gether, was only to give the assured an option to continue the insurance or not during fifteen days after the expiration of the year ensuing, notwithstanding any intervening loss, provided the office had not, before the end of the year, determined the option by giving notice that they would not renew the contract. Salvin and Others v. Jones and Others, 6 East, 571.

A covenant in the lease of a house to insure, and keep insured, a given sum of money upon the premises, during the term, in some sufficient insurance office, is not void for uncertainty, but means that the premises shall be insured against fire, in some office where insurances against fire are usually effected. Where there was such a covenant in a lease on the part of the tenant, he effected an annual policy on the premises with an insurance company, in the usual printed form, by which it was declared that the policy shall be for such longer period as the tenant shall regularly pay, and the company receive the premium, during which the company was to be liable. The policy expired on the 25th of March, 1811; but the tenant did not pay the premium for a renewal until the 25th of April following; the company then gave a receipt for the premium, stating the insurance to be from Lady-day, 1811, till Lady-day, 1812. Here the covenant was ruled to have been broken, by reason of the non-payment of the premium on or before the 9th of April, and the lease was held void under a clause of re-entry, Doe d. Pitt v. Shewen, 3 Campb. 134. Lord Ellenborough C. J. in this case said, "that it may admit of considerable doubt, whether by the revenue laws the policy could be lawfully renewed by the payment of the premium after the end of the fifteen days. At any rate its existence was suspended from the 9th to the 25th of April, the covenant to insure was therefore broken, and the landlord was entitled to recover at law, whatever relief there might be for the tenant in equity." On the 19th of January, defendants applied for insurance by letter desiring to be informed in regard to the terms of insurance. The office replied on the 21st of the same month stating the terms. And on the 22d the defendants again wrote the plaintiffs thus—“ We have received yours of the 21st instant and accept your terms for the stock in the Gleaner and wish a policy filled, viz. on 26 horses, valued at $2200, and on 20 oxen valued at $800=$3000." It was held, that no contract was perfected, because the first two letters were conversant about an open policy, while that of the 22d, requested a valued policy. This was a new proposal, which the defendants might presume the underwriters would accept, but they could not know it. The office had assumed no such obligation. The policy transmitted, was not conformable to the proposition; and there having been no union of minds between the parties, the Court decided, of consequence, that there was no contract; and the note given for the premium in suit was not recoverable. Ocean Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 3 Conn. 225.

The contract must be complete; otherwise the company shall not be liable to pay any loss. Therefore where the plaintiff applied for insurance, and the defendants prepared an application and a note for the premium dated the 16th January, which was sent to the plaintiff to be signed and returned by mail. He signed the application on the 28th of January and returned the same by mail together with the premium note to his agent on the 28th of the same

inonth. The House was burnt on the 31st of January, but the papers were not sent to the office until the 3d of the ensuing month. Held, that at the time when the fire took place, there was no complete contract of insurance between the parties, but only a negotiation which had not resulted in a contract. Thayer v. Middlesex Mutual F. Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 326.

It is settled, that a policy of insurance on a voyage from a particular part to a specified port or ports, and until moored 24 hours in safety, against the usual risks, has the effect to prolong the time for which the assurers have engaged to be liable, without varying the nature of the perils insured against. If without this clause the vessel be insured to her port of destination, the voyage is determined on her arrival and being moored on the usual anchorage ground; but with this clause the policy is further extended twenty-four hours. If therefore no loss, for which the underwriters are answerable, shall happen during the voyage, or during twenty-four hours after, they are discharged. And the vessel is safe within the terms of the policy, until she suffers a loss insured against. Bill et al. v. Mason, 6 Mass. 313. This construction seems necessa

ry to give some termination to the risk; for if it was held that the vessel was not moored in safety while she is in hazard of a loss, she never can be moored in safety; for in the finest weather she may be in danger of fire, lightning, enemies and other perils, if not exposed to any sea risks.

5. Effect of notice by an Office to determine a contract, except upon payment of a higher premium, and of the time allowed for the payment of premiums.

After notice by the Sun Fire Office under the following circumstances to determine a contract, except upon payment of a higher premium, and refusal on the part of the insured to pay such premium, the insured were held to be protected by the policy during the fifteen days allowed by the Office for the payment of the premium, &c. for the following year.

The allowance of the fifteen days is to be considered as forming part of the period covered by the policy for the following year, but, in order to discharge the Office of liability during that period, there must be notice to determine the contract.

Where the insurance company reserves to itself the right to refuse to renew the policy, unless upon payment of a higher premium, the assured has an option to continue the insurance or not during the time mentioned for the payment thereof. If the assured refuse to accept the increased rate of premium, the company will not be liable for a loss; though the assured, after the loss, and before the time specified for the payment of the premium has expired, tender the full premium demanded. He shall not have a right to revoke his refusal after a loss has happened and thereby claim to recover for what he had previously determined he would not be insured. Salvin v. Jones, 6 East. 571. It is made a condition with most Offices, that persons insuring property should give notice of any other insurance made elsewhere on the same property on their behalf, and cause a minute or memorandum of such other insurance to be endorsed on their policies; and in this case the company is only

liable to the rateable proportion of any loss or damage which may be sustained, and unless such notice be given, the insured are not to be entitled to any benefit under the policy. Ellis p. 23.

According to the general principles of insurance, whenever the risk to be run is entire, there is no return of premium, though the contract should cease and determine the next day after its commencement. This rule applies to insurances against fire which generally are made for one entire and connected portion of time, which cannot be severed; and therefore if the property insured should be destroyed by fire, arising from the act of a foreign enemy, the very day after the commencement of the policy, though the underwriters would be discharged, yet there can be no apportionment or return of premium. Park, C. 23; 2 Marsh 652.

