says: "Our Roman constitution, on the contrary, did not spring from the genius of one individual, but of many, and it was established, not in the life time of a man but in the course of ages and centuries. For there never yet existed a genius so vast and comprehensive as to allow nothing to escape its attention, and all the geniuses in the world united in a single mind could never within the limits of a single life exert a foresight sufficiently extensive to embrace and harmonize all, without the aid of experience and practice."/

We have here a clear perception of social organization as the product of man's instinctive social nature reacting in a particular physical environment, disciplined by experience and knowledge and requiring the time element for its completion.

He attacks further the theory of utility as the basis of justice in the state. Justice does not arise out of human experience varying with circumstances as men strive to realize their interests.

"For of all the questions on which our philosophers argue, there is none which it is more important thoroughly to understand than this that man is born for justice and that law and equity are not a mere establishment of opinion, but an institution of nature. This truth will become still more apparent if we investigate the nature of human association and society.

There is no one thing more like to another, more homogeneous and analogous, than man is to man, and if the corruption of customs and the variation of opinions had not induced an imbecility of minds and turned them aside from the course of nature, no one would more nearly resemble himself than all men would resemble all men. Therefore, whatever definition we give of man it must include the whole human race. And this is a good argument that no portion of mankind can be heterogeneous or dissimilar from the rest; because if this were the case one definition could not include all men.

In fact, reason, which alone gives us so many advantages over beasts by means of which we conjecture, argue, refute, discourse, and accomplish and conclude our designs, is assuredly common to all men; for the faculty of acquiring knowledge is similar in all human minds. though the knowledge itself may be endlessly diversified."

"It follows then in our line of argument that nature made us just that we might participate our goods with each other and supply each other's wants. You observe in this discussion whenever I speak of

nature, I mean nature in its genuine purity and not in the corrupt state which is displayed by the depravity of evil custom, which is so great that the natural and innate flame of virtue is often almost extinguished and stifled by the antagonist vices, which are accumulated around it.” •

Political and social morality is absolute and derives its force from a principle of nature that lies behind all manifestations. The Stoic concept of nature is thus revived with emphasis. True reason accords with this principle which is "constant and permanent." Justice is something independent of the character and consciousness of men. It is for this reason that the various states coördinated in the Roman political system exhibited common characters. Only where conformity to this principle of innate justice is found does the res publica exist. Injustice under whatever form of government destroys the very existence of the state.

The logic of Cicero's theory of human nature bears directly upon all the relations of organized society. We are familiar with Aristotle's philosophy of human inequality. Men differ in native endowments and even slavery was justified as a law of nature.10 Political events since Aristotle's day made way for a different concept. Cicero therefore sets up and defends the doctrine of the natural equality of men. This equality exhibited among all nations is one of the most common facts of observation. Men differ in achievement but not in capacity. Common standards of morals are found among the most diverse peoples. Where discrepancies do exist it is not due to inherent differences in moral nature, but to perversions. All men are capable of guidance and to the attainment of common virtues.

There is thus swept away not only the distinction between contemporary nationalities but between the civilized man and the savage, and between the master and slave. He commends kindness to slaves and suggests their equality at least with hired labor.

In this theory of natural equality there is laid the basis of two important doctrines, the idea of human brotherhood which held such a prominent place in the teachings of early Christianity, and the more modern doctrine of liberty, fraternity, and equality so important in the period of the French Revolution.

SENECA

Lucius Annaeus Seneca was born at Cordoba, Spain, 4 or 3 B.C., of Spanish-Roman ancestry. His father, Annaeus Seneca, was a wealthy 'The Laws, Book I, Barham, p. 48.

