It is therefore a most advantageous circumstance in the English government, that its security renders all such expedients unnecessary, and that the representatives of the people have not only been constantly willing to promote the public liberty, but that the general situation of affairs has also enabled them to carry their precautions so far as they have done. And indeed, when we consider what prerogatives the crown, in England, has implicitly renounced;-that, in consequence of the independence conferred on the judges, and of the method of trial by jury, it is deprived of all means of influencing the settled course of the law both in civil and criminal matters-that it has renounced all power of seizing the property of individuals, and even of restraining in any manner whatsoever, and for the shortest time, the liberty of their persons ;-we do not know which we ought most to admire, whether the public virtue of those who have deprived the supreme executive power of all those dangerous prerogatives, or the nature of that same power, which has enabled it to give them up without ruin to itself,-whether the happy frame of the English government, which makes those in whom the people trust continue so faithful to the discharge of their duty, or the solidity of that same government, which can afford to leave to the people so extensive a degree of freedom.*

Again, the liberty of the press, that great advantage enjoyed by the English nation, does not exist in any of the other monarchies of Europe, however well established their

:

At the times of the invasions of the Pretender, assisted by the forces of hostile nations, the Habeas Corpus Act was indeed suspended (which, by the by, may serve as one proof that, in proportion as a government is in danger, it becomes necessary to abridge the liberty of the subject) but the executive power did not thus of itself stretch its own authority; the precaution was deliberated upon and taken by the representatives of the people; and the detaining of individuals in consequence of the suspension of the act was limited to a certain fixed time. Notwithstanding the just fears of internal and hidden enemies, which the circumstances of the times might raise, the deviation from the former course of the law was carried no farther than the single point we have mentioned. Persons detained by order of the Government were to be dealt with in the same manner as those arrested at the suit of private individuals; the proceedings against them were to be carried on no otherwise than in a public place; they were to be tried by their peers, and have all the usual legal means of defence allowed to them,-such as calling of witnesses, peremptory challenge of juries, &c.

THE PRESS.

ROME-VENICE.

275

power may at first seem to be; and it might even be demonstrated that it cannot exist in them. The most watchful eye, we see, is constantly kept in those monarchies upon every kind of publication; and a jealous attention is paid even to the loose and idle speeches of individuals. Much unnecessary trouble (we may be apt at first to think) is taken upon this subject: but yet, if we consider how uniform is the conduct of all those governments, how constant and unremitted are their cares in those respects, we shall become convinced, without looking farther, that there must be some sort of necessity for their precautions.

In republican states, for reasons which are at bottom the same as in the before-mentioned governments, the people are also kept under the greatest restraints by those who are at the head of the state. In the Roman Commonwealth, for instance, the liberty of writing was curbed by the severest laws with regard to the freedom of speech, things were but little better, as we may conclude from several facts; and many instances may even be produced of the dread with which the private citizens, upon certain occasions; communicated their political opinions to the consuls, or to the senate. In the Venetian republic, the press is most strictly watched; nay, to forbear to speak in any manner whatsoever of the conduct of the government is the fundamental maxim which they inculcate on the minds of the people throughout their dominions.†

*The law of the Twelve Tables had established the punishment of death against the author of a libel: nor was it by a trial by jury that they determined what was to be called a libel. "Si quis carmen occentassit, actitassit, condidissit, quod alteri flagitium faxit, capital esto."

+ Of this I have myself seen a proof somewhat singular, which I beg leave of the reader to relate. Being, in the year 1768, at Bergamo, the first town of the Venetian state as you come into it from the state of Milan, about a hundred and twenty miles distant from Venice, I took a walk in the evening in the neighbourhood of the town; and wanting to know the names of several places which I saw at a distance, I stopped a young countryman to ask for information. Finding him to be a sensible young man, I entered into some farther conversation with him and as he had himself a great inclination to see Venice, he asked me whether I proposed to go there? I answered that I did: on which he immediately warned me, when I was at Venice, not to speak of the prince (del prencipe); an appellation assumed by the Venetian government, in order, as I suppose, to convey to the people a greater idea of

;

With respect therefore to this point, it may again be looked upon as a most advantageous circumstance in the English government, that those who have been at the head of the people have not only been constantly disposed to procure the public liberty, but also that they have found it possible for them to do so; and that the remarkable strength and steadiness of the government have admitted of that extensive freedom of speaking and writing which the people of England enjoy. A most advantageous privilege this! which, affording to every man a mean of laying his complaints before the public, procures him almost a certainty of redress against any act of oppression that he may have been exposed to: and which leaving, moreover, to every subject a right to give his opinion on all public matters, and, by thus influencing the sentiments of the nation, to influence those of the legislature itself (which is sooner or later obliged to pay a deference to them), procures to him a sort of legislative authority of a much more efficacious and beneficial nature than any formal right he might enjoy of voting by a mere yea or nay, upon general propositions suddenly offered to him, and which he could have neither a share in framing, nor any opportunity of objecting to and modifying.