Even if the insured have no interest, yet it would appear that he, cannot re cover back the premium after taking the chance of a loss, and of obtaining from the generosity of the insurers the sum insured. Lowrieu v. Bordieu, Dougl. 468.

6. A nominal misdescription and the necessary introduction of fire into a building, covered by the common insurance.

Where the misdescription is merely nominal, but is substantially correct, it will not vitiate the policy, and the introduction of a tar-barrel and fire for the necessary purpose of tarring the building, in consequence of which it was consumed by fire, will not vitiate the policy, though the premium was paid as for a building wherein no fire was kept, and no hazardous goods deposited.

In Dobson v. Sotheby, 1 Moo. & M. 96, an action of assumpsit was brought upon a policy of insurance against the defendants, three of the directors of the Beacon Insurance Company. The policy was effected upon 66 a barn, situate in an open field, lumber-built, and tiled." The conditions endorsed on the policy required the usual description of the property. The policy was effected at the lowest rate of premium, such as is only payable for buildings of a certain description, where no fire is kept, and no hazardous goods deposited. There were articles fixing a higher rate of premium for buildings of other descriptions, with the same proviso against hazardous goods; and a proviso, that "if buildings of any description insured with the company shall at any time after such insurance be made use of to stow or ware-house any hazardous goods" without leave from the company, the policy should be forfeited. The premises were agricultural buildings, but not such as were strictly to be described as a barn, but they were of such a nature that they would have been insured by the company at the same rate, if they had been more accurately described. They required tarring, and a fire was consequently lighted in the ware-house, and a tar-barrel was brought into the building for the purpose of performing the necessary operation. In the absence, and by the negligence of the plaintiff's servant, the tar boiled over, took fire, and communicated with that in the barrel, and the premises were burnt down.

It was contended that the plaintiff could not recover, 1st, because the premises were incorrectly described as a barn; 2d, because the lighting a fire was a contravention of the terms of the policy, which required that no fire should be kept in buildings on which the rate of insurance in the present case was paid; 3d, that the tar-barrel came under the description of hazardous goods, which was a breach of the condition.

Lord Tenderden, C. J.-If the property insured has not been correctly described, the defendants certainly are not liable; but I do not think that there is in this case any misdescription which will discharge them. The word "barn" is not the most correct description of the premises, but it would give the company substantial information of their nature; there would be no difference in their risk, and the insurance would have been at the same rate; whether the word "barn" or a more correct phrase had been used, I think therefore that they are substantially well described. Nor do I think that the circumstances relied on furnish any answer to the action. If the company intended to stipulate, not merely that no fire should habitually be kept on the same premises, but that none should ever be introduced upon them, they might have expressed themselves to that effect; and the same remark applies to the case of hazardous goods also. In the absence of any such stipulation, I think that the condition must be understood as forbidding only the habitual use of fire or the ordinary deposite of hazardous goods, not their occasional introduction, as in this case, for a temporary purpose connected with the occupation of the premises. The common repairs of a building necessarily require the introduction of fire upon the premises, and one of the great objects of insuring is security against the negligence of servants and workmen. I cannot therefore be of opinion, that the policy in this case was forfeited; and certainly if it is valid, the circumstance that the fire happened through the negligence of the plaintiff's servant furnishes no answer to the action. See Austin v. Drew, 6 Taunt, 436; 1 Holt's N. P. C. 126.

It appears that a coffee-house is not an inn within the meaning of a policy, enumerating the trade of an inn-keeper amongst others as doubly hazardous. Doe d. Pitt v. Laing, 4 Campb. 76.

CHAPTER IV.

OF INSURANCE AGENTS.

1. Of the Agents for the Office.

2. Of the Agents for the Assured.

1. Upon the payment of a deposit at the head office or to the respective agents, the office usually hold themselves liable for any loss by fire which may take place between the payment of the deposit and the making out the policy; and the slip, or memorandum of agreement usually delivered at the time of applying to insure, specifies the heads of the contract afterwards to be carried into effect. The powers of the agents, however, differ according to the rule of the different offices. In general, the agents are restricted from definitively undertaking that a policy shall be granted where large amounts are to be insured, or circumstances of doubt or difficulty are involved; and where the agents are not authorised to bind the company, the slip or memorandum should be accompanied with a proviso to that effect. Ellis, p. 78.

The general rule of principal and agent will apply, where no special regulations are made. ib.

One may become an agent of an incorporated company in the same manner as he may of an individual, without any deed or writing. Perkins v. Washington Ins. Co. 4 Cowen, 645. Here, the authority to bind the company seems to have been implied. The insured paid the premium to a person by the name of Russell for the purpose of insuring a specified sum on his stock of goods, in the city of Savannah; and Russell signed a receipt, describing himself as the agent of the company, and acknowledging also the receipt of fifty cents for the expense of the policy, and three dollars for the survey, &c. Six days after this the goods were consumed by fire. The principal question was as to the authority of Russell to bind the company. It was admitted that Russell had been previously appointed surveyor, but with no other powers. It appeared, that Russell had previously published in the papers in Savannah the proposals of the company; and added that insurance might be effected on application to him; and that he could obtain policies from the office with the least possible delay. It appeared also, that Russell previously to the receipt of the premium in this case had agreed to insure for a number of individuals, and received the premiums, which were sent to the company in New York; and that in every instance, save one, the company confirmed the insurance, and transmitted policies bearing date at the time the receipt