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nically an accomplice in the crime charged against the defendant; and, if he is, the jury has the power to find the defendant guilty on his uncorroborated testimony, the credibility of the witness being for the jury.

Thus, in State v. White (Mo.) supra, the court said: "A prosecution for subornation of perjury is not governed by the same rules of evidence as in trials for perjury; in the latter the principal witness must be corroborated. The suborner and the perjurer are not accomplices. Each is guilty of

a separate crime. It is not necessary, therefore, as we held in a well-considered opinion by Williams, C. (State v. Richardson (1913) 248 Mo. 571, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 307, 154 S. W. 735), to the validity of a conviction for subornation of perjury, that the testimony of the perjurer be corroborated, either as to the subornation or the actual commission of the perjury. Wherever it is held to the contrary it will be found due to statutory provisions which do not exist here. We find no merit in this contention." G. R. R.

POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE COMPANY, Appt.,

V.

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respt.

California Supreme Court (In Banc) October 31, 1927.
(- Cal. -

260 Pac. 1101.)

Electricity, § 9 liability for induction from power line.

1. A telegraph company cannot recover damages for the mere construction of a power line so close to its wires that the induction interferes with their use.

[See annotation on this question beginning on page 421.]

Pleading, § 346 complaint

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gence of electric power line sufficiency.

2. A complaint by a telegraph company seeking damages against a power line for interference with its business by induction and burning out and destroying its equipment, which charges that the power line in various portions of the state is negligently constructed

and maintained in that, old, weak, and defective appliances are in use as specified, is not sufficient to state a cause of action for negligently interfering with use of a telegraph line between two cities and other portions of the line in the state by induction.

[See 9 R. C. L. 1231; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 950; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 535; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 592.]

(Waste, Ch. J., and Shenk, J., dissent in part.)

APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco (Deasy, J.) in favor of defendant in an action brought to recover damages for an alleged nuisance and for negligent interference with the use of plaintiff's telegraph line by induction. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Willard P. Smith, for appellant: The complaint alleges a continuing nuisance in that defendant is not able to confine its high-voltage currents to its own wires, and that these currents are inducted onto, and interfere with the operation of, plaintiff's lines, to its damage.

Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 29 A.L.R. 833, 218 Pac. 753; Kall v. Carruthers, 59 Cal. App. 555, 211 Pac. 43;

Stoops v. Pistachio, 70 Cal. App. 772, 234 Pac. 423; Parker v. Larsen, 86 Cal. 236, 21 Am. St. Rep. 30, 24 Pac. 989; Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520, 91 Am. Dec. 72; Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 58 Am. Rep. 556, 10 Pac. 395; Hickey v. McCabe, 30 R. I. 346, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 425, 75 Atl. 404, 19 Ann. Cas. 783; Wood, Nuisances, § 72; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Guernsey & S. Electric Light Co. 46 Mo. App. 120;

(Cal., 260 Pac. 1101.)

Cumberland Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. United Electric R. Co. 93 Tenn. 492, 27 L.R.A. 236, 29 S. W. 104; Fitzsimons & C. Co. v. Braun, 199 Ill. 390, 59 L.R.A. 421, 65 N. E. 249, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 9; Chicago v. Murdock, 212 Ill. 9, 103 Am. St. Rep. 221, 72 N. E. 46; Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co. 60 Ohio St. 560, 45 L.R.A. 658, 71 Am. St. Rep. 740, 54 N. E. 528, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 674; Cary Bros. v. Morrison, 65 L.R.A. 659, 63 C. C. A. 267, 129 Fed. 181, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 287; Smith v. Day (C. C.) 86 Fed. 62; Loudon v. Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, L.R.A.1915E, 356, 106 N. E. 970, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1171; Hundley v. Harrison, 123 Ala. 292, 26 So. 294; Ponder v. Quitman Ginnery, 122 Ga. 29, 49 S. E. 746; Wiedman v. Line, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 590; Bowen v. Wendt, 103 Cal. 236, 37 Pac. 149; T. A. Snider Preserve Co. v. Beemon, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1527, 60 S. W. 849; Jutte v. Hughes, 67 N. Y. 267; Hargro v. Hodgdon, 89 Cal. 623, 26 Pac. 1106; 20 R. C. L. 435, 453.

