EFFECT OF PUBLIC OPINION. 209 who, from some accidental advantages, are enabled to influence their determinations. It is not fortune, it is nature, that has made the essential differences between men; and whatever appellation a small number of persons, who speak without sufficient reflection, may affix to the general body of their fellow-creatures, the whole difference between the statesman, and many a man from among what they call the dregs of the people, often lies in the rough outside of the latter, a disguise which may fall off on the first opportunity and more than once has it happened, that from the middle of a multitude, in appearance contemptible, a Viriatus has been suddenly seen to rise, or a Spartacus to burst forth.* Time, and a more favourable situation, are therefore the only things wanting to the people; and the freedom of the press affords the remedy to these advantages. Through its assistance every individual may, at his leisure and in retirement, inform himself of every thing that relates to the questions on which he is to take a resolution. Through its assistance, a whole nation as it were holds a council, and deliberates, slowly indeed (for a nation cannot be informed like an assembly of judges), but after a regular manner, and with certainty. Through its assistance, all matters of fact are at length made clear; and, through the conflict of the different answers and replies, nothing at last remains but the sound part of the arguments.† * Viriatus was a native of Lusitania (Portugal), who, from the station of a peasant, animated his countrymen to rise in arms and fight for fourteen years against the Roman invaders of his native land; and for fourteen years made a valiant and glorious stand. Unable to subdue him in the field, they caused his death by treachery. Spartacus was a gladiator, who, during the tyranny of Marius and Sylla, headed a formidable insurrection of the slaves, and formed them into a disciplined army. He fell commanding them in the battle in which they were utterly exterminated.-Ed. This right of publicly discussing political subjects is alone a great advantage to a people who enjoy it; and if the citizens of Geneva preserved their liberty better than the people were able to do in the other commonwealths of Switzerland, it was, I think, owing to the extensive right they possessed of making public remonstrances to their magistrates. To these remonstrances, the magistrates (for instance the Council of Twentyfive, to which they were usually made) were obliged to give an answer., If this answer did not satisfy the remonstrating citizens, they took time, P Hence, though all good men may not think themselves obliged to concur implicitly in the tumultuary resolutions of a people whom their orators take pains to agitate, yet, on the other hand, when this same people, left to itself, perseveres in opinions which have for a long time been discussed in public writings, and from which (it is essential to add) all errors concerning facts have been removed, such perseverance is certainly a very respectable decision; and then it is, though only then, that we may with safety say," the voice of the people is the voice of God." How, therefore, can the people of England act, when, having formed opinions which may really be called their own, they think they have just cause to complain of the administration? It is, as has been said above, by means of the right they have of electing their representatives; and the same method of general intercourse that has informed them with regard to the objects of their complaints, will likewise enable them to apply the remedy to them. Through this medium they are acquainted with the nature of the subjects that have been deliberated upon in the assembly of their representatives ;-they are informed by whom the different motions were made, by whom they were supported ;--and the manner in which the suffrages are delivered, is such, that they always can know the names of those who have voted constantly for the advancement of pernicious measures. * And the people not only know the particular dispositions of every member of the House of Commons, but, from the perhaps two or three weeks, to make a reply to it, which must also be answered; and the number of citizens who went up with each new remonstrance increased, according as they were thought to have reason on their side. Thus, the remonstrances which were made on account of the sentence against Rousseau, and were delivered at first by only forty citizens, were afterwards often accompanied by about nine hundred. This circumstance, together with the ceremony with which those remonstrances or representations were delivered, rendered them a great check on the conduct of the magistrates: they were even still more useful to the citizens of Geneva as preventives than as remedies and nothing was more likely to deter the magistrates from taking a step of any kind than the thought that it might give rise to a representation. * This remark is of great weight at the present time.