thorities bearing on the question, from Semayne's Case (1604) 5 Coke, 91a, 77 Eng. Reprint, 194, 11 Eng. Rul. Cas. 628, down, were discussed, and while the court held, as I have stated, that the breaking of the outer door of that building was justifiable, the several judges very clearly laid down that they so held because the rule did not include buildings not connected with the dwelling house. Lord Esher, M. R., at p. 666, says: 'It seems clear that "house" in that maxim means "dwelling house," and does not include other buildings, such as barns or outhouses not connected with a dwelling house.' And Lopes, L. J., at p. 667, says: 'It has frequently been stated as the law that this privilege only extends to the dwelling house, and not to a barn or other building not connected with or within the curtilage or the dwelling house. . . The doctrine relied upon has never been supposed to apply to anything but a dwelling house, and has never operated to prevent a sheriff from breaking open the door of any building not being a dwelling house or connected with a dwelling house.' And Kay, L. J., at p. 667, says: 'A barn or outhouse not connected with the dwelling house may be broken open in order to levy execution.' It will be observed that all the judges lay it down, it seems to me by clear implication, that, in order to justify the breaking of an outer door, the building must not be connected with a dwelling house or within its curtilage. I am therefore reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the breaking open of the door of this store was unlawful." Persons protected by outer door. The protection of the outer door extends not only to the householder and his goods, but to his children and domestic servants, his permanent boarders and lodgers, and all who have, without fraud or covin, made the house their lawful home. The repose and tranquillity of the family, which it is the purpose of the law to preserve, would be as much disturbed by a forcible entry to execute process on a servant or boarder who has acquired by contract, express or implied, a right to enter the house at all times and to remain in it as long as he pleases, as if the object were to serve process on the householder himself. Not every person, however, who may chance to be within the house, is entitled to the protection of its outer doors and windows. Thus, a guest who flees there fraudulently to conceal his goods from levy is not so favored; and an officer, after demand and refusal of admittance where such would not be a useless ceremony, is justified in breaking or forcibly entering the house in order to execute the mandate of his writ. See Semayne's Case (Eng.) supra. An officer has no right to break open doors of a dwelling house to levy an execution on the owner, or one of his family, or on his or their goods; however, where a demand for the opening of the doors is made and refused, the house may be broken into in order to levy a writ, or to retake goods belonging to another than the owner of the house or the members of his family. DeGraffenreid v. Mitchell (1826) 14 S. C. L. (3 M'Cord) 506, 15 Am. Dec. 648, wherein the court said: "It is said in Semayne's Case (Eng.) supra, that the sheriff, at the suit of a common person, upon request made to open the doors and denial thereof, ought not to break open the door of the house to execute any process at the suit of any subject, or to execute a fieri facias, but, if he do, he is a trespasser. Yet it was resolved that the house of a man is not a castle or defense for any other person but for the owner, his family, and goods, and not to protect another who flyeth into the same, or the goods of another; for then the sheriff, upon request and denial, may break the house and do execution. A distinction is attempted to be made between the case before us and the one in Coke. That the sheriff was not about to execute the process, but to retake the goods after they had been in execution, and had in contemplation of law become his own. the principle is the same, except that this is a stronger case, the goods being in the custody of the law. The house of every man, says Lord Coke, is to But him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defense against injuries and violence, as for his repose. And the reason is, domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium. But the principle is not to be extended beyond the object which the law intended to effect. The house or castle of a man is to be a refuge for himself, a place of safety for his goods, and of repose for his family. But that immunity is to be allowed only to the owner himself. It is not to be a sanctuary for others." A sheriff may break into one man's house to