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should have the force of law: by this act public liberty seemed to be irretrievably lost; and the parliament which passed it seemed to have done what the Danish nation did about a century afterwards. The same privilege procured. the peaceable abolition of the Court of Star-chamber,―a court which, though in itself illegal, had grown to be so respected through the length of time it had been suffered to exist, that it seemed to have for ever fixed and riveted the unlawful authority it conferred on the crown. By the same means was set aside the power which the privy council had assumed of imprisoning the subject without admitting to bail, or even mentioning any cause. This power was, in the first instance, declared illegal by the Petition of Right; and the attempts of both the crown and the judges to invalidate this declaration, by introducing or maintaining practices that were derogatory to it, were as often obviated, in a peaceable manner, by fresh declarations, and, in the end, by the celebrated Habeas Corpus act.*

I shall take this opportunity of observing, in general, how the different parts of the English government mutually assist and support each other. It is because the whole executive authority of the state is vested in the crown, that the people may without danger delegate the care of their liberty to representatives: it is because they share in the government only through these representatives, that they are enabled to possess the great advantage arising from framing and proposing new laws: but for this purpose it is again absolutely necessary that a correspondent prerogative of the Crown,

*The case of general warrants may also be mentioned as an instance. The issuing of such warrants, with the name of the person to be arrested left blank, was a practice that had been followed by the secretaries of state for above sixty years. In a government differently constituted, that is, in a government in which the magistrates, or executive power, should have been possessed of the key of legislation, it is difficult to say how the contest might have been terminated; these magistrates would have been but indifferently inclined to frame and bring forth a declaration which would abridge their assumed authority. In the republic of Geneva, the magistracy, instead of rescinding the judgment against Rousseau, of which the citizens complained, chose rather openly to avow the maxim, that standing uses were valid derogations from the written law, and ought to supersede it. This rendered the clamour more violent than before.

that is to say, a veto of extraordinary power, should exist in the state.

It is, on the other hand, because the balance of the people is placed in the right of granting to the crown its necessary supplies, that the latter may, without danger, be intrusted with the great authority we mention; and that the right, for instance, which is vested in it, of judging of the proper time for calling and dissolving parliaments (a right absolutely necessary to its preservation*) may exist without producing, ipso facto, the ruin of public liberty. The most singular government upon earth, and which has carried farthest the liberty of the individual, was in danger of total destruction, when Bartholomew Columbus was on his passage to England, to teach Henry the Seventh the way to Mexico and Peru.

As a conclusion of this subject (which might open a field for speculation without end) I shall take notice of an advantage peculiar to the English government, and which, more than any other we could mention, must contribute to its duration. All the political passions of mankind, if we attend to it, are satisfied and provided for in the English government; and whether we look at the monarchical, the aristocratical, or the democratical part of it, we find all those powers already settled in it in a regular manner, which have an unavoidable tendency to arise, at one time or other, in all human societies.

If we could for an instant suppose that the English form of government, instead of having been the effect of a concurrence of fortunate circumstances, had been established from a settled plan by a man who had discovered, beforehand and by reasoning, all those advantages resulting from it which we now perceive from experience, and had undertaken to point them out to other men capable of judging of what he said to them, the following is, most likely, the manner in which he would have expressed himself.

Nothing is more chimerical (he might have said) than a state either of total equality, or total liberty, amongst mankind. In all societies of men, some power will necessarily arise. This power, after gradually becoming confined to a

* As affairs are situated in England, the dissolution of a Parliament on the part of the Crown is no more than an appeal either to the people themselves, or to another Parliament.

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smaller number of persons, will, by a like necessity, at last fall into the hands of a single leader; and these two effects (of which you may see constant examples in history) arising from the ambition of one part of mankind, and from the various affections and passions of the other, are absolutely unavoidable.

"Let us, therefore, admit this evil at once, since it is impossible to avoid it. Let us, of ourselves, establish a chief among us, since we must, some time or other, submit to one; we shall, by this step, effectually prevent the conflicts that would arise among the competitors for that station. But let us, above all, avoid plurality; lest one of the chiefs, after successively raising himself on the ruin of his rivals, should, in the end, establish despotism, and that through a train of incidents the most pernicious to the nation.

