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two persons, without the consent of whom the king could not remit the punishment of any offence.

The King of England has an exclusive power in regard to foreign affairs, war, peace, treaties;-in all that relates to military affairs, he has the disposal of the existing army, of the fleet, &c. The King of Sweden had no such extensive powers; but they nevertheless existed; every thing relating to the above-mentioned objects was transacted in the assembly of the senate; the majority decided; the king was obliged to submit to it; and his only privilege consisted in his vote being accounted two.*

If we pursue farther our inquiry on the subject, we shall find that the King of Sweden could not raise whom he please to the office of senator, as the King of England can in regard to the office of member of the privy council; but the Swedish states, in the assembly of whom the nobility enjoyed most capital advantages, possessed a share of the power we mention, in conjunction with the king; and in cases of vacancies in the senate, they elected three persons, out of whom the king was to return one.

The King of England may, at all times, deprive the ministers of their employments. The King of Sweden could remove no man from his office; but the states enjoyed the power that had been denied to the king; and they might deprive of their places both the senators, and those persons in general who had a share in the administration.

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* The Swedish senate was fully composed of sixteen members. In regard to affairs of smaller moment they formed themselves into two divisions in either of these, when they did sit, the presence of seven members was required for the effectual transacting of business. affairs of importance the assembly was formed of the whole senate; and the presence of ten members was required to give force to the resolutions. When the king could not or would not take his seat, the senate proceeded nevertheless, and the majority continued to be equally decisive.

As the royal seal was necessary for putting in execution the resolutions of the senate, King Adolphus Frederick tried, by refusing to lend the same, to procure that power which he had not by his suffrage, and to stop the proceedings of the senate. Great debates in consequence of that pretension arose, and continued for a while; but at last, in the year 1756, the king was overruled by the senate, who ordered a seal to be made, that was named the king's seal, which they affixed to their official resolutions when the king refused to lend his own.

The King of England has the power of dissolving, or keeping assembled, his parliament. The King of Sweden had not that power; but the states might of themselves prolong their duration as they thought proper.

Those who think that the prerogative of a king cannot be too much abridged, and that power loses all its influence on the dispositions and views of those who possess it, according to the kind of name used to express the offices by which it is conferred, may be satisfied, no doubt, to behold those branches of power that were taken from a king distri-. buted to several bodies, and shared by the representatives of the people; but those who think that power, when parcelled and diffused, is never so well repressed and regulated as when it is confined to a sole indivisible seat, which keeps the nation united and awake,-those who know, that, names by no means altering the intrinsic nature of things, the representatives of the people, as soon as they are invested with independent authority, become, ipso facto, its masters, -those persons, I say, will not think it a very happy regulation in the former constitution of Sweden to have deprived the king of prerogatives formerly attached to his office, in order to vest the same either in a senate, or in the deputies of the people; and thus to have intrusted with a share in the exercise of the public power, those very men whose constitutional office should have been to watch and restrain it.

From the indivisibility of the governing authority in England, a community of interest takes place among all orders of men: and hence arises, as a necessary consequence, the liberty enjoyed by all ranks of subjects. This observation has been insisted upon at length in the course of the present work. The shortest reflection on the frame of the human heart suffices to convince us of its truth, and at the same time manifests the danger that would result from making any changes in the form of the existing government, by which this general community of interest might be lessened, unless we are at the same time also determined to believe, that partial nature forms men in this island with sentiments very different from the selfish and ambitious dispositions which have ever been found in other countries.*

* Such regulations as may essentially effect, through their conse

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But experience does not by any means allow us to entertain so pleasing an opinion. The perusal of the history of this country will show us, that the care of its legislators, for the welfare of the subject, always kept pace with the

quences, the equipoise of a government, may be brought about, even though the promoters themselves of those regulations are not aware of their tendency. When the bill passed in the seventeenth century, by which it was enacted that the Crown should give up its prerogative of dissolving the Parliament then sitting, the generality of people had no thought of the calamitous consequences that were to follow: very far from it. The King himself certainly felt no very great apprehension on that account, else he would not have given his assent; and the Commons themselves, it appears, had very faint notions of the capital changes which the bill would speedily effect in their political situation.

When the Crown of Sweden was, in the first instance, stripped of all the different prerogatives we have mentioned, it does not appear that those measures were effected by sudden open provisions for that purpose it is very probable that the way had been paved for them by indirect regulations formerly made, the whole tendency of which scarcely any one, perhaps, could foresee at the time they were framed.