Courts have long recognized the right to recover for damages caused by electric interference where there was no actual contact of the wires.

Cumberland Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. United Electric R. Co. 93 Tenn. 492, 27 L.R.A. 236, 29 S. W. 104; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles Electric Co. (C. C.) 76 Fed. 178; Paris Electric Light & R. Co. v. Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. Tex. Civ. App. —, 27 S. W. 902; Meissner Teleph. Co. v. Union Electric Light & P. Co. (Mo.) P.U.R.1919C, 733; Cambria Rural Teleph. Co. v. Economy Electric Co. (Mich.) P.U.R.1922D, 553; Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. Spink County Power Co. 42 S. D. 448, 176 N. W. 143; Brazil Gas Co. v. Terre Haute, I. & E. Traction Co. (Ind.) P.U.R.1919E, 579; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Guernsey & S. Electric Light Co. 46 Mo. App. 120; Indianapolis & C. Traction Co. v. Arlington Teleph. Co. 47 Ind. App. 657, 95 N. E. 280; Nebraska Teleph. Co. v. York Gas & E. Co. 27 Neb. 284, 43 N. W. 126; Bell Teleph. Co. v. Belleville Electric Light Co. 12 Ont. Rep. 571; Deiser, Conflicting Uses of Electricity, 22; Buffalo & S. R. Corp. v. Dubois Electric Co. (Pa.) P.U.R.1920D, 391; La Harpe Teleph. Co. v. Western Illinois Utilities Co. (Ill.) P.U.R.1920C, 216; Re Louisiana L. P. & T. Co. (Case No. 2931, Aug. 21, 1923; Mo. Pub. Serv. Com.); Northern Teleph. Co. v. Iowa,

Teleph. Co. Iowa, -
98 N. W. 113;
Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual
Light, Heat & P. Co. 239 U. S. 121, 60
L. ed. 174, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Re
Central Illinois Light Co. (Ill.) P.U.R.
1916C, 560 (abstract); Re Stockton El.
Co. (Nov. 17, 1919; Ill. Pub. U. Com.);
Re Electrical Interference (Iowa)
P.U.R.1917B, 841; P.U.R.1918A, 835;
Wamego Tel. Co. v. Rocky Ford M. &
P. Co. (Case No. 2972, dec. Sept. 9,
1920; Kan. Ct. of Industrial Rela-
tions); Re W. B. Foshay Co. (Case No.
4202, Feb. 23, 1920; Neb. R. R. Com.);
Tenney Teleph. Co. v. Wisconsin-Min-
nesota Light & P. Co. P.U.R.1920C, 848
(abstract); Re Clifton Hills Light &
P. Co. (Case No. 2550, Sept. 1, 1922;
Mo. Pub. Serv. Com.); Yamhill County
Mut. Teleph. Co. v. Yamhill Electric
Co. 111 Or. 57, 33 A.L.R. 373, 224 Pac.
1081; Holt County Independent Teleph.
Co. v. Mound City Electric Light & Ice
Co. (Mo.) P.U.R.1925E, 279; Iowa
Electric Co. V. Van Buren County
(Iowa) P.U.R.1925D, 847.

Plaintiff has a right to operate its lines without hindrance from the lines of a power company such as defendant's, which subsequently constructs lines in the vicinity of plaintiff's lines in such close proximity as to cause inductive or contact interference with its lines.

