provocation is not so extraordinary, as to justify fo violent a paffion. We fhould have indulged, we fay perhaps, have approved of the violence of his emotion, had the cause been in any refpect proportioned to it.

When we judge in this manner of any affection, as proportioned or difproportioned to the cause which excites it, it is fcarce poffible that we should make use of any other rule or canon but the correfpondent affection in ourfelves. If, upon bringing the cafe home to our own breaft, we find that the fentiments which it gives occafion to, coincide and tally with our own, we neceffarily approve of them as proportioned and suitable to their objects; if otherwife, we neceffarily disapprove of them, as extravagant and out of proportion.

Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your fight by my fight, of your ear by my ear, of your reafon by my reafon, of your refentment by my refentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them.

W

CHA P. IV.

The fame fubject continued.

E may judge of the propriety or impropriety of the fentiments of another person by their correfpondence or difa

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greement

greement with our own, upon two different occafions; either, firft, when the objects which excite them are confidered without any peculiar relation, either to ourselves or to the perfon whofe fentiments we judge of; or, fecondly, when they are confidered as peculiarly affecting one or other of us.

1. With regard to thofe objects which are confidered without any peculiar relation either to ourselves or to the perfon whofe fentiments we judge of; wherever his fentiments intirely correfpond with our own, we afcribe to him the qualities of tafte and good judgment. The beauty of a plain, the greatness of a mountain, the ornaments of a building, the expreffion of a picture, the compofition of a difcourfe, the conduct of a third perfon, the proportions of different quantities and numbers, the various appearances which the great machine of the univerfe is perpetually exhibiting, with the fecret wheels and fprings which produce them; all the general subjects of fcience and taste, are what we and our companions regard, as having no peculiar relation to either of us. We both look at them from the fame point of view, and we have no occafion for fympathy, or for that imaginary change of fituations from which it arifes, in order to produce, with regard to these, the moft perfect harmony of fentiments and affections. If, notwithstanding, we are often differently affected, it arifes either from the different degrees of attention, which our different habits of life allow us to give easily to

the

the feveral parts of thofe complex objects, or from the different degrees of natural acutenefs in the faculty of the mind to which they are addressed.

When the fentiments of our companion coincide with our own in things of this kind, which are obvious and eafy, and in which, perhaps, we never found a fingle perfon who differed from us, though we, no doubt, muft approve of them, yet he seems to deferve no praife or admiration on account of them. But when they not only coincide with our own, but lead and direct our own; when in forming them he appears to have attended to many things which we had overlooked, and to have adjusted them to all the various circumstances of their objects; we not only approve of them, but wonder and are furprised at their uncommon and unexpected acuteness and comprehenfivenefs, and he appears to deserve a very high degree of admiration and applaufe. For approbation heightned by wonder and furprife, conftitutes the fentiment which is properly called admiration, and of which applaufe is the natural expreffion. The decifion of the man who judges that exquifite beauty is preferable to the groffeft deformity, or that twice two are equal to four, muft certainly be approved of by all the world, but will not, furely, be much admired. It is the acute and delicate difcernment of the man of tafte, who diftinguishes the minute, and fearce perceptible, differences of beauty and deformity; it is the comprehensive

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comprehenfive accuracy of the experienced mathematician, who unravels, with ease, the most intricate and perplexed proportions; it is the great leader in fcience and tafte, the man who directs and conducts our own fentiments, the extent and fuperior juftness of whofe talents aftonifh us with wonder and furprife, who excites our admiration and feems to deferve our applaufe: and upon this foundation is grounded the greater part of the praise which is bestowed upon what are called the intellectual virtues..

The utility of thofe qualities, it may be thought, is what first recommends them to us; and, no doubt, the confideration of this, when we come to attend to it, gives them a new value. Originally, however, we approve of another man's judgment, not as fomething useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality and it is evident we attribute thofe qualities to it for no other reafon but because we find that it agrees with our own. Tafte, in the fame manner, is originally approved of, not as ufeful, but as just, as delicate and as precisely fuited to its object. The idea of the utility of all qualities of this kind, is plainly an afterthought, and not what first recommends them to our approbation.

2. With regard to thofe objects, which affect in a particular manner either ourselves or the person whofe fentiments we judge of, it is at once more difficult to preserve this harmony and correfpondence, and at the fame

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time, vaftly more important. My companion does not naturally look upon the miffortune that has befallen me, or the injury that has been done me, from the fame point of view in which I confider them. They affect me much more nearly. We do not view them from the fame station, as we do a picture, or a poem, or a fyftem of philofophy, and are, therefore, apt to be apt to be very differently affected by them. But I can much more eafily overlook the want of this correfpondence of fentiments with regard to fuch : indifferent objects as concern neither me nor my companion, than with regard to what interefts me fo much as the misfortune that has befallen me, or the injury that has been done me. Though you despise that picture, or that poem, or even that fyftem of philofophy, which I admire, there is little danger of our quarrelling upon that account. Neither of us can reasonably be much interefted about them. They ought all of them to be matters of great indifference to us both; fo that, though our opinions may be oppofite, our affections may ftill be very nearly the fame. But it is quite otherwife with regard to thofe objects by which either you or I are particularly affected. Though your judgments in matters of fpeculation, though your fentiments in matters of tafte, are quite oppofite to mine, I can eafily overlook this oppofition; and if I have any degree of temper, I may ftill find fome entertainment in your converfation, seven upon thofe very fubjects.

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