who redeem in the field of letters their political misdoings. Bolingbroke has found worshippers who forget his unworthy desertion of Marlborough, his unscrupulous and often treasonable partisanship; and he lives in their indiscriminate admiration, as, perhaps, none else but Cicero and Canning have ever lived. The staunchest Whig will scarcely find his severe judgment proof against the enchantments of Bolingbroke's marvellous style-so freshly redolent of life and of the world, so graceful in its abundant and perennial courtliness, always level to every occasion, adjusting itself evenly and without a strain, to a vigorous argument with Torcy, to a budget of London gossip from "The Brothers" for Matt Prior, to a sparkling compliment for Madame de Fériole, or to a skillful combination of politics and flattery for the Princess Orsini.

St. John despised the grosser absurdities of Toryism as much as was natural to a man of his brilliant intelligence; and next to them he probably despised nothing so heartily as the narrow, precise views, the bourgeois predilections, and the Presbyterian antecedents of his colleague, Lord Treasurer Oxford and Mortimer. He was, nevertheless, forced into a connection with a party for which he was every way unfitted, by a theory, which harmonizes most of the irregularities of his life. His aim was to make England a great monarchical and ecclesiastical State; in the sense in which France was one, and in which England has certainly never been. We do not mean that he deliberately thought of crushing the House of Commons; but he labored constantly to bring the monarchical element into a prominence, which, since the Revolution, it has never permanently held. We are convinced that no fragment of this policy could have been carried out, without the loss of onr liberties and the alteration of our national character. But it was obvious, that if it were to have a chance of success, it could only be by an application of present opportunities, so immediate and complete, as almost to have the character of a coup d'etat. The Queen was well disposed, and St. John must have known enough of the narrow obstinacy that distinguished the early Princes of the House of Brunswick, not to recollect that the Elector of Hanover was certain to avoid what, if a mistake in William, was at least a generous mistake-the seeking to employ the talents of every party in the service of the state. But the Queen's health was fast failing; and it was plain that what ever was to be done, must be done quickly. By a vigorous exertion of the prerogative, |

it was just possible that the Tory system might be so rooted in the country; and the commercial and dissenting interests so effectually crippled by concentrating power in the classes which most cordially detested them, that even the accession of a Whig King would fail to subvert such an organization. And if the reaction could only be made strong enough to repeal the Act of Succession, as well as to exclude the Whigs, it is idle to suppose that any of the new Ministerial party would have regretted the result. The whole resources of the party were accordingly put in force for the occasion. A landed qualification was imposed on Members of Parliament. The Clergy were conciliated by the Act for building fifty new churches. The Occasional Conformity Bill was passed. The Schism Bill received the Royal assent on the very day of the Queen's death. Every means were employed to harass the Dissenters, and, above all, the Church of Scotland. But the great requisite was that with which alone we are now concerned, the speedy conclusion of such a peace as would deprive the English Whigs of continental support, and ensure at least the neutrality of France.

English interests were therefore abandoned at every step of the following negotiations; but even this is less painful to remember than the base treachery which compromised our honor with Holland and the Empire. Their true situation was not once fairly revealed either to the English people or to the Allies. Queen Anne began the dissimulation by volunteering an assurance that the Ministerial changes were not to go further than the removal of Sunderland; and the new Ministers were forward in professions of sympathy for the Allies, even on points which the French Government distinctly knew that we were ready to relinquish. For this was the original vice of the transaction. Our Ministers, from the first, treated the French Government, to which they were professedly hostile, with far more confidence and cordiality than they showed the Allies, to whom our country was committed by its public acts. This system was carried so far as even to affect the relation between the Government and its accredited agents. The information which we now possess, proves clearly that St. John had never seriously thought of preserving Spain for the Archduke; or of doing more than preventing the union of the two Bourbon crowns on one head. But when the Allies resented the scanty offers of the new preliminaries, St. John was not content to soothe the Dutch with promises of co

operation he even inserted in Lord Strafford's instructions an order for insisting on the cession of Spain and the Indies; which, throughout his official correspondence with France, he had uniformly acquiesced in relinquishing. On the opening of the conferences at Utrecht in January, 17 his bearing was still more extraordinary. Zinzendorf, the Austrian Envoy, naturally referred to the terms of Gertruydenberg, as the obvious basis of the new negotiation. Alarmed at the possible consequences of this appeal, St. John remonstrated with the French Ministers, in the tone of a man who presumes on long friendship to persuade another to make concessions to an unreasonable adversary. The same tone is carried through the whole discussion; and the French plenipotentiaries returned it by communicating to their nominal opponents their plans for delaying or embarrassing the Dutch and Austrian Minis

ters.

