by the carpenter for his shop, was conclusive evidence of the fact, that it was used for the purpose of exercising therein an extra-hazardous trade or vocation within the meaning of the prohibitory clause or provision of the policy, without the assent of the corporation, and therefore caused a suspension of the policy, which continued until and at the time of the fire.

Mr. Justice Oakley overruled these objections at the trial; and the Court upon consideration refused a new trial. Ch. J. Jones observes :-" All the witnesses who testify to the point, concur in the opinion that a carpenter is a necessary workman in such establishments.-This proof of the necessity of a carpenter, and of the usage of manufacturers to employ and keep one as an ordinary workman in such an establishment, is not contradicted, and if it was admissable evidence, of which no question is made, it must, we think, be sufficient to take the plaintiff's case out of the operation of the prohibitory clause or provision of the policy, and justify the assured in the use he permitted of the store-room in question; for one carpenter only was retained by him, and continued in his employ in the factory at the time of the fire. Such a workman was required for the ordinary purposes of the manufactory, and he must have a place to work in.

The restriction inhibiting the appropriation of the building to extra-hazardous trades, on the pain of the suspension of the obligation of the insurers, was considered inapplicable to a trade or vocation, however hazardous, appertaining, or usually attached to an establishment, which the underwriters, with a description of it before them, agreed to insure; such an occupation forms a prominent object of the insurance, and without which, the establishment cannot be profitably carried on. ib. And, however unwarrantable the use made of the buildings by the workmen might have been, the contract of insurance, by the terms of it, could be suspended during the continuance only of such unauthorised use of them. ib.

2. Damage by heat in the process of manufacture without ignition.

To found a valid claim under the policy, a loss or damage by fire must occur; for it seems that loss or damage by heat alone, without ignition, is not covered by the usual policy, against loss by fire.

The insurers, in consideration of the premium paid, usually undertake to pay or make good to the insured, his executors, administrators or assigns, all such loss or damage as shall happen by fire, (except loss or damage by fire happening by any invasion, foreign enemy, civil commotion or riot, or any military or usurped power whatever,) to the property specified, to the extent of the sum for which it is insured, but they sometimes also give notice, by the indorsements of the policy, that they will not be answerable for loss or damage on stock of any kind occasioned by the misapplication of fire heat under process of manufacture, or for loss or damage to hay or corn, or stock of any kind, occasioned by its own natural heating. It is obvious that to indemnify the insured against ignition under either of these circumstances, would be to open a door to negligence and fraud, if not directly to encourage it. On the other

hand, to remove any doubt in the minds of the insured, though little could exist upon the terms of most policies, it is sometimes expressly stated that losses occasioned by fire from lightning will be made good. (Ellis, p. 15.)

1. In order to recover upon a policy against loss or damage by fire, it is not sufficient to show that the property has been damaged by the heat of fires usually employed in the manufacture, and increased by the negligence of the insured, or his servants, beyond its usual intensity.

In Austen v. Drew, 6 Taunt, 436, the action was on a policy effected "against all the damage which the plaintiffs should suffer by fire" on their "stock and utensils in their regular built sugar-house," and plaintiffs averred that their "stock and utensils were very much damaged by fire in the sugar-house." The defendants pleaded that the stock and utensils were, through the negligence and improper conduct of the plaintiffs and their servants in managing the fires usually employed in the sugar-house, damaged by the smoke arising from such fires, and not from any other cause, and traversed the damage by, fire. It appeared that the building insured contained eight stories, and in each story sugar, in a certain state of preparation, was deposited for the purpose of being refined; in order for refining, a certain degree of heat was necessary, and a chimney, running through the whole building, formed almost one side of one of the stories, and by means of this chimney, heat was communicated to each of the stories. At the top of the chimney, above the eight stories, was a regulator, which the plaintiff used to shut up at night, in order to retain in the chimney and building all the heat they could. They shut it one night, and lighted the fires the next day, and they soon afterwards found the building full of smoke and sparks; and it was found that the regulator, which always ought to be open when the fire was burning, was continued shut down. There was much smoke, but the only injury done to the sugars proceeded from heat; nothing was on fire that ought not to be on fire; the damage was occasioned by the sparks, heat and smoke taking a wrong direction. Gibbs, C. J., directed the Jury, that inasmuch as the damage was occasioned entirely by the increased heat which was produced by keeping the regulator closed, it was not a loss by fire within the meaning of the policy, but was occasioned by the improper management of the regulator. The Jury found a verdict for the defendants;-and upon a motion for a new trial, on the ground that the words of the policy were "damage by fire," not "excess of fire,” or “improper fire." Shepherd, Sol. Gen., said, if flame caused the mischief, it mattered not whether the fire was properly or improperly lighted, the question was, whether fire occasioned the damage. It could not be necessary that the fire, to produce a loss within the policy, should be only fire as was communicated to some substance not contained in the proper receptacle of fire. Suppose the intensity of heat necessarily required should be so great that the fire made in a chimney, though confined there, might ignite neighboring bodies, it might in that case as well be said that it was not a damage by fire. Put the case of a chimney on fire, there is only the usual quantity of heat below, but the mischief is occasioned by an accumulation of soot in the chimney, yet the insurers would be bound to pay any loss thereby occasioned. Gibbs, C. J.---I think