"Let us even give him every thing we can confer without endangering our security. Let us call him our sovereign; let us make him consider the state as being his own patrimony; let us grant him, in short, such personal privileges as none of us can ever hope to rival him in; and we shall find that those things which we were at first inclined to consider as a great evil, will be in reality a source of advantage to the community. We shall be the better able to set bounds to that power which we shall have thus ascertained and fixed in one place. We shall thus rendermore interested the man whom we shall have put in possession of so many advantages, in the faithful discharge of his duty; and we shall procure, for each of us, a powerful protector at home, and for the whole community, a defender against foreign enemies, superior to all possible temptation of betraying his country.

"You may also have observed (he might continue) that in all states there naturally arise around the person or persons, who are invested with the public power, a class of men, who, without having any actual share in that power, yet partake of its lustre,--who pretending to be distinguished from the rest of the community, do from that very circumstance become distinguished from it; and this distinction, though only matter of opinion, and at first thus surreptitiously obtained, yet may become in time the source of very grievous effects.

"Let us therefore regulate this evil, which we cannot

entirely prevent. Let us establish this class of men, who would otherwise grow up among us without our knowledge, and gradually acquire the most pernicious privileges. Let us grant them distinctions that are visible and clearly ascertained: their nature will thus be the better undesrtood, and they will of course be much less likely to become dangerous. By the same means, also, we shall preclude all other persons from the hopes of usurping them. As to pretend to distinctions can thenceforward be no longer a title to obtain them, every one who shall not be expressly included in their number must continue to confess himself one of the people; and, just as we said before, 'Let us choose ourselves one master, that we may not have fifty,' we may now say, 'Let us establish three hundred lords, that we may not have ten thousand nobles.'

"Besides, our pride will better reconcile itself to a superiority which it will no longer think of disputing. Nay, as they will themselves see that we are beforehand in acknowledging it, they will think themselves under no necessity of being insolent to furnish us a proof of it. Secure as to their privileges, all violent measures on their part for maintaining, and at last perhaps extending them, will be prevented: they will never combine with any degree of vehemence, but when they really have cause to think themselves in danger; and by having made them indisputably great men, we shall have a chance of often seeing them behave like modest and virtuous citizens.

"In fine, by being united in a regular assembly, they will form an intermediate body in the state,-that is to say, a very useful part of the government.

But

"It is also necessary (our reasoning lawgiver might add) that we, the people, should have an influence upon government: it is necessary for our own security; it is no less necessary for the security of the government itself. experience must have taught you, at the same time, that a great body of men cannot act, without being, though they are not aware of it, the instruments of the designs of a small number of persons; and that the power of the people is never any thing but the power of a few leaders, who (though it may be impossible to tell when or how) have found means to secure to themselves the direction of its exercise.

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"Let us, therefore, be also beforehand with this other inconvenience. Let us effect openly what would otherwise take place in secret. Let us intrust our power, before it be taken from us by address. Those whom we shall have expressly made the depositories of it, being freed from any anxious care about supporting themselves, will have no object but to render it useful. They will stand in awe of us the more, because they well know that they have not imposed. upon us; and instead of a small number of leaders, who would imagine they derive their whole importance from their own dexterity, we shall have express and acknowledged representatives, who will be accountable to us for the evils of the state.

"But, above all, by forming our government with a small number of persons, we shall prevent any disorder that may take place in it from ever becoming dangerously extensive. Nay more, we shall render it capable of such inestimable combinations and resources, as would be utterly impossible in the government of all, which never can be anything but uproar and confusion.

"In short, by expressly divesting ourselves of a power, of which we should, at best, have only an apparent enjoyment, we shall be entitled to make conditions for ourselves; we will insist that our liberty be augmented; we will, above all, reserve to ourselves the right of watching and censuring that administration which will have been established by our own consent. We shall the better see its faults, because we shall be only spectators of it: we shall correct them the better, because we shall not have personally concurred in its operations."*

The English constitution being founded upon such principles as those we have just described, no true comparison can be made between it and the government of any other state; and since it evidently secures, not only the liberty,

* He might have added,—" As we will not seek to counteract nature, but rather to follow it, we shall be able to procure ourselves a mild legislation. Let us not be without cause afraid of the power of one man ; we shall have no need either of a Tarpeian rock, or of a council of ten. Having expressly allowed to the people a liberty to inquire into the conduct of government, and to endeavour to correct it, we shall need neither state-prisons, nor secret informers."