It

charge against Harley's Government.
was at best an ungrateful task to force a
Sovereign on a country, and every day de-
monstrated more clearly the hopelessness of
permanently reducing the Peninsula.
the year that had elapsed since the negotia-
tions of Gertruydenberg, fertile of disaster to
France in every other quarter, had brought
her nothing but success in Spain. Except,
however, with regard to Spain, there was no
pretext for an English Government to yield
one iota of the other terms of Gertruyden-
berg, (terms, be it remembered, to which
Louis had actually subscribed as a condition
of opening the conferences,) unless on the
hypothesis of an allegiance other than that
due to the Queen and Parliament of Eng-
land. A simple comparison of the prelimi-
naries of the Hague with the terms eventu-
ally obtained, will show the derelictions of
the English Ministry on this point.

The Duke of Savoy was the only ally for whom our Government made any decent efforts; and even his interests were subordinated to the superior influence of France. Savoy was the one State whose claims were sure of a favorable consideration from the latter power; for every addition to the exist

For the conferences nominally held at Utrecht were nothing but a blind; and in spite of Queen Anne's repeated protestations that she would act only in concert with the Allies, the real business was carried on in confidential letters between Bolingbroke and Torcy. We are not aware of a single pointing Sardinian States went to form a counterwhich the plenipotentiaries, originally ac- poise to Austrian ascendency in Italy. But credited by France and England, were called as far as the Continental interests of Engon to decide. At last the confidence be- land at the beginning of the eighteenth centween the hostile Governments became so tury were concerned, it would have signified strict, that, with an abandonment of deco- nothing if Austria had held the whole of rum more scandalous than is elsewhere to be Northern Italy. Nay, considering the chrofound, even during this negotiation, the En- nic opposition to England in which Louis's glish Ministers informed Torcy of their inten- Catholic policy placed the Papacy, the most tion to enforce a suspension of arms on the extreme Ghibellinism would have been pureDuke of Ormond; while at the same timely to our advantage. But France was to be they actually insisted that the latter should conceal his instructions from those Allies who had shared with us the trophies of Blenheim and Malplaquet, and whom a struggle of ten years, and the friendship of their commanders had cemented into a more homogeneous mass, and kindled with more of a common spirit, than has, perhaps, ever existed in any other coalition.

The great feature in the treaty of Utrecht was the establishment of the Bourbons on the throne of Spain and the Indies. We must premise with respect to this treaty, that it is one thing to find grave fault with its provisions, and another to echo every cry that was raised against it by the heated partisanship of the day. The cession of Spain and the Indies was, perhaps, more condemned than any other of its stipulations. But as far as Spain is concerned, we make no

favored, even though, at the same time, we were constrained to be faithful to an ally; and, at one time, we find Bolingbroke actually urging France to support Victor Amadæus against Austria*-a length to which the French Ministers themselves, in their cooler judgment, declined to follow him. The really important point for Savoy, as for every State between the Ocean and the Vistula, was a barrier against France; and this she was unable to obtain, except by ceding the Barcelonette-a cession which had not been even named at Gertruydenberg.