levy on the goods of another concealed therein. Keith v. Johnson (1833) 1 Dana (Ky.) 605, 25 Am. Dec. 167. See also Burton v. Wilkinson (1846) 18 Vt. 186, 46 Am. Dec. 145. b. Inner door. The privilege of the outer door, or other outside protection to a dwelling house, does not extend to all the doors of the house; and, being peaceably in the building, the officer has the right to execute his writ. Furthermore, if the property sought is concealed, the officer has the right, after demand and refusal of admittance, when such will not be a useless ceremony, to break open inner doors, and generally to use such force as is necessary to enable him to obey the command of his writ. Snydacker v. Brosse (1869) 51 III. 357, 99 Am. Dec. 551; Trainer v. Saunders (1921) 270 Pa. 451, 19 A.L.R. 861, 113 Atl. 681; State v. Thackam (1794) 1 S. C. L. (1 Bay) 358; Rex v. Bird (1794) 2 Shower, K. B. 87, 89 Eng. Reprint, 811. Thus, in Snydacker v. Brosse (Ill.) supra, the court said: "It is a uniformly recognized rule of the common law that no officer has the legal authority to break an outer door, or other outside protection to an individual's house, for the purpose of executing civil process. Even to arrest a defendant of civil process, the officer must corporally seize or touch the defendant's body, and thus render him a prisoner, before he can justify the breaking and entering the defendant's house to retake him; otherwise, he has no such power, but must watch his opportunity to arrest him; for every man's dwelling house is looked upon by the law as his castle of defense and asylum, wherein he should suffer no violence. 3 Bl. Com. 288. And, in the execution of civil process against the goods of a defendant, an officer is equally powerless to enforce an entrance into the house of the defendant for the purpose of seizing them. Blackstone says a sheriff may not break open any outer doors to execute either a fieri facias or a capias ad satisfaciendum; but he must enter peaceably, and may then, after a request and refusal, break open any inner doors belonging to the defendant, in order to take the goods. 3 Bl. Com. 417." If a landlord lives in a house with his tenants, even though he reserves to himself only a single room, he is considered in law the occupant of the whole, and the outer door of the house is the "outer door" of each tenant's apartment; so, where an officer lawfully enters through such outer door, he commits no trespass by breaking an inner door of a tenant's apartment in order to levy an execution. Cantrell v. Conner (1875) 6 Daly (N. Y.) 39. When a sheriff has entered the open door of a house, it is not necessary that he should demand that the inner doors be opened to him before he breaks them in order to take, under a writ of fieri facias, goods which are within them. Hutchison v. Birch (1812) 4 Taunt. 619, 128 Eng. Reprint, 473. Compare Ratcliffe V. Burton (1802) 3 Bos. & P. 223, 127 Eng. Reprint, 123. III. Building other than dwelling. The privilege which the law allows to a man's habitation, and which precludes the sheriff from entering, unless the outer door is open, either to arrest the man or to take his goods on execution, does not extend to a store or barn disconnected from the dwelling house, and forming no part of the curtilage. Haggerty v. Wilber (1819) 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 287, 8 Am. Dec. 321. See also M'Gee v. Givan (1835) 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 16. And see the reported case (SILVERMAN V. STEIN, ante, 209), wherein it is held that a sheriff may break open a garage within the curtilage, but not connected with the dwelling house, for the purpose of levying on an automobile therein. A barn or outhouse adjoining to and parcel of the house, or within the curtilage, may be broken open to levy an execution on goods; but a request must first be made for admittance. Burton v. Wilkinson (1846) 18 Vt. 186, 46 Am. Dec. 145. See also Douglass v. State (1834) 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 525. A sheriff, for the purpose of levying under a writ of fieri facias, may break open the outer door of a workshop or other building of the judgment debtor, not being his dwelling house or connected therewith. Hodder v. Williams [1895] 2 Q..B. (Eng.) 663-C. A. See to the same effect, Nelson v. Van Gazelle Valve Mfg. Co. (1889) 45 N. J. Eq. 594, 17 Atl. 943; Penton v. Brown (1664) 1 Keble, 698, 83 Eng. Reprint, 1193, 1 Sid. 186, 82 Eng. Reprint, 1047. Thus, in Hodder v. Williams (Eng.) supra, the court, per Lopes, L. J., said: "The doctrine that the sheriff cannot break open the door of the judgment debtor's dwelling house is of ancient date, and proceeded on the principle that a