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THE CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT.

of what is known as the " courtesy of the senate," the spirit and proceedings of feudal times. To quote from a recent discussion of this point, in the Princeton Review:1 "Under the extension of the courtesy' to removals, it follows that, as to all those five hundred officers, excepting at most the thirty-three serving at Washington, their removal really depends on the will of the senators of the state where these officials respectively serve." "The power and prestige of the executive are thus enfeebled and degraded in the estimation of his own subordinates in the same degree that senators are exalted and are tempted to become domineering patronage monopolists at Washington, and feudal purveyors of places and despots in partisan politics at home." 8

Again, no less must a government truly democratic be a government "by the people." That form of government is oligarchic, rather than democratic, in which the control is concentrated in the hands of a few, to the exclusion of the body of the people. In this country political control is vested in the exercise of the suffrage. But such is the management of the office-holding body in some states that but a small portion of the citizens are admitted to the exercise of this right. A volume published in 1880, entitled "The Independent movement in New York," explains with much fulness the "New York system of primaries." They are "a series of permanent clubs or companies." And the writer adds: They must have members enough to make a pretence of popular representation, but they must not be so numerous as to become unmanageable." To show the extent to which this power is committed to a few men, consider, he says, that, "in a city of a million, six thousand club men are sufficient." 4 Mr. Dorman B. Eaton, also, in the article already referred to, 5 states other features: "Life-long adhesion to the Republican party, and un

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1 Princeton Review, Sept., 1881, p. 167.

2 Referring to certain officers in the Treasury Department.

3 The reform of the civil service not only aims to remove the system of appoint. ments from politics, but to restore the appointing power to the executive, as enjoined by the constitution.

"The Independent movement," p. 168.

5 Princeton Review, Sept., 1881, p. 159.

broken support of its principles, do not even create a presumptive right to pass the doors of any one of these primaries; and until admitted to one of them no recognized as a member of the party, nor can he vote or be heard on any nomination of delegates." In this

man is

system "the civil officials" are "the spoils-system generals, colonels, and captains."' How demoralizing to true citizenship is any such substitution of personal rule for the support of the principles of a free government is obvious. Civil-service reform, as everywhere understood, means the utter divorce of official interference from the expression by the citizens of their choice of officers."

Yet, conceding all that has been stated, the charge is sometimes made, that a system of official selection, promotion, and service will raise up an official class, or caste, out of sympathy with the people, and not responsible to them. In order that this should result, however, it would be necessary that the body of office-holders should control and dispense patronage; should be drawn from a similar or uniform class of society; and be beyond fear of interference or removal for cause. But this reform provides for competitive examinations, open to all classes and localities and shades of opinion, and demanding only that the applicant be found fit for the place.3 The tenure of office, again, is not beyond reach of necessary limitation; but while securely removed from envious partisanship it is at the same time distinctly subject to the proper discharge of duties.

Those who see in this reform the bugbear of an aristocratic class should study the history of civil-service reform in Great Britain, where it had to meet at the outset the objection, not that it was "not democratic," but that it was "too democratic," and would allow the "lower classes to compete and enter the service; and

1 Princeton Review, Sept., 1881, p. 158.

2 See the Willis bill," To prevent extortion," coercion, etc.

3 As a level-headed daily paper (the Boston Herald, has remarked, in commenting on this claim, "One element in good behavior is courtesy to the public; and we do not fear that placing the service on merit would endanger our liberities."

4 One of the provisions of the Pendleton bill is "that no person in the public service is for that reason under any obligation to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so." (Sect. 2, rule 6.)

where, as the result has proved, the service has been practically opened to men of any social rank whatever, provided they possess the real qualifications for the position.

To quote Mr. Eaton once more: "There is no more politics in a British custom-house than in a college, a regiment, or a church. Neither members of parliament, great officers, nor politicians have any patronage in connection with such offices. The son of a duke or a bishop, if he would gain an appointment over the son of a drayman or a stoker, must show himself the better man in open competition by his side."1

In this country we know no rank or class distinction, and, in this light, civil-service reform, we shall admit, is democratic.

