the school. For M. Comte has modified the motto of Positivism, "Vivre POUR autrui," and changed it for the benefit of himself and his acolytes into " Vivre PAR autrui.” In the original conception of Positivism, the Philosophy of the sciences was contemplated as a corrective for the confusion and segregation of scientific studies, which were regarded as at once effects and causes of the prevalent anarchy of the intellect. In order to restore system and unity to these dispersed pursuits, it was deemed important that one class of intellectual labourers should devote themselves to the general principles and harmonious relations of all the sciences.* The true Positive philosophers were to constitute this class; and, in the fullness of time, were to have as a central committee, the general regulation of all intellectual exercises, and of all the applications of science to government, society, and arts. When the Positive Philosophy was sublimated into the Positive Religion, a change declared to be henceforth imperative, this central committee was raised to the dignity of a College of Cardinals, and invested with complete spiritual and intellectual dominion; and a clergy was extemporised to form the ministers of a new Church Universal, limited neither by time nor by space, -neither by differences of language nor of civilization. Henceforward a grand Sociocracy, whose capital was to be Paris, was to replace, with larger powers, and a more arrogant supremacy, the effete and antiquated authority of the Roman hierarchy. The kingdom of the new revelation was to be of this world; though the clergy were to renounce all temporal honours and authority, and to subsist only on the voluntary contributions of the faithful, until a regenerate public may, about the beginning of the next century, assign lands and revenues for the maintenance of the Church of Humanity. There are many profound and just views incidentally struck out in this development of the small band of Positive Philosophers into a grand hierarchy. Even the voluntary support of the clergy,' and their renunciation of wealth, suggest an important truth, when we regard them as the representatives of intelligence. Intellect is the free gift of God, bestowed less for the benefit of its immediate possessor, than for the general service of humanity, not to be the instrument of individual gain, but the agency to further the general good. If "wisdom will be justified of her children," the justification must consist in the service rendered to society, not in the pecuniary accumulations of her favourites. They should not come into the market-place, and to the tables of the money-changers to compete with the multitude for temporal honours and gain, but, aloof from all lower motives, should pursue without coarse temptations their noble vocation, and receive their maintenance from those whom they serve. When genius is directed to profit, intellect is warped from true aims, perverted to wrong ends, and prostituted to ignoble purposes. It is corrupted at its source; it ministers to vice or frivolity rather than to virtue, and spreads desolation where its mission was to fertilize and invigorate. The manner in which M. Comte himself explains the concatenation of his Sociological and religious system with his Philosophy is curious. It depends upon the succession and relations of the organs of the brain, that is, upon Phrenology. After many attempts, he has drawn up a craniological chart for himself, which owes little to Gall and Spurzheim. though the former is earnestly eulogized, But the new Phrenology rests apparently on no anatomical observation of the brain, and on no study of the protuberances of the skull, but simply on-conjecture. It is determined by no scientific process, but subjectively, deductively, chimerically. But even in M. Comte's wildest extravagances there is ingenuity and instruction; and, although we are no believers in Phrenology, and cannot consider his map of the brain as anything but an imaginary delineation of a terra incognita, we regard it as an exceedingly acute but problematical analysis of the mental and moral faculties of man. It is from this ideal Phrenology that he derives his doctrine of the subordination of action to intelligence, and of reason to sentiment. The extension of this subordination to society determines the position, in the social scale, of the multitude, the rulers, and the priesthood; and the order of the family relations in private life. In this way, Sociology is connected with Cosmology, the Positive Politics with the positive Philosophy, the religion of Humanity with the theory of the world. The link is fanciful and arbitrary, but it serves M. Comte's immediate purposes; and it would have been difficult to dispense with some such assistance to close the chasm between mind and matter, over which Kant and Fichte, Hegel and Schelling in vain attempted to construct a bridge. At an earlier stage of this investigation we pointed out the necessity for some theory of the mind before proceeding to the theory It is, indeed, a lofty and inspiriting, as it is a most seductive idea, to imagine that there is a common and discoverable law running through all the parts of creation and all the departments of knowledge, identical throughout in its spirit, but modified by the changing circumstances of its application, and blending by its power all the forms and phenomena of the visible and intelligible universe into a symmetrical whole. Such is the vision of unity by which M. Comte has been visited. But is the idea anything more than a dazzling dream? Is not this substitution of the vague longing of the human mind for rest,-when its wing is weary with wandering through the immense spheres of contemplation, for the apprehension of realities which lie beyond. mortal keen? If there be a perfect unity spread out in the works of creation before the omniscient eye of God, is this unity cognizable in our science or philosophy? Does not the supposition spring rather from the weak and arrogant delusion, that we know all that can be known and all that exists, rather than from the true philosophic spirit of anxious and continuous inquiry? Is it not of itself a valid proof that the orbit of the Positive Philosophy is too confined to comprehend the truth? moral or of social action. This necessity | system to attempt it by arbitary parallelisms. weighed upon M. Comte, and a Psychology of some sort was felt to be essential. He had laughed to scorn the Experimental Psychology of the Scottish school, which he had declared to be a contradiction in terms.