acting under the eye, and expofed to the pu nifhment of God, the great avenger of injuf tice, is a motive capable of reftraining the moft headftrong paffions, with thofe at least who, by conftant reflection, have rendered it familiar to them.

It is in this manner that religion enforces the natural fenfe of duty and hence it is, that mankind are generally difpofed to place great confidence in the probity of thofe who feem deeply impreffed with religious fentiments. Such perfons, they imagine, act under an additional tye, befides those which regulate the conduct of other men. The regard to the propriety of action as well as to reputation, the regard to the applause of his breaft, own a

as well as to that of others, are motives which they fuppofe have the fame influence over the religious man, as over the man of the world. But the former lies under another restraint, and never acts deliberately but as in the prefence of that Great Superior who is finally to recompenfe him according to his deeds. A greater truft is repofed, upon this account, in the regularity and exactnefs of his conduct. And wherever the natural principles of religion are not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of fome worthlefs cabal; wherever the firft duty which it requires, is to fulfil alls the obligations of morality; wherever men are not taught to regard frivolous obfervances, as more immediate duties of religion, than acts of justice and beneficence and to imagine, that by facrifices and ceremonies, and vain fupplications,

fupplications, they can bargain with the Deity. for fraud, and perfidy, and violence, the world undoubtedly judges right in this refpect, and justly places a double confidence in the rectitude of the religious man's behaviour.orly. used of veilionat

narraba noigilst tadt og eldr ni at I redholi song! HA PubIV. vel termen sala ausa vurig et beleqib yllensus am brittura In what cafes the fenfe of duty ought to be the fole principle of our conduct and in what cafes it ought to concur with other motives.dong da.2 esblod „ort lagsbil

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ELIGION affords fuch strong moss tives to the practice of virtue, and guards us by fuch powerful reftraints from the temptations of vice, that many have been led to fuppofe, that religious principles were the fole laudable motives of action. We oughtneither, they said, to reward from gratitude, nor punish from refentment; we ought neither to protect the helplessness of our children, nor afford fupport to the infirmities of our parents, from natural affection. All affections for particular objects, ought to be ex-tinguifhed in our breaft, and one great affection take the place of all others, the love of the Deity, the defire of rendering ourselves. agreeable to him, and of directing our conduct in every refpect according to his will. Wer ought not to be grateful from gratitude, we ought not to be charitable from humanity, we ought not to be public-fpirited from the love of our country, nors generous and just from „proftroilqqut

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ན་

the

Part III. the love of mankind. The fole principle and motive of our conduct in the performance of all thofe different duties, ought to be a fenfe that God has commanded us to perform them. I fhall not at present take time to examine this opinion particularly; I fhall only obferve, that we fhould not have expected to have found it entertained by any fect, who profeffed themfelves of a religion in which, as it is the first precept to love the Lord our God with all our heart, with all our foul, and with all our ftrength, fo it is the fecond to love our neighbour as we love ourselves; and we love ourfelves furely for our own fakes, and not merely because we are commanded to do fo. That the fenfe of duty fhould be the fole principle of our conduct, is no where the precept of Christianity; but that it fhould be the ruling and the governing one, as philofophy, and as, indeed, common fenfe directs. It may be a queftion however, in what cafes our actions ought to arife chiefly or entirely from a fenfe of duty, or from a regard to general rules; and in what cafes fome other fentiment or affection ought to concur, and have a principal influence.

The decifion of this question, which cannot, perhaps, be given with any very great accuracy, will depend upon two different circumftances; firft, upon the natural agreeablenefs or deformity of the fentiment or affection which would prompt us to any action independent of all regard to general rules; and fecondly, upon the precision and exactnefs, or

the

the loofenefs and inaccuracy of the general rules themselves e'ni Bubnoɔ no la evitori

I. First, I fay, it will depend upon the natural ageeableness or deformity of the affection itself, how far our actions ought to arife from its or entirely proceed from a regard to the general rule ou bod y d

རྩྭ

All thofe graceful and admired actions, to which the benevolent affections, would prompt us, ought to proceed as much from the paffions themselves, as from any regard to the general rules of conduct. A benefactor thinks himfelf but ill requited, if the person upon whom he has bestowed his good offices, repays them merely from a cold fenfe of duty, and without any affection to his perfon. A hufband is diffatisfied with the moft obedient wife, when he imagines her conduct is animated by no other principle befides her regard to what the relation fhe ftands in requires. Though a fon fhould fail in none of the offices of filial duty, yet if he wants that affectionate reverence which it fo well becomes him to feel, the parent may juftly complain of his indifference. Nor could a fon be quite fatisfied, with a parent who, though he performed all the duties of his fituation, had nothing of that fatherly fondnefs which might have been expected from him. With regard to all fuch benevolent and focial affections, it is agreeable to fee the fenfe of duty employed rather to reftrain than to enliven them, rather to hinder us from doing too much, than to prompt us to do what we ought. It gives

us

Part III. us pleasure to fee a father obliged to check? his own fondnefs, a friend obliged to fet bounds to his natural generofity, a perfong who has received a benefit, obliged to restrain! the too fanguine gratitude of his own temper. 1

The contrary maxim takes place with regard to the malevolent and unfocial paffions. We ought to reward from the gratitude and generofity of our own hearts, without any reluctance, and without being obliged to reflect how great the propriety of rewarding: but we ought always to punish with reluctance, and more from a fenfe of the propriety of punifhing, than from any favage difpofi tion to revenge. Nothing is more graceful than the behaviour of the man who appears to refent the greatest injuries, more from a fense that they deferve, and are the proper objects of refentment, than from feeling himfelf the furies of that difagreeable paffion s who, like a judge, confiders only the general rule, which determines what vengeance is due for each particular offence; who, in executing that rule, feels lefs for what himfelf has fuffered, than what the offender is 1 about to fuffer; who, though in wrath remembers mercy, and is difpofed to interpret the rule in the moft gentle and favourable manner, and to allow all the alleviations which the most candid humanity could, consistently with good fenfe, admit of.bog oz miyura varto

As the selfish paffions, according to what has formerly been obferved, hold in other ren spects ts a fort of middle place, between the b