us.

in the right, cannot but harden us against all fellow-feeling with the other, whom we neceffarily regard as in the wrong. Whatever this laft, therefore, may have fuffered, while it is no more than what we ourselves should have wished him to fuffer, while it is no more than what our own fympathetic indignation would have prompted us to inflict upon him, it cannot either displease or provoke When an inhuman murderer is brought to the fcaffold, though we have fome compaffion for his misery, we can have no fort of fellow-feeling with his refentment, if he fhould be so abfurd as to express any against either his profecutor or his judge. The natural tendency of their juft indignation against fo vile a criminal is indeed the most fatal and ruinous to him. But it is impoffible that we should be displeased with the tendency of a fentiment, which, when we bring the cafe home to ourselves, we feel that we cannot avoid adopting.

I.

CHA P. IV.

Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters.

W and heartily fympathife with the

E do not, therefore, thoroughly

gratitude of one man towards another, merely because this other has been the cause of his good fortune, unless he has been the cause of it from motives which we intirely go along with. Our heart must adopt the principles

of

of the agent, and go along with all the affections which influenced his conduct, before it can intirely fympathise with, and beat time to, the gratitude of the perfon who has been benefited by his actions. If in the conduct of the benefactor there appears to have been no propriety, how beneficial foever its effects, it does not feem to demand, or neceffarily to require, any proportionable recompence.

But when to the beneficent tendency of the action is joined the propriety of the affection from which it proceeds, when we intirely fympathife and go along with the motives of the agent, the love which we conceive for him upon his own account enhances and enlivens our fellow-feeling with the gratitude of those who owe their profperity to his good conduct. His actions seem then to demand, and, if I may fay fo, to call aloud for a proportionable recompenfe. We then intirely enter into that gratitude which prompts to beflow it. The benefactor feems then to be the proper object of reward, when we thus intirely fympathife with, and approve of, that fentiment which prompts to reward him. When we approve of, and go along with, the affection from which the action proceeds, we must neceffarily approve of the action, and regard the perfon towards whom it is directed as its proper and fuitable object.

2. In the fame manner, we cannot at all fympathife with the refentment of one man against another, merely because this other has been the caufe of his misfortune, unless

he

he has been the cause of it from motives which we cannot enter into. Before we can adopt the refentment of the fufferer, we must disapprove of the motives of the agent, and feel that our heart renounces all fympathy with the affections which influenced his conduct. If there appears to have been no impropriety in thefe, how fatal foever the tendency of the action which proceeds from them to those against whom it is directed, it does not seem to deserve any punishment, or to be the proper object of any refentment.

But when to the hurtfulness of the action is joined the impropriety of the affection from whence it proceeds, when our heart rejects with abhorrence all fellow-feeling with the motives of the agent, we then heartily and intirely fympathife with the refentment of the fufferer. Such actions feem then to deserve, and, if I may fay fo, to call aloud for, a proportionable punishment; and we entirely enter into, and thereby approve of, that refentment which prompts to inflict it. The offender neceffarily feems then to be the proper object of punishment, when we thus intirely fympathise with, and thereby approve of, that fentiment which prompts to punish. In this cafe too, when we approve, and go along with, the affection from which the action proceeds, we muft neceffarily approve of the action, and regard the perfon against whom it is directed, as its proper and suitable object.

CHAP.

I.

CHAP. V.

The analysis of the fenfe of merit and demerit.

S our fenfe, therefore, of the propriety of conduct arifes from what I fhall call a direct fympathy with the affections and motives of the perfon who acts, fo our fenfe of its merit arifes from what I fhall call an indirect fympathy with the gratitude of the person who is, if I may say so, acted upon.

As we cannot indeed enter thoroughly into the gratitude of the perfon who receives the benefit, unless we beforehand approve of the motives of the benefactor, fo, upon this account, the sense of merit seems to be a compounded fentiment, and to be made up of two distinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the fentiments of the agent, and an indirect fympathy with the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions.

We may, upon many different occafions, plainly distinguish those two different emotions combining and uniting together in our fenfe of the good defert of a particular character or action. When we read in hiftory concerning actions of proper and beneficent greatness of mind, how eagerly do we enter into fuch defigns? How much are we animated by that high-spirited generofity which directs them? How keen are we for their

fuccefs?

fuccefs? How grieved at their disappointment? In imagination we become the very person whose actions are reprefented to us : we transport ourselves in fancy to the scenes of those distant and forgotten adventures, and imagine ourselves acting the part of a a Scipio or a Camillus, a Timoleon or an Ariftides. So far our fentiments are founded upon the direct fympathy with the person who acts. Nor is the indirect fympathy with those who receive the benefit of such actions lefs fenfibly felt. Whenever we place ourselves in the fituation of thefe laft, with what warm and affectionate fellow-feeling do we enter into their gratitude towards those who served them fo effentially? We embrace, as it were, their benefactor along with them. Our heart readily fympathises with the highest transports of their grateful affection. No honours, no rewards, we think, can be too great for them to bestow upon him. When they make this proper return for his services, we heartily applaud and go along with them; but are fhocked beyond all measure, if by their conduct they appear to have little sense of the obligations conferred upon them. Our whole fense, in fhort, of the merit and good desert of fuch actions, of the propriety and fitness of recompenfing them, and making the perfon who performed them rejoice in his turn, arifes from the fympathetic emotions of gratitude and love, with which, when we bring home to our own breaft the fituation of those principally concerned, we feel ourselves na

turally