man and his family shall be protected in the occupation of a dwelling house. The maxim is well established that 'every man's house is his castle.' It has frequently been stated as the law that this privilege only extends to the dwelling house, and not to a barn or other building not connected with or within the curtilage of the dwelling house. The leading authority on the subject is Penton v. Brown (Eng.) supra. That case is more than two hundred years old; it has been referred to in every textbook on the law relating to sheriffs; and it has been recognized as law by Lord Mansfield, Lord Campbell, and Lord Blackburn. To interfere with the law so laid down at the present time would, I think, be very wrong and mischievous. The doctrine relied upon has never been supposed to apply to anything but a dwelling house, and has never operated to prevent a sheriff from breaking open the door of any building not being a dwelling house or connected with a dwelling house." W. D. M. Conflict of laws, § 139 (79 Colo. 57, 243 Pac. 1099.) rights under will. 1. The rights of the parties under a will executed in one state, where the testator then resided, but probated in another state, where he had lived for many years prior to his death, and where the property of the estate is located, are to be determined by the laws of the latter state. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 229.] Wills, § 3731 distribution of re mainder. 2. A remainder not disposed of by will giving a life estate must be disposed of in the same manner as the estate of an intestate. Wills, § 145 construction inten tion of testator. 3. The intention of the testator is the paramount rule in the construc tion of wills. tent that the remainder should go un- Conflict of laws, 141 place of execution of will effect in other states. 7. The laws of the state where testator lived at the time he made his will will not, in the courts of another state where the will is probated, be controlling or conclusive or be followed in so far as it concerns the intention of the testator, or as bearing upon the effect and operation of the will, if it is contrary to the public policy or statutes of the state where the will is probated. Wills, § 111 estoppel effect of offering will for probate. 8. A widow, in tendering her husband's will for probate as required by statute, does not vouch for its validity, or that it disposes of all of testator's property, nor does she waive her right to take under the statute, nor her right to claim all of the property of the estate as the sole heir at law of her husband. Evidence, § 207 - presumption against intestacy. 9. Although the law favors the presumption that a testator intended to dispose of all his property, this pre sumption may be overcome by the will itself. Wills, § 353-property undisposed of by will. 10. A widow who is given a life estate by a will which fails to dispose of the remainder, who elects to take against the will, under which circumstances the statute of wills gives her one half the estate, is entitled also to the other half, where there are no children and the intestate laws, in the absence of children, make the widow the sole heir. Estoppel, § 119 — wills election right to take under different statutes. 11. There is no inconsistency in a widow claiming part of an estate under one statute which entitles her to it upon renunciation of her husband's will, and the other part under a statute giving it to her as intestate property. Estoppel, § 43 necessity of change of position. 12. A widow is not estopped by her acts with reference to her husband's estate in favor of his heirs to claim the property undisposed of by his will as heir, where the heirs lost nothing by her acts, and were not led by her conduct to take the course adopted by them. Wills, § 369 celeration. 13. The doctrine of acceleration is not applicable in case a widow elects to take against her husband's will, where there is no remainder created by the will. election against ac ERROR to the District Court for the City and County of Denver (Bouck, J.) to review a judgment affirming a judgment of the County Court in favor of petitioner in a proceeding for the interpretation and construction of the will of her deceased husband. