pofe to attempt upon what has no fenfibility. Animals, therefore, are lefs improper objects of gratitude and refentment than inanimated objects. The dog that bites, the ox that gores, are both of them punished. If they have been the caufes of the death of any perfon, neither the public, nor the relations of the flain, can be fatisfied, unless they are put to death in their turn: nor is this merely for the fecurity of the living, but, in fome meafure, to revenge the injury of the dead." Thofe animals, on the contrary, that have been remarkably serviceable to their mafters, become the objects of a very lively gratitude. We are fhocked at the brutality of that officer, mentioned in the Turkish Spy, who ftabbed the horse that had carried him a-crofs an arm of the fea, left that animal fhould afterwards. diftinguish some other perfon by a fimilar ad

venture.

But, though animals are not only the caufes of pleasure and pain, but are alfo capable of feeling those fenfations, they are still far from being compleat and perfect objects, either of gratitude or refentment; and those paffions till feel, that there is fomething wanting to their entire gratification. What gratitude chiefly defires, is not only to make the benefactor feel pleasure in his turn, but to make him confcious that he meets with this reward on account of his paft conduct, to make him. pleased with that conduct, and to fatisfy him, that the perfon upon whom he bestowed his good offices was not unworthy of them,

What

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What most of all charms us in our benefactor, is the concord between his fentiments and our own, with regard to what interests us fo nearly as the worth of our own character, and the esteem that is due to us. We are delighted to find a perfon who values us as we value ourselves, and diftinguishes us from the reft of mankind, with an attention not unlike that with which we diftinguish ourselves. To maintain in him thefe agreeable and flattering fentiments, is one of the chief ends propofed by the returns we are difpofed to make to him. A generous mind often difdains the interested thought of extorting new favours from its benefactor, by what may be called the importunities of its gratitude. But to preferve and to increase his esteem, is an intereft which the greatest mind does not think unworthy of its attention. And this is the foundation of what I formerly obferved, that when we cannot enter into the motives of our benefactor, when his conduct and character appear unworthy of our approbation, let his fervices have been ever fo great, our gratitude is always fenfioly diminished. We are lefs flattered by the diftinction; and to preferve the esteem of fo weak, or fo worthlefs a patron, feems to be an object which does not deserve to be pursued for its own fake.

The object, on the contrary, which refentment is chiefly intent upon, is not fo much to make our enemy feel pain in his turn, as to make him confcious that he feels it upon account of his paft conduct, to make him re

pent of that conduct, and to make him fenfible, that the perfon whom he injured did not deferve to be treated in that manner. What chiefly enrages us against the man who injures or infults us, is the little account which he feems to make of us, the unreasonable preference which he gives to himself above us, and that abfurd felf-love, by which he seems to imagine, that other people may be facrificed at any time, to his conveniency or his humour. The glaring impropriety of this conduct, the grofs infolence and injuftice which it seems to involve in it, often fhock and exafperate us more than all the mischief which we have fuffered. To bring him back to a more just sense of what is due to other people, to make him sensible of what he owes us, and of the wrong that he has done to us, is frequently the principal end proposed in our revenge, which is always imperfect when it cannot accomplish this. When our enemy, appears to have done us no injury, when we are fenfible that he acted quite properly, that; in his fituation, we fhould have done the fame thing, and that we deserved from him all the mischief we met with; in that cafe, if we have the least spark either of candour or juftice, we can entertain no fort of re fentment.

Before any thing, therefore, can be the compleat and proper object, either of gratitude or refentment, it muft poffefs three different qualifications. First, it must be the cause of pleasure in the one cafe, and of pain

in the other. Secondly, it must be capable of feeling thofe fenfations. And, thirdly, it must not only have produced thofe fenfations, but it must have produced them from defign, and from a defign that is approved of in the one cafe, and difapproved of in the other. It is by the firft qualification, that any object is capable of exciting thofe paffions: it is by the fecond, that it is in any refpect capable of gratifying them the third qualification is both neceffary for their compleat fatisfaction, and as it gives a pleasure or pain that is both exquifite and peculiar, it is likewife an additional exciting cause of those paffions.

1

As what gives pleasure or pain, therefore, either in one way or another, is the fole exciting caufe of gratitude and resentment; though the intentions of any perfon should be ever fo proper and beneficent, on the one hand, or ever fo improper and malevolent on the other; yet, if he has failed in producing either the good or the evil which he intended, as one of the exciting caufes is wanting in both cafes, lefs gratitude feems due to him in the one, and lefs refentment in the other. And, on the contrary, though in the intentions of any perfon, there was either no laudable degree of benovolence on the one hand, or no blameable degree of malice on the other; yet, if his actions should produce either great good or great evil, as one of the exciting caufes takes place upon both these occafions, fome gratitude is apt to arise towards him in the one, and fome refentment in the

other.

other. A fhadow of merit seems to fall upon him in the first, a fhadow of demerit in the fecond. And, as the confequences of actions are altogether under the empire of fortune, hence arifes her influence upon the fentiments of mankind, with regard to merit and demerit.

CHA P. II.

Of the extent of this influence of fortune.

T

HE effect of this influence of fortune

is, firft, to diminish our fense of the merit or demerit of those actions which arofe from the moft laudable or blameable intentions, when they fail of producing their propofed effects: and, fecondly, to increase our fenfe of the merit or demerit of actions, beyond what is due to the motives or affections from which they proceed, when they accidentally give occafion either to extraordinary pleasure or pain.

1. First, I fay, fay, though the intentions of any person should be ever fo proper and beneficent, on the one hand, or ever so improper and malevolent, on the other, yet, if they fail in producing their effects, his merit feems imperfect in the one cafe, and his demerit incompleat in the other. Nor is this irregula rity of fentiment felt only by those who are immediately affected by the consequences of any action. It is felt, in fome measure, even

by