it is not necessary to determine any of those extreme questions. In the present case I think no loss was sustained by any of the risks in the policy-the loss was occasioned by the extreme mismanagement by the plaintiffs of their regulator. I have no reason to alter my opinion. Dallas, J. was of the same opinion, and the rule was refused.

Upon this decision Mr. Ellis (p. 27,) observes-It does not appear whether the proposals of the policy in this case protected the insurers from making good any loss or damage occasioned by the misapplication of fire heat under process of manufacture. It probably did not, or it otherwise would have been made a strong point for the defendants. It may be inferred, therefore, from this case, that damage by heat alone, without ignition, even where there is no express provision, is not covered by the ordinary indemnity against loss or damage by fire, and a fortiori, where this provision is introduced, and the misapplication of fire heat occasioned by ignition, the insurers will not be liable.

The policy was on premises "where no fire is kept, and where no hazardous goods are deposited. Held, that these words mean the habitual use of fire and deposit of hazardous goods; and therefore, where the fire happened in consequence of making a fire, and bringing a tar-barrel on to the premises to repair them :-Held, that the insured were entitled to recover." Dobson v. Southby, M. and M. 90.-Tenderden.

In the case of a freight policy, the underwriters were held not liable for the loss of freight, in consequence of part of the goods being left behind by the captain, on account of their being so damaged in a storm that they are liable to ignition, and that, to enable him to carry them forward, a process must be undergone, and the ship detained, at an expense which would be equal to the amount of the freight. Moody v Jones, 4 B. & Cr. 394.

If goods are put on board the ship in a very damaged state, in consequence of which they are liable to ignite and generate a fire, by which they are consumed, the underwriters are not liable for the loss. Boyd v. Dubois, 3 Camp. 133. The underwriters are not discharged by the circumstance of the goods having been damaged, or by the non-communication of that fact to the underwriters: but if in consequence of the damage which the goods have previously received, they consume themselves, the underwriters are not liable for the loss.

3. Insurance of specific articles to be construed by the general scope of the policy.

The meaning of the terms used in a policy will vary, according to the business to which they are applied. The plaintiff, a Coach-plater and Cow-keeper, insured his "stock in trade, household furniture, linen, wearing apparel, and plate," against fire for one year. Upon a fire happening within the year; and consuming, amongst other things, a large stock of linen drapery goods which he had purchased a short time before on speculation, and which, it was, contended, were protected by the policy under the denomination of " linen”— Lord Ellenborough held, that the word linen in the policy, evidently meaning, from the terms with which it was accompanied, household linen, or linen