Such a privilege, by supporting in the people a continual sense of their security, and affording them undoubted proofs that the government, whatever may be its form, is ultimately designed to ensure the happiness of those who live under it, is both one of the greatest advantages of freedom, and its surest characteristic. The kind of security, as to their persons and possessions, which subjects, who are totally deprived of that privilege, enjoy at particular times under other governments, perhaps may entitle them to look upon themselves as the well administered property of masters who

their union among themselves. As I wanted to hear him talk farther on the subject, I pretended to be entirely ignorant in that respect, and asked for what reason I must not speak of the prince. But he (after the manner of the common people in Italy, who, when strongly affected by any thing, rather choose to express themselves by some vehement gesture than by words) ran the edge of his hand with great quickness along his neck,-meaning thereby to express, that being strangled, or having one's throat cut, was the instant consequence of taking such liberty.

FREEDOM OF DEBATE.

277

rightly understand their own interests: but it is the right of canvassing without fear the conduct of those who are placed at their head which constitutes a free nation.*

The unbounded freedom of debate, possessed by the English parliament, is also a consequence of the peculiar stability of the government. All sovereigns have agreed in their jealousy of assemblies of this kind, in their dread of the privileges of assemblies who attract in so high a degree the attention of the rest of the people, who in a course of time become connected by so many essential ties with the bulk of the nation, and acquire so much real influence by the essential share they must needs have in the management of public affairs, and by the eminent services, in short, which they are able to perform to the community,† Hence it has happened that monarchs, or single rulers, in all countries, have endeavoured to dispense with the assistance of assemblies like those we mention, notwithstanding the capital advantages they might have derived from their services towards the good government of the state; or, if the circumstances of the times have rendered it expedient for them to call such assemblies together, they have used the utmost endeavours in abridging those privileges and legislative claims which they soon found to prove so hostile to their security: in short, they have ever found it impracticable to place an unreserved trust in public meetings of this kind.

We may here name Cromwell, as he was supported by a numerous army, and possessed more power than any foreign monarch who has not been secured by an armed force. Even after he had purged, by the agency of Colonel Pride, and two regiments, the parliament that was sitting when his power became settled, thereby thrusting out all his opponents, to the amount of about two hundred, he soon found

* If we consider the great advantages to public liberty which result from the institution of the trial by jury, and from the liberty of the press, we shall find England to be in reality a more democratical state than any other we are acquainted with. The judicial power and the censorial power are vested in the people.

+ And which they do actually perform, till they are able to throw off the restraints of impartiality and moderation,-a thing which, being men, they never fail to do when their influence is generally established, and proper opportunities offer. Sovereigns know these things, and dread them.

his whole authority endangered by the proceedings of those who remained, and was under a necessity of turning them out in the military manner with which every one is acquainted. Finding still a meeting of this kind highly expedient to legalise his military authority, he called together that assembly which was called Barebones' parliament. He had himself chosen the members of this parliament, to the number of about a hundred and twenty, and they had severally received the summons from him; yet notwithstanding this circumstance, and the total want of personal weight in most of the members, he began in a very few months, and in the midst of his powerful victorious army, to feel a serious alarm at their proceeding; he soon heard them talk of their own divine commission, and of the authority they had received from the Lord; and, in short, finding he could not trust them, he employed the offices of a second colonel to effect their dismission. Being now dignified with the legal appellation of Protector, he ventured to call a parliament elected by considerable parts of the people; but though the existence of this parliament was grounded, we might say grafted, upon his own, and though bands of soldiers were even posted in the avenues to keep out all such members as refused to take certain personal engagements to him, he made such haste, in the issue, to rid himself of their presence, as to contrive a mean quibble or device to shorten the time of their sitting by ten or twelve days.* To a fourth assembly he again applied; but though the elections had been so managed as to procure him a formal tender of the crown during the first sitting, he put an end to the second with resentment and precipitation.†

The example of the Roman emperors, whose power was outwardly so prodigious, may also be introduced here. They

*They were to have sitten five months; but Cromwell pretended that the months were to consist of only twenty-eight days; as this was way of reckoning time used in paying the army and the fleet.

the

The history of the conduct of the deliberating and debating assemblies we are alluding to, in regard to the monarchs, or single rulers of any denomination, who summon them together, may be expressed in very few words. If the monarch is unarmed, they overrule him so as almost entirely to set him aside: if his power is of a military kind, they form connections with the army.