.

think it better for me, however, to follow the ancient Politicians in this particular, stating these two forms of government as essentially distinct, and assigning an appropriate definition to each. And, indeed, I cannot easily conceive what induced. Montesquieu to confound them together under one generic term, when he was so completely aware of the striking contrast they present in their spirit and tendency.

Montesquieu distinguishes Monarchy from Despotism; and the distinction is, undoubtedly, solid and important. I think, however, it may bear dispute, whether Monarchy (by which he means limited Monarchy) should have a place among the simple forms, as the limitations of the sovereign power can only arise from a mixture in the government; and, therefore, I shall, in this instance, also, follow the arrangement of the ancients, excluding limited Monarchy from my enumeration of the simple forms, and employing the word Monarchy (while I am treating of these) as synonymous with Despotism. Montesquieu was led to add limited Monarchy to the ancient enumeration by the history of Modern Europe, which has afforded examples of such governments, moderated and restrained by checks, of the nature and efficacy of which the Politicians of former times were unable to form an idea. To what purposes this speculation concerning the simple forms is subservient, will, I hope, appear sufficiently from the following considerations.

I before observed, that, as the political establishments which have actually taken place in the history of mankind, have been all distinguished from each other by various peculiarities, and as their number exceeds the comprehension of our limited. faculties, it becomes necessary for those who wish to make them an object of study, to abstract from their more minute differences, and to reduce them to general classes according to their prevailing tendency. By doing so, while we circumscribe the field of observation, and abridge the labour of minute research, we gain another advantage of the utmost importance to the *[See Esprit des Loix, Liv. II. chap. iv.]

VOL. IX.

Z

justness and comprehensiveness of our conclusions,-that of separating what appears to be essential from accessory circumstances of a more secondary and incidental nature. Abstractions and classifications of a similar kind are found to be useful in examining all other subjects of observation, which are very complicated in their details; in examining, for example, the agricultural qualities of different soils, the medical peculiarities of different constitutional temperaments, or the intellectual and moral varieties of human character.

It does not furnish any objection to this view of the subject, that no governments are to be found among mankind corresponding exactly to the definitions which are now to be given. Notwithstanding the diversity of political establishments, when we come to examine the subordinate details of their administration, they may all be resolved or analyzed (as far as the spirit of the government is concerned) into three simple governing powers; inasmuch as all power must be exercised, either by a single person, or by a select body, or by the mass of the people; and these governing powers, although, in fact, always more or less blended together, may be conceived to exist apart, exhibiting their peculiar and characteristic tendencies, without any checks or modifications. In this manner, the nature and effects of each may be expected to be more clearly and distinctly comprehended than when they are all studied in their joint results; and the conclusions we thus obtain may serve as general maxims or principles, to fix the attention and guide the judgment in the examination and comparison of the complex forms exhibited in the history of human affairs. It is with a view somewhat analogous to this, that, in the theory of mechanics, we begin with studying the simple mechanical powers, before we proceed to the study of their various combinations, as they are exemplified in the contrivances of the engineer; and it is thus that the effects of these engines, even in their most complicated forms, are easily subjected to computation, when the theory of those simple powers, which enter into their composition, has been previously familiarized to the mind.

[SECT. IL―OF THE SIMPLE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT IN SPECIAL.]

[SUBSECT. 1.]-Of Democracy and Democratic States.

From the foregoing observations, it may be easily inferred, that as no governments are to be found, actually existing, which correspond exactly to the general definitions of Democracy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy, these definitions are to be understood as expressing merely ideal constitutions, which exist nowhere but in the imagination of the speculative politician. The fact is, that all the governments we know are mixed governments; and, perhaps, it may even be asserted, that every government contains some mixture, in a greater or less proportion, of all the three simple forms. In some, however, the power of the people is much greater than in others, where, by a train of accidents, it has been gradually brought under subjection to the body of the nobles, or to a single monarch; and, in like manner, where the popular branch of the government is comparatively feeble and insignificant, constitutions may differ very widely from each other, according as the supreme authority is exercised by an individual, by a few, or by a multitude of rulers. Now, the words Democracy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy, are commonly employed, in a loose and popular way, to express to which of the simple forms a particular government approaches most nearly, or which of the three governing powers prevails in its constitution.