But the abandonment of Spain to the House of Bourbon involved neither the abandonment of any compensation, nor the abondonment also of the Indies. On the first point a line had been distinctly traced

* Letters and Corres. iii. 487.

matists, who, in the " Constitutions of the Empire," &c., so long ago as 1671, had noticed the opening for English influence in Spanish America. We are speaking only in the spirit of Defoe, the most temperate of the Whigs, whose single heresy was an anxiety to give Harley the credit for good measures, which nothing but his own conduct in opposition had rendered difficult or impracticable. We are speaking, finally, in the language of the treaty of 1701, which Bolingbroke, with singular shamelessness, quoted as the model for the negotiations of Utrecht. If all these lessons had been re

long ago have been anticipated; and the New World would have been called into existence a century before, to redress the balance of the Old.

for the Government by their predecessors; | principally, and with good reason, dreaded; and it now was only necessary not to desert and the indemnity for the Protestant intera path already entered on. When the Arch- est which we are discussing, was by no duke Charles was established at Barcelona, means an Utopian scheme, taken up on the the English Government had concluded with moment by the violent adversaries of the him a treaty of commerce, by a secret ar- peace. It was pointed at by Sir William ticle of which the trade of the Spanish In-Temple, the most philosophical of our diplodies was to be opened to a mixed company of English and Spanish merchants. By the Barrier Treaty of 1710, a share of these, among other advantages, was given up to Holland. The ship in which the former treaty was sent home was taken by a French vessel; the letter-bags had been sunk, but were recovered, with their contents, by the skill and courage of a diver; and the French Government forthwith published the intercepted treaty to all Europe. It is difficult to exaggerate, or even to conceive, the possible importance of this treaty. Looking at the comparative energies of the three nations, at the small beginnings from which our Em-garded, Mr. Canning's daring policy would pire in Asia has grown to its colossal stature, and at the inexhaustible field opened in the virgin colonies of Spanish America, it is scarcely doubtful that the execution of this treaty would have secured to England no small share in the dominions of Montezuma and the Incas. And will any one pretend that, if the Allies had been thoroughly united, Louis and Philip would not thankfully have ratified the treaty of Barcelona? But, next, it is mere folly to say that the Indies must necessarily follow the fortunes of Spain. Few contrasts are more remarkable than that which subsisted throughout this war, between the obstinate patriotism that drove the Castilians and Arragonese to contest every defensible pass or stronghold, and the apathetic indifference of the American settlements. They were perfectly careless to which of the parties they might be transferred; and the cordial cooperation of the Allied Powers, (which nothing but the existence of a Tory Ministry prevented,) would assuredly have assigned those colonies to the House of Austria; and secured to us the privileges which that House had already stipulated to grant. It was the union of the Indies with the formidable marine of France that our ancestors Accord

*Humboldt, Nouvelle Espagne, v. 62. ing to the Vernon Correspondence, (cited Ed. Rev. v. 75, p. 131,) the Spaniards of Peru openly avowed their inclination to France; while Montezuma, Viceroy of Mexico, would not suffer the orders from Spain to be obeyed, as long as Spain was looked upon to be under French influence. It was thought that Montezuma, whose countess was of Indian extraction, might set up for himself. A.D. 1699-1702.

We insist the more anxiously that there was a necessity for compensating Europe for the absorption of Spain by the House of Bourbon; because, while we acknowledge the necessity of that sacrifice, we are not the less conscious that it has been an irreparable misfortune. To urge against this, that occasions have arisen in which France and Spain have been at variance, is simply to repeat that the two crowns were not actually on the same head. The great fact remains unassailable, that thrice from the treaties of

*Temple, ii. 216.

"No man can say that I ever once said in my life that I approved the Peace. . . . I printed it openly.... that the Peace I was for, was such as should neither have given the Spanish monarchy to the House of Bourbon, nor to the House of Austria; but that this bone of contention should have been broken to pieces; that it should not become dangerous to Europe, and that the Protestant powers, viz: Britain and the States, should have so strengthened and fortified their interest by their sharing the commerce and strength of Spain, as should have made them no more afraid of France or of the Empire. So that the Protestant interest should have been superior to all the powers of Europe, and been in

no

more danger of exorbitant powers, whether French or Austrian. This was the peace I always argued for; pursuant to the design of King William in the Treaty of Partition, and pursuant to that article of the Grand Alliance which was directed by the same glorious hand at the beginning of this last war, viz: that all we should conquer in the Spanish West Indies should be our own."-Defoe's Appeal to Honor and Justice, p. 21.