* Phrenology offered the only plank by which he could hope to cross the dark abyss which separated the worlds of matter and of mind. He clutched at it eagerly; and we have the result. There was another advantage, too, in this acceptance of Phrenology; it enabled him to coerce theory of mind,—we will not say how judiciously or consistently, into the intermediate domain of Biology; and the weak threads which connected it with the other parts of that science were strengthened, or at least multiplied, by exaggerating the analogies between animal and vegetable nature, and between the instincts of animals and the reason and sentiments of man. These links are augmented in the Politique Positive until it is difficult to say whether the quaint speculations on the mutual relations of humanity and the brute creation are more ridiculous or disgusting. It is gravely asserted that the various races of animals tend to constitute so many different Supreme Beings. They are represented as Fetichists in religion, with occasional manifestations of rudimentary polytheism. The contest for the honour of composing the true Supreme Being' is limited to man and the other carnivorous animals. A rude form of political organization may be detected among the brutes; but its further development is prevented by the want of an articulate language, and this is denied them by their imperfect social aggregation, consequent on the oppression of the human race— a notable reciprocation of evils! Unfortunately, the only records which throw light on this difficult subject are to be found in the Arabian Nights' Entertainments. The supremacy of Humanity over animality has not, it seems, been obtained without a struggle, by which the sociability of the inferior animals has been crushed. It is supposed that much light might be thrown on these topics, by achieving sundry Sociological voyages into those countries which are favourable to the establishment of societies of monkeys or baboons! Besides the intervention of Phrenology, and ts dependent associations, there are other kinds by which the religious and ecclesiastical scheme of Positivism is united with the system of the Philosophy; and they are skilfully managed, though often rather ingeniously constructed than solid. It is a false view of *Cours de Phil. Pos., vol. i. pp. 34-38. Syst. Pol. Pos., vol. i. p. 616, &c. Notwithstanding the efforts of M. Comte to conceal the rent between the two systems, we think the schism such as not to render hist intolerance inexcusable, when he declares in his last circular that none shall henceforth pretend to the designation of Positivists— 66 un titre destinè bientôt á procurer l'estime publique," who do not accept his religious creed as well as his scientific doctrine. There is no sufficient continuity to justify this early recourse to the excommunicatory functions of his Pontificate by the Patriarch of Positivism. For ourselves, we abjure both systems; and the thunders, not only of the Vatican but of Rue-Monsieur-le-Prince, pass harmlessly over our heads. Yet we discover less inconsistency in adhesion to either segment of the grand scheme, than in the acceptance of both. The adoption of the Philosophy may encourage scientific studies, though it cannot ennoble them. The reception of the Religion may generate a dreamy inclination towards social re-organization, though it must lead its communicants into mystical labyrinths which are lighted only by the bewildering fires of a frenzied imagination. Either choice is equally pernicious; and from neither can we expect that revival of moral sentiment, and that puri fication of intelligence, which are declared to be essential to the removal of the universal anarchy of the modern world. But truth casts her shadow over even the wastes of delusion; and never was the beau little that is objectionable, but it also offers little that is novel, except the mode of representation. With much that is extravagant in language is mingled, according to the habitual fortune of M. Comte, much that is acute and ingenious. His notions in regard to the language of signs are pushed to excess: his fancies about the language of animals are simply ridiculous. tiful intermixture of the spirit of rejected | theory of the family presents comparatively truth with the essence of accepted error more signally manifested than in the Statique Sociale. Its base rests upon the clouds and vanishes at the first breath of day inte mist: but it is the mist of the morning, which heralds the approach of the sun, and drinks in brilliant hues from the coming fountain of light. It presents, along with many aberrations, many glorious anticipations of doctrines which a truly regenerate age will hasten to recognise. Its particular provisions and its special forms will be rejected as arbitrary, inexpedient, or impracticable: the extravagance of its conclusions will be softened down into more natural and spontaneous arrangements; and its dream of a religion will give place to that Christianity, which requires only to be revived in the hearts of men, to achieve with power and permanence and security, in the actual life of individuals and states, more than the Positive Religion contemplates even in theory. It, too, can alone realize M. Comte's lofty aspirations :-the subordination once again of the presumption of rights to the sense of duty, according to his noble phylactery, "nul n'a droit