I mention this circumstance, because, in treating of the simple forms, I only follow the example of Montesquieu and all other theoretical Politicians, who are obliged to borrow their illustrations from those which are mixed in fact. This consideration, however, does not render these illustrations the less applicable to the support of their general principles; as the inconveniences resulting from those governments in which any one of the simple forms predominates beyond its due proportion, would be felt still more severely, if this simple form existed altogether pure and unmixed. The conclusions, therefore, resulting from such facts are applicable, a fortiori, to

the theoretical view of Governments which these authors have exhibited.

In treating of Democracy, I shall begin with the consideration of a State, approaching as nearly to the definition as possible; but, as the subject when considered in this light affords a very narrow field for speculation, I shall proceed, after a very few general observations, to remark the various deviations from the standard that experience has suggested, in order to remedy its inconveniences, and, at the same time, to maintain the ascendency of the people, by excluding every tendency to the other forms of government.1

First, then, it may be observed, that when the supreme power in a Democracy is said to be vested in the people, it is not to be supposed that each man is his own master; for in every form of government whatever, it must be universally understood, that the minority are to abide by the determinations. of the majority. If they do not, Government is at an end, and men are left in a state of anarchy. It is evident, therefore, that this is a limit beyond which Democracy cannot be carried even in theory.

I do not know, however, that this theory has ever been exactly realized in the history of mankind; or, in other words, that there has ever been a constitution in which the people met together on every affair of public concern, and where the majority exercised in their own persons all the functions of government. Indeed, we may venture to assert that no such thing ever existed; and, therefore, if we wish our reasonings to apply to facts, we must enlarge somewhat our definition of Democracy.

"As to popular government, in the strictest sense," says [Algernon] Sidney, "that is pure Democracy; where the people in themselves, and by themselves, perform all that belongs to government, I know of no such thing."2 And in another passage, "Being no way concerned in the defence of Democracy, I

1 Consult Filangieri, [Scienza della Legislazione,] Vol. I.

P. 121.

may leave our knight, like Don Quixote, fighting against the phantasms of his own brain, and saying what he pleases against such Governments as never were, unless in such a place as San Marino, near Sinigaglia in Italy, where a hundred clowns govern a barbarous rock that no man invades, and relates nothing to our question." He might have added, that San Marino is by no means a pure Democracy, according to the general definition, as sufficiently appears from Addison's ac

count of it.

The same author, (Sidney,) after remarking, that every good government is a mixture of all the three forms, adds ;—" More ignorance surely cannot be expressed than by giving the name of Democracy to those governments that are composed of the three simple species; for in a strict sense, it can only suit with those where the people retain to themselves the administration of the supreme power; and morely largely, when the popular part, as in Athens, greatly overbalances the other two, and the denomination is taken from the prevailing part."2

From these considerations we may infer, that the most perfect Democracy which can be realized, must admit of certain delegations of power to select councils, or to individual magistrates. At the same time, to entitle a constitution to the name of Democracy, even in the more extensive sense of the word, it seems to be essential to it, that the people should appoint the councils and the magistrates, and that every person who exercises power in the State, should be accountable to the people for his conduct. This, I apprehend, forms the definition of as perfect a Democracy as is compatible, even in theory, with the circumstances of mankind;-and of a Democracy much more perfect, than seems to be compatible with the imperfections inseparable from human character, when men are called on to act in a corporate or political capacity.

In some Democracies, it has been thought necessary, on account of the numbers, to delegate, at least for a time, even the Legislative power; or, in other words, the Sovereignty of the At Rome and Athens, the determinations of the Senate 1 [Ibid.] p. 165. 2 [Ibid.] p. 258.

state.