained no reference to this proposition, except that he gave a more minute description of the condition of the Smith farm. A number of letters written by Sadie K. Dunshee were introduced in evidence, but none of them throws any light upon the question of the alleged contract. The letters written by Mrs. Dunshee cover a period of time from February, 1908, until December 14, 1908, shortly prior to the time appellant removed from Kansas to Carroll county, Illinois. In one of these letters, |