tions of the European commonwealth should have seemed almost to efface the recollections of Louis XIV. and the War of the Succession; the Bourbons on the French throne might still claim a sort of primogenitary right to protect the dignity of the junior branch, by interference with the affairs of Spain; and a late posterity of those who

Utrecht to the French Revolution-in the war of 1740, in that of 1756, and in that of 1775-France and England were hostilely opposed, and that on each occasion France was joined by Spain; and that during the revolutionary war itself, from St. Vincent to Trafalgar, the naval strength of the allies greatly outnumbered ours.' It is true that Louis XIV. imagined a vain thing, in dream-witnessed the peace of Utrecht might be ing that this union could crush the empire of the English fleets; but it is not less true, that we never emerged from any one of these conflicts without having suffered deadly wounds. It is not less true, that but for this fatal alliance, we should have triumphed at Havanna and Finisterre, at a cheaper price in blood and gold; and that when Paul Jones disgraced civilized warfare with his bucaneering butcheries, when De Grasse was ravaging Tobago, and a fleet of seventy Spanish and French vessels spread terror along the shores of Cornwall and Hampshire, we were paying the penalty for the treason of our rulers at Utrecht. The quarrel between Philip V. and the Regent Orleans is rather an illustration of, than an exception to, the steady policy which linked the two Bourbon Houses: for it resembled a civil, more than an international struggle; and was simply an effort, by the nearest connection of the minor Louis XV., to arrest the reaction which followed the death, and subverted the policy of Louis XIV. This policy found its consummation in the Family Compact of 1761-a league in which political interests had their share, but the inner cipher of which is brought to light by the remarkable circumstance, that when Maria Theresa was most closely allied to France, she begged to be admitted to a share in the new treaty, and was distinctly refused, on the plea of her non-participation in Bourbon blood! The Family Compact survived the Revolution; and though nominally renounced in 1814, has never been abandoned by French statesmen. It was but nine years ago, (to come down no later,) that the first blow was struck at Espartero's regency, when M. de Salvandy, as Family Ambassador at Madrid, refused to hold himself accredited to that Minister. Even now, the Revolution of last February, and the recent declaration of M. Bastide, will scarcely warrant our listening with unconcern, to Mr. Hallam, while he gravely recapitulates the charges against the peace of Utrecht. "In distant ages, and after fresh combina

* Alison's Life of Marlborough, 480.

entangled by its improvident concessions."* M. Mignet winds up the historical introduction to these negotiations with an exposition of the geographically dependent character of Spain, and of the benefits she has derived from her connection with France. The first point is argued with a disregard for national rights, which from the pen of an official writer, contrasts remarkably with the Polish paragraph in the annual addresses of the late Chambers; and on this, it may be enough to say, that the severest blow ever dealt to the independence of the Peninsula was the aid which Louis afforded to Portugal, thereby forcing Spain on the Pyrenees. For the second point, when M. Mignet looks to his own great and famous country, with its organized society, its unrivalled army, the elastic spirit of its statesmen, and the majestic unity, in spite of every convulsion, impressed on all its splendid civilization, we can scarcely think he will seriously challenge a comparison between what France has developed for herself, and what she has crippled and thwarted in Spain. The dependent helplessness of Philip V. has clung, like a curse, to the dominions which his posterity have ruled. It has been equally fatal to their monarchy of the last century-to their Revolution of yesterday-to their constitutional government of to-day. Not only has the spirit of the Family Compact infatuated and compelled Spain to be the handmaid of every French aggression, and to bear a heavy share of the losses incurred in every war with England, but it has worked yet more fatally in reducing Spain to a condition of diplomatic tutelage, in which the destinies of the nation are not entrusted to its own energies, but made dependent on the struggles of rival ambassadors for influence. To the imbecility of the Austrian, the Bourbon princes superadded the corruptions of French despotism; but they imported no admixture of its high spirit, its national pride, or of its vigorous centralization. Hear M. de Marliani himself, a Spanish diplomatist, and an official of the House which M.

*Const. Hist. iii. 293.