Northern Teleph. Co. v. Iowa Teleph. Co. Iowa, 98 N. W. 113; Bell Teleph. Co. v. Belleville Electric Light Co. 12 Ont. Rep. 571; Nebraska Teleph. Co. v. York Gas & E. Co. 27 Neb. 284, 43 N. W. 126; Re Central Illinois Light Co. (Ill.) P.U.R.1916C, 560 (abstract); Cumberland Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. United Electric Co. 93 Tenn. 492, 27 L.R.A. 236, 29 S. W. 104; Deiser, Conflicting Uses of Electricity (1911) p. 56; Rutland Electric Light Co. v. Marble City Electric Light Co. 65 Vt. 377, 20 L.R.A. 821, 36 Am. St. Rep. 868, 26 Atl. 635; Paris Electric Light & R. Co. v. Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. Tex. Civ. App. -, 27 S: W. 902; Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. People's Electric Light & G. Co. 94 Ala. 372, 10 So. 440; 20 C. J. 314; 10 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 867; Los Angeles Gas & E. Co. v. Los Angeles (D. C.) 241 Fed. 912, affirmed in 251 U. S. 32, 64 L. ed. 121, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles Electric Co. (C. C.) 76 Fed. 178; Edison Electric Light & P. Co. v. Merchants & M. Electric Light, Heat & P. Co. 200 Pa. 209, 86 Am. St. Rep. 712, 49

Atl. 766; Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. v. Twin City Teleph. Co. 89 Minn. 495, 95 N. W. 460; Tri County Mut. Teleph. Co. v. Bridgewater Electric Power Co. 40 S. D. 410, 167 N. W. 501; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Guernsey & S. Electric Light Co. 46 Mo. App. 120; Cook, Teleg. Law, § 5d, p. 150; Cumberland Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Louisville Home Teleph. Co. 114 Ky. 892, 72 S. W. 4; West Jersey & S. R. Co. v. Atlantic City & Suburban Traction Co. 65 N. J. Eq. 613, 56 Atl. 890; Jones, Teleg. & Teleph. Cos. 2d ed. § 221, p. 296; Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. Spink County Power Co. 42 S. D. 448, 176 N. W. 143; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Burlington Traction Co. 90 Vt. 506, P.U.R.1917C, 320, 99 Atl. 4, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 841; Chicago Teleph. Co. v. Northwestern Teleph. Co. 199 Ill. 324, 65 N. E. 337; Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & P. Co. 239 U. S. 121, 60 L. ed. 174, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Re Central Illinois Light Co. (Ill.) P.U.R.1916C, 560 (abstract); Re Stockton El. Co. (Nov. 17, 1919; Ill. Pub. Util. Com.); Re Electrical Interference (Iowa) P.U.R.1917B, 800; Wamego Tel. Co. v. Rocky Ford M. & P. Co. (Case No. 2972, Sept. 9, 1920; Kan. Ct. of Industrial Relations); Re Caruthersville & K. Electric Light & P. Co. (Mo.) P.U.R.1917C, 1012; Re W. B. Foshey Co. (Case No. 4202, Feb. 23, 1920; Neb. R. R. Com.); Re Big Springs (Oct. 1919; Neb. R. R. Com.) Buffalo & S. R. Corp. v. Dubois Electric Co. (Pa.) P.U.R.1920D, 391; Com. v. McFaddin Teleph. Co. (Va.) P.U.R. 1918E, 272; Tenney Teleph. Co. v. Wisconsin Minnesota Light & P. Co. P.U.R.1920C, 848 (abstract).

Messrs. Thomas J. Straub, L. H. Susman, and Charles E. Finney, for respondent:

Defendant is not charged with any negligence, unskilfulness, or malice in the construction or maintenance of its lines, and therefore no cause of action is stated for injury resulting from inductive interference.

Eastern & S. A. Teleg. Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Cos. [1902] A. C. 381, 2 B. R. C. 114, 126-P. C.; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Chicago, L. S. & S. B. R. Co. 48 Ind. App. 584, 92 N. E. 989, 95 N. E. 596.

A power company is not liable to a telephone or telegraph company for inductive interference with the latter's lines by reason of electric energy from the power company's lines, in the ab

sence of negligence, unskilfulness, or malice.