-Ed. ; THE ELECTORAL BODY. 211 general notoriety of affairs, have also a knowledge of the political sentiments of a great number of those whom their situation in life renders fit to fill a place in that House. And availing themselves of the several vacancies that happen, and still more of the opportunity of a general election, they purify, either successively or at once, the legislative assembly; and thus, without any commotion or danger to the state, they effect a material reformation in the views of the government. I am aware that some persons will doubt these patriotic and systematic views, which I am here attributing to the people of England, and will object to me the disorders that sometimes happen at elections. But this reproach, which, by the way, comes with little propriety from writers who would have the people transact every thing in their own persons, this reproach, I say, though true to a certain degree, is not, however, so much so, as it is thought by certain persons who have taken only a superficial survey of the state of things. Without doubt, in a constitution in which all important causes of uneasiness are so effectually prevented, it is impossible but that the people will have long intervals of inattention. Being then suddenly called, from this state of inactivity, to elect representatives, they have not examined before-hand the merits of those who solicit their votes; and the latter have not had, amidst the general tranquillity, any opportunity of making themselves known to them. The elector, persuaded* at the same time that the person whom he will elect will be equally interested with himself in the support of public liberty, does not enter into laborious disquisitions, and from which he sees he may exempt himself. Obliged, however, to give the preference to somebody, he forms his choice on motives which would not be excusable, if it were not that some motives are necessary to make a choice, and that at this instant he is not influenced by any other; and indeed it must be confessed, that in the ordinary course of things, and with electors of a certain rank in life, that candidate who gives the best entertainment has a great chance to get the better of his competitors. * True, if the elector be intelligent, and not duped, intimidated, or corrupted.-Ed. But if the measures of government, and the reception of these measures in Parliament, by means of a too-complying House of Commons, should ever be such as to spread a serious alarm among the people, the same causes which have concurred to establish public liberty, would, no doubt, operate again, and likewise concur in its support. A general combination would then be formed, both of those members of Parliament who have remained true to the public cause, and of persons of every order among the people. Public meetings, in such circumstances, would be appointed; general subscriptions would be entered into to support the expenses, whatever they might be, of such a necessary opposition; and all private and unworthy purposes being suppressed by the sense of the national danger, the choice of the electors would then be wholly determined by the consideration of the public spirit of the candidates, and the tokens given by them of such spirit. Thus were those parliaments formed which suppressed arbitrary taxes and imprisonments. Thus was it that, under Charles II., the people, when recovered from that enthusiasm of affection with which they received a king so long persecuted, at last returned to him no parliaments but such as were composed of a majority of men attached to public liberty. Thus it was that, persevering in a conduct which the circumstances of the times rendered necessary, the people baffled the arts of the government; and Charles dissolved three successive parliaments, without any other effect than that of having those same men rechosen, and set again in opposition to him, of whom he hoped he had rid himself for ever. Nor was James the Second happier in his attempts than Charles had been. This prince soon experienced that his Parliament was actuated by the same spirit as those which had opposed the designs of his late brother; and having suffered himself to be led into measures of violence, instead of being better taught by the discovery he made of the real sentiments of the people, his reign was terminated by that catastrophe with which every one is acquainted. Indeed, if we combine the right enjoyed by the people of England, of electing their representatives, with the whole of the English government, we shall become continually more RIGHT OF RESISTANCE. 213 and more sensible of the excellent effects that may result from that right. All men in the state are, as has been before observed, really interested in the support of public liberty. Nothing but temporary motives, and such as are quite peculiar to themselves, can induce the members of any House of Commons to connive at measures destructive of this liberty. The people, therefore, under such circumstances, need only change these members in order effectually to reform the conduct of that House; and it may fairly be pronounced beforehand that a House of Commons, composed of a new set of persons, will, from this bare circumstance, be in the interests of the people. Hence, though the complaints of the people do not always meet with a speedy and immediate redress (a celerity which would be the symptom of a fatal unsteadiness in the constitution, and would sooner or later bring on its ruin); yet, when we attentively consider the nature and the resources of this constitution, we shall not think it too bold an assertion to say that it is impossible but that complaints in which the people persevere (that is, well-grounded complaints) will sooner or later be redressed. CHAPTER XIV. RIGHT OF RESISTANCE. BUT all those privileges of the people, considered in themselves, are but feeble defences against the real strength of those who govern. All those provisions, all those reciprocal rights, necessarily suppose that things remain in their legal and settled course: what would then be the resource of the people, if ever the prince, suddenly freeing himself from all restraint, and throwing himself, as it were, out of the constitution, should no longer respect either the person or the property of the subject, and either should make no account of his conventions with the Parliament, or attempt |