return, owed him homage, followed him to war, and paid him various kinds of dues. The term may have borne this looser meaning at a comparatively late period of the feudal era, but a more exact, and probably more correct definition of the position originally occupied by the suzerain is afforded by Pothier. Tenure in full fief and in under fief, the latter informs us, are thus distinguished: a heritage is held in full fief from a seignory when allegiance is due directly to the lord of the seignory; when allegiance is not due directly to the superior lord, but is owed to a vassal of the seignory, then there is an under fief. The holder in full fief is called simply vassal in relation to the lord of the seignory, and the lord, in relation to him, is called lord simply. The holder of the under fief is called under vassal in relation to the lord of the seignory, and that lord, in relation to him, is called lord paramount (seigneur suzerain). The under vassal is not properly the vassal of the lord of the seignory, inasmuch as he has not undertaken any duty towards him, so that the rule applies vasallus mei vasalli non est meus vasallus; but he may and will effectively become vassal in case of the reuniting of his fief with that of which it is held, or in case the lord reunites with his own holding that of his immediate vassal.

As the term has been incorporated into International Law it evidently approaches more closely to the definition given by Calvo than to that of Pothier, and it is obvious, if some of the acknowledged cases of the relationship of suzerain and vassal are carefully considered (those of Turkey to Roumania or Egypt, for instance, and of Great Britain to the Transvaal) that the reciprocal duties are by no means identical. Mr. Hall, in his work on International Law, treats the

relationship in a very general manner. States under the Suzerainty of others are, he says, portions of the latter, which during a process of gradual disruption, or by the grace of the sovereign, have acquired certain of the powers of an independent community, such as that of making commercial conventions, or of confirming the appointment of foreign consuls. Their position differs from that of confederated or protected States, inasmuch as a presumption exists against their possession of any international capacity. A member of a confederation, or a protected State is prima facie independent, and consequently possesses all rights which it has not expressly resigned; a State under Suzerainty, being admittedly part of another State, has those rights only which have been expressly granted to it, and the assumption of larger powers of external action than those which have been distinctly conceded to it is an act of rebellion. Here Mr. Hall appears to agree with Lords Selborne and Kimberley that the vassal State is entitled to the independent management of its internal affairs. His description of the relative positions of suzerain and vassal will, however, scarcely harmonise with all the cases in which the relationship exists or has existed, and Dr. Stubbs, in an article in THE LAW MAGAZINE for

1882, has provided us with more

detailed and exhaustive information on this intricate question.

States subject to vassalage may be divided into two classes, according to whether the vassalage is unmodified by express terms (is a nude vassalage, as it has been called), or the vassalage has been modified by express terms of a more or less onerous description. As regards the former class there is, it appears, practical unanimity among the authorities, whether they be writers on Inter

national Law generally, or have more particularly considered the subject of national seignory, that States falling within it do possess the status of international persons. This view presents some difficulty, for clearly the possession of sovereign rights should entitle the possessors to external as well as internal control, and it is questionable how far a State which is in a condition of vassalage to another can be said to have control of its external relations. Dr. Stubbs, however, considers the position of the States in this class as closely analogous to that of persons who under the feudal system rendered plain or simple homage, which involved only the obligation to be faithful and to render service in war by deputy.

If it be necessary to determine which of the three kinds of homage (i.e., ordinary, plain, or liege) was the one due from a sovereign vassal, it will appear that it could only be the plain or simple homage, the homagium feodale. Real, indeed, says that the simple homage is the kind rendered by those who, without being by the nature of their fiefs in any dependence on another prince, yet render homage for the purpose of obtaining protection. This is exactly the case of the sovereign vassal States. Whether

the form of simple homage was that adopted in the case of sovereign vassalages or not is, however, of little consequence. It is sufficient to recognise that the special characteristics of the other two kinds of homage were from the nature of the seignories absent in the case of sovereign vassalages, and that their duties were therefore only fidelity, respect, and such service as one sovereign State can render to another.

That service with the suzerain in time of war was, and still may be a condition of such a vassalage, is proved by the fact that Egypt sent a military contigent to the assistance of Turkey in the Turko-Russian War; but the liability to the jurisdiction of the suzerain, involved in both ordinary and liege homage, has

always been absent from the relationship of Suzerainty and vassalage between States, as is clear from the case of the Transvaal, where the right of appeal to Her Majesty in

Council determined as soon as that State became autonomous. And plain homage being the rule as between States, it would seem to be beyond dispute that, where there have been no express conditions limiting the rights of the vassal, the vassal State is regarded as de facto sovereign, and possesses in full all the rights consequent on the attributes of sovereignty, subject only to restriction against the exercise of those rights in a manner derogatory

a

the due rendering of fidelity, service, and respect to its suzerain. It possesses the right of embassy, both towards its suzerain and to foreign States, the right of negotiation and of entering into treaties, the right of making wars and alliances with third Powers, though the two last rights must not be exercised to the prejudice of the suzerain Power. In the instance of war, the duty of fidelity would apparently forbid the vassal to take up arms against the suzerain, but since, as Dr. Stubbs observes, “Suzerainty gives no right of interference with the affairs of the vassal, but only to certain services, so an attempt to interfere with its freedom or other privileges may, it is presumed, be justly repelled by force." This, of course, does not prevent the suzerain from intervening in the internal affairs of its vassal in those cases in which it would be lawfully entitled to intervene in those of a State of its own standing, in order, for instance, to protect its subjects from ill-usage, or where the misgovernment of the vassal State is such as to react injuriously on the prosperity of the suzerain. It shows, however,

that the title of Suzerainty alone is not sufficient to justify intervention, except where the ordinary meaning of the word has been modified by express agreement between the suzerain and vassal Powers.