qu'à faire son devoir." The dogmatic asseveration of the absolute truth of his Social Science ill accords with the sobriety of genuine philosophy, though it may be necessary to the pretensions of the professed founder of a new religion, and the evangelist of a new creed. Yet, when we forget the Positive religion and all its accessaries, and overlook the whole mythology and hierarchy of the worship of Humanity, we cannot accord to the Social Statics the full praise anticipated. There is much profound truth; but there is also grievous error; there are brilliant glimpses into a region of lofty and novel philosophy, but there are still more frequent plunges into the mire of ancient delusion. The theory is incomplete, and not sufficiently comprehensive. The internal distribution is liable to similar objections. Its originality is more apparent than real, and is due less to novelty of invention, than to the peculiar expression of too restricted views. M. Comte bestows cordial eulogy on Aristotle, as the founder of Social Statics, but he is far from appreciating his intellectual services, the general signification of his philosophy, or the results of his political speculations. The Positive theory of material property does not include the origin, nature, conditions, or justice of property, though these questions form the basis for a large part of all legislation, and for the whole subject of public ecoIt is content to explain some of the more striking effects of property, pointing out its necessity, and its beneficial operation,even when accumulated into large capitals. The nomy. The three concluding chapters of the Statique Sociale, are in many respects admirable, and constitute the ablest portion of the work. They are devoted to "the theory of the social organism of social existence," -a somewhat fantastic distinction, and of the general limits of the varations of human order in consequence of extrinsic or intrinsic influence. The last theory is sketched merely in outline, the task completing it being reserved by M. Comte for his successor. But the few lines of his picture are drawn with a bold and firm hand, and are marked with the impress of consummate genius. It comports neither with our plan nor with our limits, to examine in detail these valuable chapters. An abridgment would be tedious as well as unsatisfactory, for it would require the accompaniment of a running commentary. We, therefore, omit the summary which we had prepared. We resign ourselves to this omission with the less hesitation, as it enables us for once to commend M. Comte's views in broad terms. We do not wholly agree with them, but we can enjoy the satisfaction of lavishing upon them liberal praise. They furnish acute and luminous suggestions in regard to many most important topics connected with the organization and amelioration of society, and tend to modify the censure which we are compelled to pass on the Systeme de Politique Positive as a whole. In this latter work the rigid logical concatenation and the orderly sequence of the parts of the theory are no longer preserved with that regularity and simplicity which characterized Philosophie Positive; or does the composition seem to have emanated from the same full comprehension of the subject. In fact, the peculiar mission of Comte was ended with the close of his earlier work: the latter is an excrescence, though professedly an application only. That he does not himself clearly appreciate the nature of his second task is manifest from the remark, that "it was due to the original'equilibrium of his moral and intellectual powers, that he had enjoyed the philosophical privilege of consecrating in turn his youth and his maturity to two grand reciprocal elaborations, each of which seemed reserved for the other age. According to his contemplated aims and plans, according to every principle of his Philosophy, and the | be eminently relative, but is virtually absolute, whole tenor of his speculations, the order because it rejects everything which transcends which his career has pursued, was that which scientific demonstration. And his hope of was theoretically appropriate. The study, constructing a self-contained philosophy of arrangement, and re-organization of the the sciences is a delusion because no metaphysciences necessarily preceded the renovation sical foundation is left whereon it may rest. and re-construction of societies, in accordance We will not deny the practicability of deviswith the spirit of Positivism. But in his ing such a philosophy, but the indispensable second System, M. Comte has materially modi- preliminary to its creation would be the recogfied his original views, abandoning in some nition of principles incapable of scientific desort their exclusive phenomenalism, though monstration, and requiring metaphysical costill yearning for the shadow, and has thus ordination. plunged into a sea of mysticism from which he entirely escaped in his earlier labours. It may be that this has infected his recent compositions; that his improvisation of an antichristian theology has misled and bewildered him; but the Politique Positive is certainly characterized by a vague, loose, and indefinite complexion. M. Comte manifests openly his mystical appetencies, thus approximating in old age to that St. Simonism which he repudiated in early life, and still passionately disaVOWS. After the dry and logical precision of his former course, he loses himself at the close of his career in sounding generalities; and at the termination of our long journey through both hemispheres of Positivism, we find neither a complete, comprehensive, and homogeneous system, nor a practical and available scheme to relieve the distress of modern society. It only remains for us to draw to a focus the various lines of this investigation, and thus determine the general spirit and prospects of Positivism. There is abundant proof that, even if we dismiss the charge that Positivism is involved in the philosophy of Kant, as a part