When the bill was in agitation for limiting the House of Peers to a certain number, its great constitutional consequences were scarcely attended to by any body. The King himself certainly saw no harm in it, since he sent an open message to promote the passing of it: a measure which was not, perhaps, strictly regular. The bill was, it appears, generally approved out of doors. Its fate was for a long while doubtful in the House of Commons; nor did they acquire any favour with the bulk of the people by finally rejecting it; and Judge Blackstone, as I find in his Commentaries, does not seem to have thought much of the bill, and its being rejected, as he only observes that the Commons "wished to keep the door of the House of Lords as open as possible." Yet, no bill of greater constitutional importance was ever agitated in Parliament; since the consequences of its being passed would have been the freeing the House of Lords, both in their judicial and legislative capacities, from all constitutional check whatever, either from the Crown or the nation. Nay, it is not to be doubted that they would have acquired, in time, the right of electing their own members; though it would be useless to point out here by what series of intermediate events the measure might have been brought about. Whether there existed any actual project of this kind among the first framers of the bill, does not appear; but a certain number of the members of the House we mention would have thought of it soon enough, if the bill in question had been enacted into a law; and they would certainly have met with success, had they been contented to wait, and had they taken time. Other equally important changes in the substance, and perhaps the outward form, of the government would have followed.

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exigencies of their own situation. When, through the minority, or easy temper of the reigning prince, or other circumstances, the dread of a superior power began to be overlooked, the public cause was immediately deserted in a greater or less degree, and pursuit after private influence and lucrative offices took the place of patriotism. When, in the reign of Charles the First, the authority of the Crown was for a while annihilated, those very men, who till then had talked of nothing but Magna Charta and liberty, instantly endeavoured openly to trample both under foot.

Since the time we mention, the former constitution of the government having been restored, the great outlines of public liberty have indeed been warmly and seriously defended; but if any partial unjust laws or regulations have been made, especially since the revolution of the year 1689, -if any abuses injurious to particular classes of individuals have been suffered to continue, it will certainly be found upon inquiry, that those laws and those abuses were of such a complexion, that from them, the members of the legislature well knew, neither they nor their friends would ever be likely to suffer.

If, through the unforeseen operations of some new regulation made to restrain the royal prerogative, or through some sudden public revolution, any particular bodies or classes of individuals were ever to acquire a personal independent share in the exercise of the governing authority, we should behold the public virtue and patriotism of the legislators and great men immediately cease with its cause, and aristocracy, as it were, watchful of the opportunity, burst out at once, and spread itself over the kingdom.

The men who are now the ministers, but then the partners of the Crown, would instantly set themselves above the reach of the law, and soon after ensure the same privilege to their several supporters or dependents.

Personal and independent power becoming the only kind of security of which men could now show themselves ambitious, the Habeas Corpus act, and in general all those laws which subjects of every rank regard with veneration, and to which they look up for protection and safety, would be spoken of with contempt, and mentioned as remedies fit only for

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peasants and cits: it even would not be long before they would be set aside, as obstructing the wise and salutary steps of the senate.

The pretensions of an equality of right in all subjects of whatever rank and order, to their property and to personal safety, would soon be looked upon as an old-fashioned doctrine, which the judge himself would ridicule from the bench. And the liberty of the press, now so universally and warmly vindicated, would, without loss of time, be cried down and suppressed, as only serving to keep up the insolence and pride of a refractory people.

And let us not believe, that the mistaken people, whose representatives we now behold making such a firm stand against the indivisible power of the Crown, would, amidst the general devastation of every thing they hold dear, easily find men equally disposed to repress the encroaching, while attainable, power of a senate and body of nobles.

The time would be no more, when the people, upon whatever men they should fix their choice, would be sure to find them ready sincerely to join in the support of every important branch of public liberty.

Present or expected personal power, and independence on the laws, being now the consequence of the trust of the people,wherever they should apply for servants, they would only meet with betrayers. Corrupting, as it were, every thing they should touch, they could confer no favour upon an individual but to destroy his public virtue; and (to repeat the words used in a former chapter)" their raising a man would only be immediately inspiring him with views directly opposite to their own, and sending him to increase the number of their enemies."

All these considerations strongly point out the very great caution which is necessary to be used in the difficult business of laying new restraints on the governing authority. Let, therefore, the less informed part of the people, whose zeal requires to be kept up by visible objects, look (if they choose) upon the Crown as the only seat of the evils they are exposed to; mistaken notions on their part are less dangerous than political indifference; and they are more easily directed than roused;-but, at the same time, let the more enlightened part of the nation constantly remember, that the