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Frank McDonough, Sr., Frank McDonough, Jr., and Gilbert L. McDonough, for defendant in error: The law of the domicil governs. Goodrich v. Treat, 3 Colo. 408; 18 C. J. 809; Stanton's Estate, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 17; Kessler v. Kessler, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 522; Re Majot, 199 N. Y. 29, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 780, 92 N. E. 402; Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle, 312, 24 Am. Dec. 345; Re Hancock, 7 Kulp, 36; Strathmann v. Kinkelaar, 105 Okla. 290, 233 Pac. 215. All such estate, both real and personal, as is not devised or bequeathed in the last will of any person, shall descend and be distributed in the same manner as the estate of an intestate, and such intestate estate shall be administered by the executor or administrator. Wolfe v. Mueller, 46 Colo. 335, 104 Pac. 487; Sutton v. Read, 176 Ill. 69, 51 N. E. 801; Bond v. Moore, 236 Ill.. (79 Colo. 57, 243 Pac. 1099.) 576, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 540, 86 N. E. 386; Parsons v. Millar, 189 Ill. 107, 59 N. E. 606; Lewis v. Harrower, 197 Ill. 315, 64 N. E. 374; Minkler v. Simons, 172 Ill. 323, 50 N. E. 176; Coffman v. Coffman (Coffman v. Heatnole) 85 Va. 459, 2 L.R.A. 848, 17 Am. St. Rep. 69, 8 S. E. 672; Boisseau v. Aldridge, 5 Leigh, 222, 27 Am. Dec. 590; Nebinger's Estate, 185 Pa. 399, 39 Atl. 1049; Corr's Estate, 202 Pa. 391, 51 Atl. 1032; Nickerson v. Bowly, 8 Met. 424; Gallagher v. Crooks, 132 N. Y. 338, 30 N. E. 746; Re Reinhardt, 74 Cal. 365, 16 Pac. 13; McCown v. Owens, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 346, 40 S. W. 336; O'Hearn v. O'Hearn, 114 Wis. 428, 58 L.R.A. 105, 90 N. W. 450; Bishop v. McClelland, 44 N. J. Eq. 450, 1 L.R.A. 551, 16 Atl. 1; Gardner v. Anderson, 114 Kan. 778, 227 Pac. 743; Re Glass, 164 Cal. 765, 130 Pac. 868. Petitioner is sole heir at law of Charles H. Blatt, deceased, and as such is entitled to the whole estate, regardless as to whether she had elected or not. Anderson v. Groesbeck, 26 Colo. 3, 55 Pac. 1086; Binkley v. Switzer, 69 Colo. 177, 192 Pac. 500, 75 Colo. 1, 223 Pac. 757. The deceased was a resident and citizen of Colorado. Miller v. Weston, 25 Colo. App. 231, 138 Pac. 424; Miller v. Weston, 61 Colo. 588, 157 Pac. 1161, 67 Colo. 535, 189 Pac. 610. The probating of the will did not deprive the widow of her right thereafter to elect whether to take under the will or under the statute. Hodgkins v. Ashby, 56 Colo. 553, 139 Pac. 538; Binkley v. Switzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Pac. 500; Ferguson v. Holborn, 106 Or. 566, 211 Pac. 953. On principle, we cannot see how any act of the widow of election, availing herself of a vested right, could accelerate the remainder, so as to vest title in plaintiffs in error, upon any theory. Barnard v. Moore, 71 Colo. 401, 207 Pac. 332. Campbell, J., delivered the opinion of the court: In June, 1907, Charles H. Blatt, at that time domiciled in Pennsylvania, made his will at Ellwood City in that state. In 1908 he removed to Colorado, and lived therein continuously until his death, at Denver, March 18, 1922. A Denver bank, custodian of the will, deposited it with the clerk of the county court of the city and county of Denver a few days after Blatt's death. March 24, 1922, Lydia M. Blatt, the widow, as proponent, filed a petition in the county court, setting forth that this was her husband's will, and that the Ellwood City Trust Company, named as executor therein, had ceased to exist as a corporation, and she asked that the will be admitted to probate and letters of administration with the will annexed granted to her. Letters as prayed for were issued to the widow May 15, 1922, and on the same day she filed a petition in the county court for an interpretation and construction of the will, and asked the court to determine who are the heirs at law of the testator, expressly reserving her right of election under the Colorado statute, and also filed that election to take one-half of the decedent's property under the statute, being, in substance, the same election which had theretofore been filed by her. To this petition two brothers, a sister, and a nephew of the testator filed their cross-petition in which they asked that distribution of the estate be made under the laws of Pennsylvania, where, had the will been probated in that state, they would be next of kin, and as such entitled to one half of the remainder of the estate, if the same was not disposed of by the will. They asked that distribution be not made under the laws of Colorado, which, if the same was not devised, would vest the remainder fee in the widow. This cross-petition was replied to, and, upon the hearing by the county court, in which testimony was taken that the testator had been a resident of Colorado continuously from the year 1908 until his death, and that all of the property of the estate, both real and personal, was situate in this state, the findings were in favor of the widow and against the next of kin, and the entire property was awarded to her. Upon an appeal to the district court, the judg |