it may be asked, in whofe hands are the reins of government to be entrusted? To this the general anfwer is eafy; but the application of it to particular cafes has occafioned one half of those mischiefs, which are apt to proceed from mifguided political zeal. In general, all mankind will agree that government should be repofed in fuch perfons, in whom thofe qualities are most likely to be found, the perfection of which is among the attributes of him who is emphatically ftiled the fupreme being; the three grand requifites, I mean of wisdom, of goodness, and of power: wifdom, to difcern the real interest of the community; goodness, to endeavour always to pursue that real intereft; and ftrength, or power, to carry this knowledge and intention into action. Thefe are the natural foundations of fovereignty, and these are the requifites that ought to be found in every well conftituted frame of government.

How the feveral forms of government we now fee in the world at first actually began, is matter of great uncertainty, and has occafioned infinite difputes. It is not my business or intention to enter into any of them. However they began, or by what right foever they subfift, there is and must be in all of [49] them a fupreme, irrefiftible, abfolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura fummi imperii, or the rights of fovereignty, refide. And this authority is placed in thofe hands, wherein (according to the opinion of the founders of such respective states, either exprefsly given, or collected from their tacit approbation) the qualities requifite for fupremacy, wifdom, goodnefs, and power, are the most likely to be found.

THE political writers of antiquity will not allow more than three regular forms of government; the firft, when the fovereign power is lodged in an aggregate affembly confifting of all the free members of a community, which is called a democracy; the fecond, when it is lodged in a council, compofed of felect members, and then it is ftiled an aristocracy; the laft, when it is entrusted in the hands of a fingle perfon, and then it takes the name of a monarchy. All other fpecies

of government, they fay, are either corruptions of, or reducible to, these three.

By the fovereign power, as was before obferved, is meant the making of laws; for wherever that power refides, all others must conform to, and be directed by it, whatever appearance the outward form and adminiftration of the government may put on. For it is at any time in the option of the legiflature to alter that form and adminiftration by a new edict or rule, and to put the execution of the laws into whatever hands it pleases; by conftituting one, or a few, or many executive magiflrates: and all the other powers of the state muft obey the legiflative power in the difcharge of their fe veral functions, or elfe the conftitution is at an end.

In a democracy, where the right of making laws refides in the people at large, public virtue, or goodness of intention, is more likely to be found, than either of the other qualitics of government. Popular affemblies are frequently foolish in their contrivance, and weak in their execution; but generally mean to do the thing that is right and juft, and have always a degree of patriotifm or public fpirit. In [50] aristocracies there is more wifdom to be found, than in the other frames of government; being compofed, or intended to be compofed, of the moft experienced citizens: but there is lefs honefty than in a republic, and lefs ftrength than in a monarchy. A monarchy is indeed the most powerful of any; for by the entire conjunction of the legislative and executive powers all the finews of government are knit together, and united in the hand of the prince: but then there is imminent danger of his employing that ftrength to improvident or oppreffive purposes.

Thus there three fpecies of government have, all of them, their feveral perfections and imperfections. Democracies are ufually the best calculated to direct the end of a law; ariftocracies to invent the means by which that end fhall be obtained; and monarchies to carry thofe means into execu

of government, they fay, are either corruptions of, or reducible to, thefe three.

By the fovereign power, as was before obferved, is meant the making of laws; for wherever that power refides, all others must conform to, and be directed by it, whatever appearance the outward form and administration of the government may put on. For it is at any time in the option of the legiflature to alter that form and adminiftration by a new edict or rule, and to put the execution of the laws into whatever hands it pleafes; by conftituting one, or a few, or many executive magifirates: and all the other powers of the state must obey the legislative power in the difcharge of their fe veral functions, or elfe the conftitution is at an end.

In a democracy, where the right of making laws refides in the people at large, public virtue, or goodness of intention, is more likely to be found, than either of the other qualities of government. Popular affemblics are frequently foolish in their contrivance, and weak in their execution; but generally mean to do the thing that is right and just, and have always a degree of patriotifm or public fpirit. In [50] aristocracies there is more wifdem to be found, than in the other frames of government; being compofed, or intended. to be compofed, of the most experienced citizens: but there is lefs honefty than in a republic, and lefs ftrength than in a monarchy. A monarchy is indeed the most powerful of any; for by the entire conjunction of the legislative and executive powers all the finews of government are knit together, and united in the hand of the prince: but then there is imminent danger of his employing that ftrength to improvident or oppreffive purpofes.

THUS thefe three fpecies of government have, all of them, their feveral perfections and imperfections. Democracies are ufually the beft calculated to direct the end of a law; ariftocracies to invent the means by which that end fhall be obtained; and monarchies to carry thofe means into execu

tion. And the antients, as was obferved, had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government but these three: for though Cicero declares himself of opinion. " effe optime conflitutam rempublicam, quae ex tribus generibus illis, regali, "optimo, et populari, fit modice confufa," yet Tacitus treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a vifionary whim, and one that, if effected, could never be lafting or secure

BUT, happily for us of this ifland, the British conftitution has long remained, and I trust will long continue, a standing exception to the truth of this obfervation. For, as with us the executive power of the laws is lodged in a fingle perfon, they have all the advantages of ftrength and difpatch, that are to be found in the most abfolute monarchy: and as the legislature of the kingdom is entrusted to three distinct powers, entirely independent of each other; first, the king; fecondly, the lords fpiritual and temporal, which is an aristocratical affembly of perfons felected for their piety, their birth their wifdom, their valour, or their property; [51] and, thirdly, the house of commons, freely chofen by the people from among themfelves, which makes it a kind of democracy; as this aggregate body, actuated by different fprings, and attentive to different interefts, compofes the British parliament, and has the fupreme difpofal of every thing; there can noinconvenience be attempted by either of the three branches, but will be withstood by one of the other two; each branch being armed with a negative power, fufficient to repel any innovation which it fhall think inexpedient or dangerous.

HERE then is lodged the fovereignty of the British conftitution; and lodged as beneficially as is poffible for fociety. For in no other shape could we be fo certain of finding the three great qualities of government fo well and fo happily