10 Cf. Ch. 2.

and influential citizen of literary tastes who devoted much time to the study of rhetoric. The younger Seneca was educated in Rome, being interested chiefly in philosophy. He soon became prominent as an orator and public pleader, achieving many "forensic triumphs." He traveled extensively in Greece. In the year 41 A.D. he was banished to Corsica for alleged intimacy with the daughter of Germanicus but was recalled in 49 through the influence of Agrippina and appointed as tutor of her youthful son, Nero. During this period he did most of his writing, which included letters, essays, orations, epigrams, and tragedies. Upon the accession of Nero to the throne in 54, Seneca remained as his preceptor. For five years the great moralist exerted a controlling influence at court. After Nero's defection and the assassination of Burrus in 62 Seneca resigned his position, but his petition was refused. Without the emperor's consent he withdrew. In 65 he was accused of complicity in the conspiracy of Piso, and Nero ordered him to commit suicide, which he did by opening his veins.

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Seneca's period falls outside that described in the historical survey at the beginning of this chapter, but his thought, little influenced by the change from the Republic to the Empire, belongs to the period under review. His concepts of nature and justice are practically identical with those of Cicero. He adopts Cicero's view of slavery but elaborates it. All men are descended from a common source and hence nobility is common to all. Men become slaves through the exigencies of fortune. Bondage pertains only to their bodies while their minds remain free. The later legal theories of equality find ample confirmation in the writings of Cicero.

In one important essential Seneca differs from Cicero, namely, in his theory of social origin. In his theory of the Golden Age, borrowed no doubt from Hesiod's scheme of the Five Ages," he gave currency to an idea which in modified forms has survived through eighteen centuries.

Carlyle summarizes the theory admirably as follows: "Behind the conventional institutions of society there lay a condition in which these institutions had no place. Before the existing age there was an age when men lived under other conditions, in other circumstances, an age which was called the golden. In this primitive age men lived in happiness and in the enjoyment of each other's society. They were incorrupt in "Cf. Bury, The Ancient Greek Historians, p. 187.

nature, innocent, though not wise. They were lofty of soul, newly sprung from the gods, but they were not perfect or completely developed in mind or soul. They were innocent but their innocence was rather the result of ignorance than of virtue; they had the material out of which virtue could grow rather than virtue itself, for this properly only belongs to the soul trained and taught and practiced; men are born to virtue but not in possession of it. It is important to notice these points in Seneca's theory, for they serve to differentiate his position. from that of some later theorists of the state of nature. In this primitive state men lived together in peace and happiness, having all things in common; there was no private property. We may infer that there could have been no slavery and there was no coercive government. . . . Order there was and that of the best kind, for men followed nature without fail and the best and wisest men were their rulers. They guided and directed men for their good and were gladly obeyed as they commanded wisely and justly. The heaviest punishment they could threaten was expulsion from their territories." 12 One observation upon this theory will serve to emphasize its importance for future interpretations.

The institutions of society do not owe their origin to the natural conditions of human progress as with Aristotle, or to perceived utility as with Plato, but to the corruption of human nature. Their miseries begin as soon as men degenerate from this state of innocence and negative virtue. Avarice and greed disrupt the primitive communism and thirst for power destroys the simplicity of the benevolent rulership of the wise. A condition which ought easily to be maintained, because men are rational above all other beings and should live according to nature, is made impossible "by that universal madness which possesses mankind." Hence the necessity of social and political organization in order to curb these evil propensities. Seneca's conception of primitive human society corresponds very closely with the ancient Hebrew tradition of man's original innocence and fall,13 and with the further development of this view by the Christian Fathers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbott, F. F., History and Description of Roman Political Institutions, Ginn, Boston, 1901.

Barham, Francis, The Political Works of Marcus Tullius Cicero, 2 vols., Spettigue, London, 1841.

Breasted, J. H., Ancient Times, Ginn, Boston, 1916.

Bury, J. B., History of Greece, Macmillan, New York, 1906.

Bury, J. B., The Ancient Greek Historians, Macmillan, New York, 1909. Carlyle, A. J., History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1903.

Davidson, J. S., Polybius, in Hellenica, Ed. by E. Abbott, Longmans, London, 1898.

Dunning, W. A., Political Theories, Ancient and Mediaval, Macmillan, New York, 1902.

Myers, P. V. N., History as Past Ethics, Ginn, Boston, 1913.

Rogers, A. K., Students' History of Philosophy, Macmillan, New York, 1909.

Zeller, Edward, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Tr. by Reichel, Longmans, London, 1870.