Phillippay v. Pacific Power & Light Co. 120 Wash. 581, 23 A.L.R. 1251, 207 Pac. 957, 211 Pac. 872; Yamhill County Mut. Teleph. Co. v. Yamhill Electric Co. 111 Or. 57, 33 A.L.R. 373, 224 Pac. 1081; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Chicago, L. S. & S. B. Co. supra; Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Chicago, L. S. & S. B. R. Co. 49 Ind. App. 697, 97 N. E. 20; Citizens Teleph. Co. v. Ft. Wayne & S. R. Co. Ann. Cas. 1916A, 132 and note, 53 Ind. App. 230, 100 N. E. 309; Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92, 8 Am. Dec. 369; Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. United Electric R. Co. 12 L.R.A. 544, 42 Fed. 273; Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. Spink County Power Co. 42 S. D. 448, 176 N. W. 143.

Priority in time of location of plaintiff's line would not create liability on the part of defendant for alleged inductive interference of electric energy from its subsequently located power line.

Eastern & S. A. Teleg. Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Cos. [1902] A. C. 381, 2 B. R. C. 114-P. C.; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Chicago, L. S. & S. B. R. Co. supra; Phillippay v. Pacific Power & Light Co. supra; Yamhill County Mut. Teleph. Co. v. Yamhill Electric Co. 111 Or. 57, 33 A.L.R. 373, 224 Pac. 1081; Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Chicago, L. S. & S. B. R. Co. 49 Ind. App. 697, 97 N. E. 20; Citizens Teleph. Co. v. Ft. Wayne & S. R. Co. 53 Ind. App. 230, 100 N. E. 309, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 132; Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. Spink County Power Co. supra.

Langdon, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment against it after a demurrer to the complaint had been sustained and plaintiff had declined to amend. The complaint, after alleging the corporate capacity of the parties and the nature of their respective businesses, as disclosed by their corporate names, sets out, in the first count, that one of the power lines of the defendant extends from the city of Sacramento to the city of Suisun, a distance of about 40 miles, over which the defendant transports normally an alternating electric current of high potentiality of about 53,000 volts, and that said line par

(Cal., 260 Pac. 1101.)

allels the portion of said plaintiff's telegraph line for the entire distance between said cities, "being at no point more than 210 feet from the line of plaintiff, and for a distance of about 8 consecutive miles between said cities not more than 21 feet from plaintiff's line, and for a distance of 5 consecutive miles between said cities not more than 25 feet from plaintiff's line; and that the portion of said lines of defendant between said cities was constructed many years after the construction of plaintiff's said line."

It is then alleged: That by reason of the said high voltage of defendant's line, "there extends, in all directions about it, a field of force for more than 210 feet, and said field of force carries within such

field many electric currents of high and varying intensity which are not controlled by or confined to said power lines and due to said proximity and parallelism of plaintiff's

and defendant's said lines between said cities of Sacramento and Suisun, and the fact that said field of force extends in every direction about its said power lines and carries within such field many currents of high and varying intensity which are not controlled by or confined to said power lines, a portion of the electric current transported by defendant on said lines is at all times inducted on to plaintiff's said lines, thereby interfering with the transmission of telegraphic messages thereover and greatly decreasing the quickness and accuracy with which telegraphic messages can be transmitted over plaintiff's said line as compared with what would be the case if such induction did not exist. That said inductive interference has been increasing within the past three years and particularly interferes with the use of machine transmission of messages, and at times completely prevents the operation of said machines. That there have been within the past three years interruptions and breaks in the said lines of the de56 A.L.R.-27.

fendant, causing at such times the current passing through defendant's said line to surge and rise in voltage, and said high voltage to be inducted on to plaintiff's said line between said cities whereby the said portions of plaintiff's said telegraph line and equipment thereof in this state have been burned out, destroyed, and damaged, and on many occasions it has been impossible, for several hours at a time, to transmit telegraphic messages over said line, and the physical damage to plainiff's said line and the equipment thereof, from such surges and induction, within three years last past has amounted to the sum of $2,000."