Another point yet remains to be considered. A recent writer on the subject claims that in view of the fact that "the public places are public property," "the active participation by the largest number of persons in the practical administration of their own government" is an "object highly to be desired." It is to be feared that this writer's views are somewhat confused on this point. It is clear that by "practical administration he means holding an office; and yet only one hundred thousand offices for fifty millions of people is a ludicrously small allowance, and not "enough to go around." He has not clearly apprehended the nature of our government. This is a representative republic, and it is by the exercise of the right of suffrage that each citizen makes his voice heard in its administration, rather than by holding an office.3

Lastly, it may be said that the system to be reformed

1 See also Mr. Eaton's "Civil service in Great Britain," p. 259, 316. 2 Lippincott's Magazine, Dec., 1880, v. 296, p. 690-97.

A New England journal (Providence Journal) remarks, that in too many instances "the American citizen is taught from his youth up, that the possession of a public office is proof of the estimation, or, at any rate, will command the respect, of the people; that it is to be sought to be attained by a struggle commencing with the first effort in a debating society; that anybody may be President, and that all ought to strive to be somebody officially;"" and admonishes citizens of the wholesome "fact that office is a trust which imposes responsibility, and reflects no credit upon any one who cannot properly fulfil its duties; that it is not to be scrambled for as the most essential thing in life, to be obtained at the sacrifice of the heart, the judgment, and the conscience."

is undemocratic because it discourages "the active participation by the largest number of persons," not as this writer urges, "in the practical administration of" the government, but in the act of suffrage itself, and the preliminary meetings for expressing choice of officers. Besides the instances already cited of involuntary dis franchisement, there has been forming, during the last twenty-five years, an element in American citizenship which is, rightly or wrongly, withdrawing its participation and influence from the politics of the country. Disgusted at the abuses and outrages of the partisan system, overborne and neutralized by the office-holding influence, they have subtracted their votes, and their interest1 as well, from the country to which they belong. It is easy to say that they are blameworthy. Indeed, "the continued neglect of the caucus," to quote from a recent address,2 2 will work the ruin of the republic, for it means in the end the utter decay of all real interest in public affairs." The proposed reform strikes at the root of these evils. It aims to introduce efficiency into administration, and to protect the exercise of each citizen's fundamental right of suffrage from official manipulation and interference.

1 Yet there are indications that the class of citizens most alienated by longcontinued abuses from active interest and participation in politics are seeing their way clear to renewing their influence. There is much truth in the significant utter. ance of the late Professor Diman: "It is in the indirect and slower process of appealing to public opinion that the ultimate vindication of truth and justice is assured." In this sense, he adds, the educated citizen "is a spiritual power in the state that no factions can outwit, that no majorities can overwhelm."["The alienation of the educated class from politics," by J. L. Diman ( B K oration at Cambridge, June 29, 1876), p. 26.

2 Address of Mr. A. Thayer, before the Massachusetts Club, Oct. 8, 1SS1.

CHAPTER II.

IT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

BUT the reform is objected to, not only on the ground that it is out of harmony with the spirit of our institutions, but with the letter also; that it conflicts with the provisions of the constitution itself. Let us see, first, what the constitution really provides. Next let us observe what is actually the case under the present system, and, afterwards, what the proposed reform requires. What does the constitution provide? In Sect. 2, art. 2, it specifies that "he" (i.e., the president) shall nominate, and, by and with the advice. and consent of the senate, shall appoint, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments."

What is the practice which has grown up under the partisan system of public service? Let answer be made in the forcible language of Gen. Garfield, in 1870, when a member of the house of representatives1:

"We go" (i.e., the legislators), "man by man, to the heads of these several departments, and say: Here is a friend of mine; give him a place.' We press such appointments upon the departments; we crowd the doors; we fill the corridors; senators and representatives throng the offices and bureaus until the public business is obstructed; the patience of officers is worn out, and sometimes, for fear of losing their places by our influence, they at last give way, and appoint men, not because they are fit for their positions, but because we ask it."

1 Congressional Globe, March 14, 1870, p. 1940.