formulate a systematic series of "rules of war." Among generals, Mack, the unfortunate Austrian who surrendered at Ulm to Napoleon, and in our own time Count Palikao, who had made himself the laughing-stock of the English staff during the advance on Peking, and was afterwards responsible for bringing about the catastrophe of Sedan, have been the great sticklers for the "rules of war." At least once Count Palikao, in China, came without his sword to look on at the success of operations which he had denounced as "contrary to every maxim of war." On the other hand, Sir Edward Hamley, who has done more than any other Englishman to make known to English officers the value of a methodical treatment of the study of campaigns, has most vigorously denounced such talk as this.

Nothing is more common," he writes, "than to find in writings on military matters reference to the rules of war,' and assertions such as that some general 'violated every principle of war,' or that some other general owed his success to 'knowing when to dispense with the rules of war.' It would be difficult to say what these rules are, or in what code they are embodied; and an inquirer, who is somewhat puzzled, perhaps, to understand how the highest proficiency can be displayed in a science by defiance of its principles, had better resolve to base his own conclusions upon fact and reason alone, when he will probably discover that such criticisms have only very vague ideas for their foundation."

great

Jomini, a very eminent authority in his day, though not View of a little disposed to somewhat exact definition, and perhaps writers. sometimes to over-pedantic statement, has with very little difference expressed the same view. Clausewitz, probably the most profound of all military students, has even more emphatically declared that the theory of the art of war is valuable, just in so far as it assists to guide a man

View of great soldiers.

through the vast labyrinth of military experience, and to prepare his mind to be ready to act for itself under the emergencies of actual war; but, he adds, "it must renounce all pretension to accompany him on to the field of battle." Both he and Jomini agree in asserting, that it must have become with him an instinct, almost absorbed into his blood, to be of any value to him. "The wise teacher," says Clausewitz, "restricts himself to the work of directing and assisting the mental development of his pupil, and does not try to keep him in leading-strings throughout his career." Thus from all countries those who have come to be accepted as authorities on the study of war, the very men who, if any, ought to be tempted to magnify their office, have cried aloud against the abuse of such study. It is not from them, but from non-military writers like Macaulay, that the notion of some formal code of the rules. of war has been derived. Macaulay's expression about Peterborough winning battles by violating the rules of war cannot be characterised otherwise than as worthless rhetoric, not only unsupported, but absolutely contradicted by fact. So thoroughly reasoned and so entirely worked out on a principle were Peterborough's campaigns, that they have in our own day served to guide one of the most brilliant of English soldiers in the conduct of one of his most successful wars. The campaigns by which Colonel Gordon saved China were largely assisted in their conception by his careful study of Peterborough's generalship in Spain.

On the other hand, it is not from writers on war, but from the greatest generals, that the most emphatic statements have come as to the paramount importance to a soldier of the careful study of past campaigns. The classical instance of the most authoritative dictum on this subject is surrounded by circumstances of dramatic interest.

Napoleon in 1813, sitting after dinner surrounded by his marshals, between the first and the second battle of Dresden, was drawn to speak on this subject by Marmont, the one who, in Napoleon's own judgment and that of others, had himself the most complete knowledge of war as an art. Marmont, observing how difficult it was, during the continued strain of war itself, to improve in its practice, maintaining that rather in peace than in war could war be best studied, said to Napoleon that he thought that Napoleon's own first campaign in Italy was the most brilliant in its conception of any that he had ever fought; so that sixteen years of high command had hardly made his knowledge of war as an art more perfect. Napoleon at once admitted the truth of this, and in reply said, "Yes; Turenne was the only one of us all who constantly improved in the management of his campaigns as he advanced in years." This reply is especially remarkable, because Napoleon was not only the greatest captain of his own age, but he was by far the most careful student that the world has known of the great generals of all ages. It is an unanswerable assertion that only by study of the past experience of war has any great soldier ever prepared himself for commanding armies.

past war

study.

It must, however, be always a question how far the cir- Period of cumstances of our own time have so changed as to limit suited for the period within which it is worth while to devote very careful study to the wars of the past. On the one hand, the greater number of officers will never find time to study all the great campaigns which would be worth the trouble, and it is therefore of special importance that the most modern experiences at least should be completely known to them. On the other hand, it can hardly be claimed for the campaigns which have taken place since breechloaders and rifle-guns have become the determining factors

Campaign of Fredericksburg

as illustration.

of battles, that they present a picture approximately complete of all the possibilities of modern war. To any one who tells us that nothing applicable to the wars of the future is now to be learnt from the campaigns of Napoleon, or even from the events of the Peninsular War, we are prepared to reply by adducing, either from almost any, one of Napoleon's most important campaigns or from the Peninsula, specific lessons, for the most part experiences of human nature, and illustrations of the mistakes which men are liable to make, which have in no wise been diminished in value by the changes which have come over the face of war.

As an instance in point, reference may here be made to a recently published study of the campaign of Fredericksburg during the civil war in America. It deals in a sound and useful manner with both strategy and tactics, and yet it is based entirely on conclusions drawn from a period of war prior to the introduction of the breech-loader. We are disposed to put it forward as a very powerful illustration of the kind of lessons which a careful student may draw from one condition of tactics and apply to another. What is most interesting in the work is perhaps the way in which those lessons are made to apply with exceptional force to the peculiar and special conditions involved in breech-loader fighting. It seems impossible for any one who has realised its excellence not to perceive that in a similar manner, with the like wise appreciation of those things which are permanent and those things which change, sound deductions may be drawn from even the tactical experiences of the Napoleonic era. Nay, the statement of the most brilliant and successful general in the British army of to-day appears to be indisputable, that a perusal of the words of even Cæsar himself will suggest to any thoughtful soldier, who knows something also of modern war, reflections that

he may afterwards recall with advantage as applicable to modern campaigns.

change oc

That tactics have been first and most directly affected by Has, then, the changes which have recently taken place in the condi- curred in tactics only, tions of modern war it is impossible to doubt. The nature or in strategy also? of tactics has been always of a kind more tending to admit of rapid change, and more frequently suggesting to a commander of originality new developments. Napoleon, indeed, declared that tactics should be changed every ten years. Strategy has always, on the other hand, been assumed to possess a more permanent character. All important changes in armament immediately affect tactics. No one now disputes the general character of the tactical changes which have been produced by the introduction of the breech-loader and the development of artillery. Indeed, when we come to describe the broad features of modern tactics, we shall be dealing with matters as to which, except as to a few specific points, it may be said that practically the military world of Europe is agreed; but we confess that we are not prepared to accept the assumption that tactics only have been changed, and that he who would be ready for future war on the grand scale must not also look for some change in the general character of strategy.

changes in

strategy.

Sir E. Hamley, in his "Operations of War," has graphi- Former cally described how armies lived in the days of Edward III.; method of how they depended upon the food which they found in the country through which they moved; and how, when they had exhausted that country, and were opposed by an enemy holding a strong position, which they could not venture to assail, they were obliged to fall back because they had no arrangements for obtaining supplies regularly from their own land. Now the great strategic movements of armies have depended always upon their means of obtaining food and warlike supplies. It will therefore be evident at once