Appellant contends that these allegations constitute the defendant's power lines a nuisance, within the meaning of section 3479, Civil Code. On the other hand, the respondent maintains that a distinction exists between cases where a plaintiff has been making an ordinary use of his property and is prevented from doing so by inductive interference, and cases where both plaintiff and defendant are making an extraordinary use of their property and inconvenience results to one in this extraordinary use of his property by reason of the use of the other. The case of Eastern & S. A. Teleg. Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Co. [1902] A. C. 381, 2 B. R. C. 114, 126 -P. C., contains the following language: "A man cannot increase the liabilities of his neighbor by applying his own property to special uses, whether for business or pleasure. The principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 6 Mor. Min. Rep. 129, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 256, which subjects to a high liability the owner who uses his property for purposes other than those which are natural, would become doubly penal if it implied a liability created and measured by the non-natural uses of his neighbor's property."

In the instant case the use of each party is extraordinary, and each makes a similar use, though differ

Electricity

duction from power line.

ent in degree. The distinction between the rights of liability for in- parties thus situated and the respective rights of parties where one is engaged in the ordinary development of his land and the other is subjecting his land to an extraordinary use is pointed out in the case of Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Chicago, L. S. & S. B. R. Co. 48 Ind. App. 584, 589, 92 N. E. 989, 991, 95 N. E. 596, where the court says: "This controversy is between users of electricity-appellant using light currents, and comparatively delicate instruments, which are interrupted by escaping currents from the wires belonging to appellee which carry exceedingly high voltage. It is not a question between one engaged in the ordinary development of his land and the customary and appropriate employment of it according to its inherent qualities and its surroundings, without bringing upon it artificially [of] any substance not naturally found there (Evans v. Reading Chemical Fertilizing Co. 160 Pa. 209, 28 Atl. 702; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 57 Am. Rep. 445, 6 Atl. 453), and one engaged in the unnatural and extraordinary use of his property, calling for the application of the maxim Sic utere tuo, etc., which is the governing principle in the cases Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Exch. 265, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 235, and Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 256, 6 Mor. Min. Rep. 129. In this case the use of electricity is common to both parties, and both are acting under legislative sanction. In such cases it seems to be the consensus of opinion, both in England and in this country, that where one is acting under legislative authority, and within the right thus given, and reasonably within the exercise thereof, using care and caution regarding the rights of his neighbor, any inconvenience or incidental damage that may arise in the absence of any negligence from the reasonable use of his own prop

erty will be regarded as within the rule damnum absque injuria."

In Phillippay v. Pacific Power & Light Co. 120 Wash. 581, 23 A.L.R. 1251, 207 Pac. 957, 211 Pac. 872, the telephone company brought action against the power company for the cost of metallicizing a telephone line to prevent inductive interference and for loss of profits occasioned by such interference. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed upon appeal. This case reviews, at some length, the conflicting authorities concerning the relative rights of telephone and telegraph companies and power companies and accepts the rule of nonliability for inductive interference, using the following language: "The appellant contends that it, being rightfully on the highway by reason of a franchise properly granted, was under no duty of metallicizing or bearing the cost of metallicizing the telephone line. The respondent contends that, since the power line interfered with the use of the telephones, that company should bear the expense of metallicizing. The controlling question, then, is whether the power company was under obligation to bear such cost. This question is one of first impression in this court. It should be remembered, in considering the question, that the telephone company did not own the land through which, with its single line system, the current returned to the point of origin. The weight of authority, so far as the question has been determined, is in favor of nonliability of the power company."

The case of Yamhill County Mut. Teleph. Co. v. Yamhill Electric Co. 111 Or. 57, 33 A.L.R. 373, 224 Pac. 1081, is in harmony with the view above quoted, as are the cases of Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Chicago, L. S. & S. B. R. Co. 49 Ind. App. 697, 97 N. E. 20; Citizens' Teleph. Co. v. Ft. Wayne & S. R. Co. 53 Ind. App. 230, 100 N. E. 309, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 132. The rule is summarized in 20 C. J. 315, as follows: "As has been said, however, the right of the first

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