The extent to which service is due from the vassal State to its suzerain is deserving of a moment's consideration. It is perfectly clear that such service must always be rendered when the suzerain is in extremity, since that is a necessary corollary from the duty of mutual protection essential to the condition of vassalage; and it would seem that assistance is bound to be rendered during the continuance of all wars waged by the suzerain State, if such assistance is required. all vassals owed service," writes Dr. Stubbs, "limited or unlimited, personal or by deputy, without reference to the danger of the suzerain, but merely to his need, the service must therefore have been due in every war waged by the suzerain, and vassal States should be equally liable, while, as has been shown in the case of Naples, the practice appears to bear out the principle."

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To come now to the second class of vassalage: where vassal States have been erected capable of sovereignty, the question whether they are or are not actually sovereign may become a matter of some perplexity. The vassal is clearly a sovereign State if so defined by the terms of the convention of settlement. When in former times princes intended to create nonsovereign vassals, they in most cases expressly reserved the sovereignty to themselves. The inference accordingly was that sovereignty, if not verbally retained, was included in the grant and became an attribute of the vassal seignory. It would, however, seem to be a fair presumption at the present day, that if the suzerain Power is found to be in the exercise of some

of

of the rights which would naturally belong to the vassal were it a sovereign State, sovereignty has been reserved by the suzerain, and we may take it that there are few instances Suzerainty in modern times in which there has not been, in one way or another, a reservation of the abstract rights of sovereignty from the grant. Where this reservation has been made, where, in other words, the Suzerainty is not plainly nominal, the vassal State can, of course, only exercise such rights as have been granted to it by the instrument to which it owes its existence.

The liabilities already mentioned as attaching to nude vassalages, attach equally, it need hardly be said, to States whose vassalage is not of so nominal a character. What, however, are the rights of sovereignty which may be deducted from the grant without creating nude vassalage on the one hand, or complete subjection on the other, it is rather difficult to determine. The vassal State must obviously be allowed some power of internal control to remove it from the second category, while it would seem probable that all, and not merely some of, the external or international rights of sovereignty must be retained by the suzerain, if the latter is desirous of maintaining any real control over its vassal's actions. The relation between Egypt and the Porte is fairly representative of the second kind of vassalage, and shows in addition how Suzerainty may undergo subsequent modification in one direction or the other. In 1840 the administration of the Pachalic was granted by the Sultan of Turkey to Mehemet Ali and his descendants in the direct line, with the right to collect and retain to his own profit taxes and customs, and to maintain military and naval forces. But complete internal control was not granted;

there was no right of legislation, and the laws of the Ottoman Empire were to apply to Egypt. The powers then conferred were confirmed and extended at various subsequent dates, and complete autonomy, including the right of legislation, was given by a firman of 1867, even to the extent of entering into arrangements with foreign agents in furtherance of the financial and commercial interests of the country. The original sovereign rights of the Porte were, however, expressly reserved, and Egypt could

conclude no treaties with any political signification.

From what has been said it will be understood that Suzerainty is a word which may express very distinct degrees of relationship between the parties which it connects; but if the bare term does not convey very precise information as to the rights and duties existing in a particular instance, it at least indicates the limits within which those rights and duties may be sought for. TEMPLAR

THE life of an Englishwoman in one of the little wooden towns away out on the American prairies must, I am bound to say, be described as monotonous; while, if she cannot adapt herself to circumstances and make the best of her surroundings, her fate is indeed pitiful. Housekeeping is a very simple affair, when the household goods are kept at an irreducible minimum with no opportunity of throwing away money on furniture, for the good reason that there is none to be got in the place; and when all your rooms are on the ground-floor, in case of danger from fire, there is little trouble in keeping things straight. Shopping is an impossibility, and in the matter of clothes, all you have to do is to wear out the stock of old ones which you brought with you. Cooking is of the sort called plain, and your only trouble is to be able to provide variety enough.

With the Canadian women, the case is different. Their whole time is occupied in multiplying labour about the house; they bake their own bread, and are adepts at wonderful cakes built up in different-coloured layers; when they sit down, they are for ever sewing or knitting, making useless articles with which they adorn their bedrooms or decorate the walls; books they never look at, and when nothing else remains, they upset the whole place in order to put it to rights again.

I knew one farmer's wife who made about ten different kinds of preserves from the various wild berries that grow in the bluffs, and when you can

buy such delicacies for a trifle, and capital bread from some excellent woman in town for a dollar a dozen, it would be foolish to bother about it yourself. You might amuse yourself with rearing fowls and getting eggs when there were none to be procured for love or money; and of an afternoon in summer you might wander over the prairie in search of wild flowers, many of which are the originals of those growing in the gardens at home. Sometimes there was a dance at a farmer's house in the country, or a picnic to the Qu'appelle valley when work was slack in the fine weather; otherwise there was nothing but whist, and that generally involved an expedition to some Englishman's house at a distance; though I confess I have known Jack on an election-day to suspend the polling for half-an-hour or more, on the ostensible ground that voters were not coming in, but really for the purpose of retiring to a back-room with the electionclerk and the poll-clerk (both English, needless to say,) for the sake of a quiet rubber. But this, I think, exhausts the list in a general way, and afterwards you must fall back upon the study of the ways and customs of the natives.

In the face of such monotony it will be readily seen that a very slight cause is hailed as an excuse for a diversion, and on this particular occasion, it was that simple but obtrusive matter, a tooth-ache. Is that all, you ask? Then why not go into the next street and find the nearest dentist? Quite so, but in the first place, there were no streets at the