Changes since 1815 in the general conditions of war.

that the character of strategy necessarily changed from the moment when a system was devised by which, along a regular chain of posts, or "line of communications," an army received its supplies of food, warlike implements, and reinforcements, from either its own country or some other source, which came to be known as its "base of supply." It began to be the object of generals to manœuvre in such a way as to interfere with the lines by which their opponents were receiving their supplies, and to protect their own. In many respects, no doubt, even the Roman armies in the time of Hannibal acted on strategical principles that are applicable in our own time. Yet the change in the conditions under which armies began to live in the field was so great from the moment when, in order to facilitate and hasten their movements, they began to be thus suppliedfrom a particular "base," and along these "lines of communication," that the art of handling them in campaigns changed almost as completely as tactics ever changed. New combinations became possible. Skill was turned into a new direction. The historical deduction is that strategy, like tactics, changes when its implements or weapons change. If now it be asked whether, since the days of Napoleon and Wellington the implements of strategy have changed as completely as those of tactics, it must be answered that the change has been even more complete.

Since 1815 the face of Europe has been more altered than it had been in five previous centuries. It is now covered with a network of railways and telegraphs. The commerce of the world and its means of inter-communication have developed in a manner that has everywhere revolutionised the conditions of life. The advance of science has operated in a thousand forms upon the circumstances under which armies exist in the field. The conditions of sea transport and of sea warfare are even more

completely changed than those of land. Further, it must be remembered that battle-action is itself one of the determining factors of strategy. If, in their general character, the nature of battles and the circumstances under which battles have to be fought change very materially, that in itself involves a further change in the combinations which are open for manœuvres in the field of which the ultimate object is to lead up to battle. Once more, the size of the armies which will enter into the next great campaign in Europe will be so vastly different from those which fought out the great wars of the past that their manoeuvring in campaigns must necessarily be very different from anything that Napoleon undertook. Now, even during the later wars of Napoleon, Jomini was obliged to admit that many of the experiences of the past must be materially modified as armies increased in size. One of the most familiar forms in which Napoleon exercised his strategic skill lay in defeating with his own entire army a fraction of the forces opposed to him, before it could be reinforced by the remainder of the enemy. Thus the element of time essentially entered into the question. Even during the great campaign of 1813, when Napoleon, holding a central posi→ tion on the Elbe, endeavoured to strike from thence against the masses of the allies formed in a great circle round him at Berlin, in Silesia, and in Bohemia, experience showed that it was by no means easy to crush with sufficient rapidity armies of 120,000 men so as to prevent them from being supported in time by others. As the allies gradually closed in on him, and the distances between their different forces diminished, this became continually more and more apparent. In fact, it became clear, if it had been doubtful beforehand, that the question was altogether a matter of proportion between time, distance, and the resisting power of the several armies concerned. On the other hand, in

Increased power of modern armies as

affecting

strategy.

Increased expendi

ammuni

ing combinations.

1814, when the nature of the country invaded caused a reduction in the size of the armies moving forward separately, Napoleon was able as of old to strike his blows right and left with telling effect.

Now, if it were possible for an army of our day, supplied with all the implements with which modern science has provided it, to meet any army of equal numbers equipped as Napoleon's armies were equipped, the difference in power of the modern army would be such that it would almost be able to deal with its enemy as civilised armies provided with firearms were at first able to deal with savages possessed only of bows and arrows. The artillery of the days of Napoleon would not be able to act at all, for our modern infantry can fire with effect at a distance greater than could Napoleon's big guns. Our artillery would be able to destroy Napoleon's army before either his artillery or infantry could act against us. Thus an army of 50,000 men of our own time must be reckoned as possessing, at least, the resisting power of 100,000 of the days of Napoleon. It is obvious, therefore, that the relationship between time, distance, and the resisting power of armies has been greatly affected by the change in the character of weapons, and that calculations as to what a superior army can do in a given time to break up the force of an army opposing it, and to be free to deal with another army, are greatly

modified.

There is another element which has largely to be taken ture of into account in our modern battles. The expenditure of tion affect- ammunition is, from the rapidity of fire, enormous. Even in the days of Napoleon it was extremely difficult, as his own words after the battle of Ligny show, for a victorious. army rapidly to turn upon a second force which had not been engaged, because of the time required for filling up the empty ammunition waggons and the men's cartouches.

These difficulties under our conditions of warfare are im

measurably increased.

other

conditions

Again, in order that an army may nowadays be isolated Effects of in the way in which Napoleon in 1805 cut off the army modern of Mack in Ulm and utterly destroyed it, many conditions on strategy. have to be secured which were not needed then. The telegraph is a formidable enemy to such an operation. The newspapers are a still greater. When MacMahon in 1870 attempted his disastrous march to the relief of Bazaine in Metz, to the success of which secrecy was essential, his movements first became known to the Prussian headquarters through French and English journals. Thus the rapid intercommunication between town and town, capital and capital, which is now extended in all directions over Europe to an extent that makes it extremely difficult to completely prevent news of all kinds from leaking out, is an element that cannot be neglected in any strategical calculations. The change in this respect is strikingly shown by the fact, that seven weeks elapsed before the news of Trafalgar reached Naples. Furthermore, distant parts of an army may, under certain conditions, be in point of time much more closely connected than they formerly were because of the facilities afforded by railways and telegraphs. There are a variety of other elements less important separately than as all contributing to the same result, which must not be ignored, the facilities afforded for the supply of armies by compressed food and compressed forage, the enormously extended area which caters for the feeding of the European populations and the organisation of the commerce of the world, rendering all which that area yields rapidly available, and, lastly, the continually improving methods of machine transport by road, bicycles, tricycles, &c., making it possible to effect rapid movements without forage at all.

B

Changed spirit of armies affecting strategy.

Furthermore, not only have we to deal with new material conditions, but, as already observed, the armies which have to be led under these new circumstances have themselves been profoundly changed, not only in their armament, but in the very spirit, discipline, and organisation by which they are held together. What is true of the private, of the sergeant, of the captain, in his relations with superiors, is even truer of the leader of the brigade, of the division, of the army-corps, of the co-operating army. The whole method of the Prussian discipline and organisation, as it showed itself in 1870, implied an intelligent independence of action in all ranks that most seriously affected the strategical operations. In fact, in that campaign two very noteworthy points may be observed. From the first battle at Weissenburg up to and including Gravelotte, the peculiar feature of the war was that the German successes at each action-Weissenburg, Wörth, Spicheren, Colombey-Nouilly, Mars-la-Tour-were much more important in their strategical than in their tactical aspect-much more important, that is to say, in their general influence on the campaign than in the severity of the losses in men and material inflicted on the enemy. The losses in battle were in fact greater on the side of the victors than on that of the vanquished. Yet, secondly, each of these actions, up to but not including Gravelotte, with a partial exception in the case of Weissenburg, was brought on by the determination of subordinate leaders, and was not designed beforehand either by the King's headquarters or by the headquarters of any one of the three armies. It cannot of course be denied that there was an element of danger in this way of managing a campaign. But the general who attempts to carry out a modern campaign without having realised the nature of this strictly strategical experience is reckoning without his host. Armies now occupy, even when in numbers similar to those