used by way of apparel; and consequently did not protect the linen drapery goods on speculation :-the party insured not being a linen draper. Watchorne v. Langford and others, 3 Camp. 422. So, in Moadinger v. The Mechanic's Fire Ins. Co. of the City of N. Y. 2 Hall, 490, the plaintiff effected an insurance on "his stock in trade, as a baker, and on household furniture, contained in a framed dwelling-house and bake-house, front and rear, situated at No. 17 Thames street." It was insisted by the plaintiff that the terms "stock in trade" covered not only the flour used by him in his bake-house, but also all the implements and fixtures belonging to his business. The judge instructed the jury, that the terms stock in trade, when applied to a baker's property, must be intended to mean something more, than when used among merchants, from whom they were borrowed, and to whose business they were originally applicable. The terms when used in a policy, to designate the property of a mechanic, must be taken to mean whatever was necessary for the conducting of his business; and in the case then before the Court, not merely the flour used for baking. Moadinger v. The Mechanic's F. Ins. Co., 2 Hall, 490. The plaintiff was a baker, carrying on business in a limited way. On the day of the fire, his whole stock of bread was upon his cart, and he contended, that in order to give effect to the intention of the parties, his fixtures and implements of business, must be considered as covered by the terms "stock in trade" as used in the policy; and of this opinion was the Court saying:-"We think the policy protected every thing which was necessary for carrying on of the plaintiff's business; and such ought to be the construction in all cases relating to the pursuits of mechanics-A mechanic who insures his stock, covers his implements of trade also. ib. The stock of a merchant comprehends articles entirely different from the stock of a farmer; but the terms in all cases, apply to personal property only. ib.

The insurance also was 66 on household furniture," and the plaintiff claimed to recover for the loss of five portraits, with their frames, twelve silver tablespoons, twelve tea-spoons, and a silver sugar-tongs. Defendants objected, because the 8th condition annexed to the policy provided that "jewels, plate, &c. should not be included in any insurance, unless specified in the policy." But the Chief Justice charged the Jury, "that although plate and paintings" were not covered by the policy, unless specified, yet he doubted, whether the condition could be applied to the portraits, or silver spoons specified in the plaintiff's schedule; and he accordingly instructed the jury to consider them as covered by the policy. Upon exception taken, Held, that the charge of the Judge was correct. ib.

The stock of a baker "contained in a framed dwelling-house and bakehouse, front and rear, situated at No. 17 Thames st." Thirty barrels of flour, were stored under a shed which led from the bake-house to the front house, and the judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the flour thus stored. Moadinger v. The Mechanic's Fire Ins. Co. 2 Hall, 490.

4. Commencement and Duration of the Contract.

In general the risk commences from the signing of the policy, the payment of the premium, or of a deposite on account thereof; and it will in general end with the term for which it is made. In England insurances against fire are in general either annual, or for a term of seven years, at an annual premium; and the offices as an indulgence to the assured, generally allow fifteen days from the expiration of each year; and the assured is considered under the protection of the policy till the expiration of the fifteen days, provided the premium be paid within that time. Ellis, p. 49.

The plaintiffs stipulated to pay £7 10s. half-yearly on the 10th day of June and the 10th day of December, and that they would, as long as the managers agreed to accept the same, make their payments within the 15 days after the time limited; but no insurance is to take place until the premium be actually paid. The continuation of the term, therefore, depends on two circumstances, which may both concur, namely, that the insured should pay the £7 10s. and that the insurers should agree to accept that sum. Barely stating these facts is sufficient to show that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover." The judgment was afterwards affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber. See Hughes on Ins. 508. Soon after this decision the Royal Exchange Assu. Co., the Phoenix, and some other companies, gave notice that they did not mean to take advantage of the judgment so pronounced, but would hold themselves liable for any loss during the 15 days which are allowed for the payment of the renewed premium upon annual policies, and others for a longer period, but that every policy for a shorter period than a year would cease at six o'clock in the evening of the day mentioned therein. Ib. By a policy under seal referring to certain printed proposals, a fire office insured the defendant's premises from the 11th of November, 1802, to the 25th December, 1803, for a certain premium, which was to be paid yearly on each 25th of December; and the insurance was to continue so long as the insured should pay the premium at the said times and the office should agree to accept it. And by the printed proposals, it was stipulated that the insured should make all future payments annually at the office within fifteen days after the day limited by the policy, on pain of forfeiting the benefit thereof, and that no insurance was to take effect till the premium was paid. And by a subsequent advertisement (agreed to be taken as part of the policy) the office engaged that all persons insured there, by policies for a year or more, had been and should be considered as insured for fifteen days beyond the time of the expiration of their policies. Notwithstanding this latter clause, the assured having, before the expiration of the year, had notice from the office to pay an increased premium for the year ensuing, otherwise they would not continue the insurance, which the assured had refused; the office was held not liable for a loss which had happened within fifteen days from the expiration of the year for which the assurance was made; though the assured, after the loss, and before the fifteen days expired, tendered the the full premium which had been demanded. The effect of the whole contract taken to