Before I conclude this note, I muft take notice of a difference between the approbation of propriety and that of merit or beneficence. Before we approve of the fen

timents of any person as proper and fuitable to their objects, we must not only be affected in the fame manner as he is, but we muft perceive this harmony and correfpondence of fentiments between him and ourselves. Thus, though upon hearing of a misfortune that had be fallen my friend, I fhould conceive precifely that degree of concern which he gives way to; yet till I am informed of the manner in which he behaves, till I perceive the harmony between his emotions and mine, I cannot be faid to approve of the fentiments which influence his behaviour. The approbation of propriety therefore requires, not only that we fhould intirely fympathize with the perfon who acts, but that we fhould perceive this perfect concord between his fentiments and our own. On the contrary, when I hear of a benefit that has been bestowed upon another perfon, let him who has received it be affected in what manner he' pleafes, if, by bringing his cafe home to myself, I feel gratitude arife in my own breaft, I neceffarily approve of the conduct of his benefactor, and regard it as meritorious, and the proper object of reward. Whether the person who has received the benefit conceives gratitude or not, cannot, it is evident, in any degree alter our fentiments with regard to the merit of him who has bestowed it. No actual correfpondence of fentiments, therefore, is here required. It is fufficient that, if he was grateful, they would correspond; and our sense of merit is often founded upon one of thofe illufive fympathies, by which, when we bring home to ourselves the cafe of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the perfon principally concerned is incapable of being affected. There is a fimilar difference between our difapprobation of demerit, and that of impropriety.

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SECTION II.

Of justice and beneficence.

CHAP. I.

Comparison of those two virtues.

CTIONS of a beneficent tendency which proceed from proper motives feem alone to require reward; because fuch alone are the approved objects of gratitude, or excite the fympathetic gratitude of the spec

tator.

Actions of a hurtful tendency, which proceed from improper motives, seem alone to deferve punishment; because fuch alone are the approved objects of resentment, or excite the fympathetic refentment of the spectator.

Beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the meer want of it expofes to no punishment: because the meer want of beneficence tends to do no real pofitive evil. It may disappoint of the good which might reasonably have been expected, and upon that account it may juftly excite diflike and difapprobation: it cannot, however, provoke any refentment which mankind will go along with. The man who does not recompence his benefactor, when he has it in his power, and when his benefactor needs his

affiftance,

affistance, is, no doubt, guilty of the blackest ingratitude. The heart of every impartial fpectator rejects all fellow-feeling with the felfishness of his motives, and he is the proper object of the highest disapprobation. But ftill he does no pofitive hurt to any body. He only does not do that good which in propriety he ought to have done. He is the object of hatred, a paffion which is naturally excited by impropriety of fentiment and behaviour; not of refentment, a paffion which is never properly called forth but by actions which tend to do real and pofitive hurt to fome particular perfons. His want of gratitude, therefore, cannot be punished. To oblige him by force to perform what in gratitude he ought to perform, and what every impartial spectator would approve of him for performing, would, if poffible, be ftill more improper than his neglecting to perform it. His benefactor would dishonour himself if he attempted by violence to constrain him to gratitude, and it would be impertinent for any third perfon, who was not the fuperior of either, to intermeddle. But of all the duties of beneficence, those which gratitude recommends to us approach nearest to what is called a perfect and compleat obligation. What friendship, what generosity, what charity, would prompt us to do with universal approbation, is still more free, and can ftill lefs be extorted by force than the duties of gratitude. We talk of the debt of gratitude, not of charity, or generosity, nor even of friendship, when friend

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fhip.

fhip is meer efteem, and has not been enhanced and complicated with gratitude for good offices.

Refentment seems to have been given us by nature for defence, and for defence only. It is the fafeguard of juftice and the fecurity of innocence. It prompts us to beat off the mifchief which is attempted to be done to us, and to retaliate that which is already done; that the offender may be made to repent of his injuftice, and that others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified from being guilty of the like offence. It must be referved therefore for these purposes, nor can the fpectator ever go along with it when it is exerted for any other. But the meer want of the beneficent virtues, though it may difappoint us of the good which might reasonably be expected, neither does, nor attempts to do, any mifchief from which we can have occafion to defend ourselves.

There is, however, another virtue, of which the observance is not left to the freedom of our own wills, which may be extorted by force, and of which the violation exposes to refentment, and confequently to punishment. This virtue is juftice: the violation of justice is injury it does real and pofitive hurt to fome particular perfons, from motives which are naturally difapproved of. It is, therefore, the proper object of refentment, and of punifhment, which is the natural confequence of refentment. As mankind go along with, and approve of, the violence employed to

avenge the hurt which is done by injustice, fo they much more go along with, and approve of, that which is employed to prevent and beat off the injury, and to restrain the offender from hurting his neighbours. The perfon himself who meditates an injustice is fenfible of this, and feels that force may, with the utmost propriety, be made ufe of both by the perfon whom he is about to injure, and by others, either to obftruct the execution of his crime, or to punish him when he has executed it. And upon this is founded that remarkable distinction between justice and all the other focial virtues, which has of late - been particularly infifted upon by an author of very great and original genius, that we feel ourselves to be under a ftricter obligation to act according to justice, than agreeably to friendship, charity, or generofity; that the practice of these last mentioned virtues feems to be left in fome measure to our own choice, but that, fomehow or other, we feel ourfelves to be in a peculiar manner tyed, bound, and obliged to the observation of justice. We feel, that is to fay, that force may, with the utmost propriety and with the approbation of all mankind, be made ufe of to constrain us to observe the rules of the one, but not to follow the precepts of the other.

We must always, however, carefully dif tinguish what is only blameable, or the proper object of disapprobation, from what force may be employed either to punish or to prevent. That feems blameable which falls