when possible to allow one road at least to each division. and rear Advanced and Rear Guards.—The questions involved in Advanced the proper use and employment of advanced and rear guards. guards would occupy more space than we can possibly afford for them. In general terms it may be said that, with both advanced and rear guards, artillery (perhaps with machine and quick-firing guns), cavalry, and mounted infantry will play the principal parts. It is tolerably certain, though opinion is much divided on the subject, that the enormous advanced guards employed by the Germans during the 1870 campaign, in which the advanced guard of an army corps sometimes consisted of about half the whole force, would be for most campaigns a mistake. The tendency of very large advanced guards is, as that campaign showed, to bring on actions prematurely. Artillery or mounted corps can be easily drawn out of a premature action. Infantry cannot be so withdrawn. If the advanced guard is large enough to give time to the marching body to form upon suitable ground before it is attacked, it possesses all the strength that is necessary. The task of a rear guard retiring before a victorious enemy, and covering the retreat of a beaten army, is one of the most delicate of operations. It depends for its proper execution on the full employment of those means for gaining time by forcing an enemy to deploy on un Outposts. favourable ground which have been described under the general heading. Outposts. The subject of outposts is also one which, for its full explanation, would require a volume to itself. The general principle on which their use is based is, that a slender cordon of men shall so surround an army when at rest that no enemy can approach its quarters unobserved, and that this cordon shall be supported by piquets from which the actual sentries for the cordon are taken, and these again by stronger but less numerous bodies, serving to connect together the different parts, so that, if the enemy attempts to drive in the outposts at any point, he meets with a continually increasing resistance. In this broad indication of the method, the principle is equally applicable to cavalry and to infantry outposts. In general, however, the security of a modern army, when not in actual contact with an enemy preparatory to battle, depends chiefly on the early information gained by cavalry pushed far out beyond the rest of the army. The cavalry will be at a distance of at least one or two days' march in advance and on the flanks scouring the country in all directions. It is practically certain that during the earlier stages of a campaign the collisions that will occur will be between bodies of cavalry pushed forward from both sides, supported by horse artillery and by such infantry as can be rapidly transported to the front. The circumstances of the collision of the main armies must depend in the first instance upon what happens in these encounters, in which cavalry will be the most important arm. Both sides will endeavour to use their cavalry to obtain all the information they can and to prevent the enemy from obtaining information of their own movements. At the same time, in the case of two great neighbouring powers like France and Germany, it is probable that attempts will be made by the cavalry on both sides to interfere with the mobilisation of the armies across the frontier. These efforts promise to result in contests on a scale and of a kind such as we have never yet seen, and of the nature of which it is difficult to judge from any past experience of war. It seems certain, however, that the body which will gain victory in these encounters will be the most highly trained and numerous cavalry, supported by its sister arm the horse artillery. But the value of a body of mounted infantry, and perhaps a strong force of cyclists, pushed forward to support the cavalry, can hardly be doubted when it is remembered how often defiles will have to be seized, bridges held, and important stations permanently secured. No doubt, when such infantry is not available, cavalry will at times have to be employed on foot for these purposes. So long as such employment is looked on as exceptional and a necessity to be regretted, it need do no harm. In any case no rules must prevent the securing of the actual object for the time being. sance and gence. Reconnaissance and Intelligence.-The vital necessity of Reconnaisobtaining all possible information of what an enemy is intellidoing makes the reconnaissances continually carried out by cavalry all round an army, and the occasional special reconnaissances conducted by single officers and small parties, or strong bodies employed for the purpose, some of the most important operations of war. It is, however, difficult in brief space to lay down rules for their guidance, because the essence of the value of such work depends on officers being trained in all parts of the art of war so as to know what to look for and what to report. The principles of such reconnaissance are determined by the general principles of both strategy and tactics, and are not in themselves independent. Nevertheless, it is very important that it should be realised, by men who are sending in reports from some one point of a large circle, that information in itself apparently unimportant may be of the greatest value when it is collated with other facts either already known or simultaneously gathered from other quarters. Thus, for instance, a newspaper advertisement, or a reference to a particular man or officer as not being with his regiment, may give negative evidence of the position of that regiment which may become of great importance. The sifting, therefore, of information should be chiefly left to the department at headquarters, which has charge of that work. Spies and deserters will supply evidence the value of which usually depends on the power of the department to check their assertions by a number of minute facts already known. Any information about the enemy or the country which may assist to that end should be carefully gathered and reported. Numerous forms and rules have been drawn up to supply hints as to the kind of information about roads, rivers, railways, villages, &c., which should be gathered. Lord Wolseley's "Pocket-Book" and Colonel Harrison's "Handbook" are the best for these purposes. MILITARY LITERATURE. THE subject of military literature is a very extensive one. It occupies a field almost unknown to most English readers. My attention has been lately drawn to a rather curious piece of evidence showing that the very existence of most of the books which constitute it is unknown even to many officers of our army. An A discussion which recently took place in one of those useful little regimental journals which are published by some corps in India showed this fact plainly enough. appeal was made, as quite decisive, to Mr. J. R. Green's "History of the English People" on a matter connected with the events of the Waterloo campaign. Now, no one would have been more astonished than Mr. Green to hear of an appeal to him on any subject connected with the army. His book starts with a repudiation of all interest in such matters. It is not surprising, therefore, that the officer who quoted Mr. Green as an authority should have been hopelessly wrong as to his facts. There is perhaps no campaign in relation to which the literature of the chief European countries is so full of valuable material as the Waterloo campaign. There is none as to which one might have hoped that English officers would have more cared thoroughly to inform themselves. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that it may not be a superfluous task if I attempt to draw attention to a class of books many of which are at least as graphic and interesting as any novel, all of which will tend to impart to soldiers some knowledge of their own proper work, and to those who are not soldiers |