is contained in the whole, still as a whole it is not original. It is no advance in the march of philosophy, but rather a return towards its cradle. It links itself with the Sensationalism of the last century, is closely assimilated to St. Simonism, and presents many points of contact with the humanitarianism of Hegel, and the mythicism of Strauss. In every aspect it is rather a simplification and consolidation of past delusions, than an anticipation of coming truth. It is the dream of the by-gone, not the magic mirror of the future. While partially true, as the theory of those parts of knowledge which the exclusive devotion of the late centuries to Physical Science has brought to provisional perfection, it lends no aid to the re-construction of those branches which have been neglected, and offers no effectual ministration towards the revival of more enlightened religious influences, nor to the reorganization of societies. Nay, its influence is cast into the opposite scale. It deplores, As a speculative system, the Positive Philo- indeed, the ascendency of the intellect over sophy is invalid, for the exclusion of every- the heart, and promises to dethrone the thing but phenomena,-as M. Comte employs usurper; but its adoption would result only that term, leaves our knowledge without real- in the consolidation of the intellectual power ity, and science without foundation. Its ex- which it condemns. The functions of its clusive pretensions alone are erroneous, for priest-hood spring from their appropriation of observational science should without doubt all higher knowledge-the knowledge of the profess no more than the discovery and ap- laws of nature and of humanity; their power plication of phenomenal laws; but reason is formally declared to consist in its intellecequally requires a tenacious conviction in the tual supremacy: their preaching is to be dereality of agencies, not to be scientifically ex-voted to the diffusion of popular science or 'seplained, which operate behind the phenomena and determine their evolutions. The union of both these aspects in one philosophy is the distinguishing merit of the Scottish school and, on a liberal interpretation, of Kant. The adoption of the last important half, and the absolute exclusion of the other, is the grave error of M. Comte, on which his other errors more or less directly depend. The philosophy of Kant was purely relative, because limited to human range by the exact determination of the bounds and conditions of science imposed by the constitution of the human mind. The theory of M. Comte professes to cularism;' and the chief instrument of their action is to be education. The whole tenor of M. Comte's writings confirms the conviction that his system does re-instate intellect in the sovereignty from which he pretends to depose her. And this is only one symptom of the affinity of Positivism for past or present rather than prospective doctrines. With reverted eyes, and gaze fixed upon the present and the past, it walks backwards along the line of advancement, and explores the future in the clouds of the evening, not in the promises of the dawn. These conclusions acquire more than double force from the consideration of the Positive religion, a creed at variance with the scien- | latest and earliest ages of the past as the tific principles and development of Positivism. Religion of Humanity is, be contemplated as Chaos is renewed when this notion, borrowed on the whole an advancement in either from the outrageous idealism of the Hegelian speculative or practical knowledge? It is school, incorporates the mystical mythicism of preposterous to ask the question in relation Strauss, with the chimeras of St. Simonism to practice. The social system which trusts and the dry formalism of science, and baptizes to such a sanction is fatally pierced by the the conglomerate fantasy with the new name broken reed on which it leans. Whatever is of the Religion of Humanity." Doubtless admirable in M. Comte's incidental views the dreamy tentatives of French Eclecticism loses its efficacy by association with his aided and expedited the unnatural transmigra- general principles and his polity. Hence we tion and superposition of souls, which have see the founder of a system of Politics,only acted, however, as the solvent of the claiming to be prophetic because asserted to body they were intended to animate. But it be scientific, altering its text to conceal the is no Promethean fire stolen from heaven: it failure of its oracles; proclaiming the definite is no Prometheus who has arrogated to him- institution of the French Republic on the eve self the task of gods. The heterogeneous of the inauguration of the Empire; fawning materials will not mingle; they are only on the autocrat whom it had ridiculed as a compacted together. If the substance of the charlatan; and trampling in the dust before new religion is borrowed from Strauss,-if such a shadow may be dignified with the name of substance, its forms and vesture are taken from the Catholicism of the Middle Ages; and all its appetencies lead it back through the deepening mists of time to the darkness of primeval Fetichism. Fortunately for our exposition, the Fetichistic tendencies of Positivism are distinctly avowed by M. Comte himself. But is this to be the church of the Future? Can we recognise, as a sign of the proud emergence of civilisation into the splendour of its brightest day, this recurrence to that worship of animals which degraded the ignorance and brutality of its ignorant and undisciplined infancy? There are some poisons, and those the most active and deleterious, which can only be obtained by sublimation. In the same way, the essence of all the religious delusions of the past ages may be concentrated in the scientific alembic of Positivism. Apart from the blasphemy of the fantastic dream, can a creed, so steeped in the wildest errors of the his feet that liberty whose triumph it had "Anticipator Mundi, Quem facturus erat." The |