Digest of the Law of Evidence. Sir James Fitz-James Stephen. Macmillan & Co. 1877. Hints to Courts-Martial. By T. C. O'Dowd. London. Clowes & Son. 1883. The work of the Deputy-Judge-Advocate. Military Law. By Lieut.-Colonel S. C. Pratt, R.A. London. Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co. 1889. A valuable précis. ago NOTE.-In my preface I have spoken of the effect of the introduction of "high explosives." I reserve, however, for this note to Major Clarke's volume a reference to the changes in fortification which are now rapidly taking place on the Continent in consequenee of the introduction of the new explosives. Both France and Germany are spending enormous sums of money in altering their fortifications. The purpose is to relieve them from that condition which a few years made many of the most experienced officers of both armies believe, as I have put it in the preface, that in their former condition the fortifications might be destroyed even by field-artillery armed with high explosives. Major Clarke, in his very able work, appears to me to have passed the subject by with an indifference which does not inspire confidence in the conclusions at which he has in this matter arrived. Neither France nor Germany spend vast sums of money under the advice of men who are likely to be affected by "unreasoning panic" (p. 113). Moreover, I happen to have been the "recent speaker at the R.A.S. Institution who appeared to contemplate the practicability of clearing the Channel by picrates." If "practicability" means that I suggested that the thing was at present reduced to a condition of mathematical precision, certainly that neither represented my views nor my argument. But I do share with many of our ablest sailors considerable anxiety on the subject, and I should have been very grateful to Major Clarke if he could have relieved my doubts about it. He has, however, shown conclusively that he misunderstands the cause of the anxiety which he pooh-poohs. He thinks it sufficient to pass the subject by, saying that it is "by no means certain that the French have overcome the difficulties which surround the use of this material." Those difficulties consist in the fact that it is deteriorated and made dangerous by much transport from point to point, and that no one has yet discovered a picrate or other high explosive which is permanent for a lengthened period. Now the French are meeting this difficulty by vast storage at different centres of the materials of mélinite. They make it fresh, and they load their shells fresh each year. That being so, the point to which I want to get an answer, for which I have as yet asked in vain, is this: What is there to prevent a French Channel fleet being stored with shells recently filled with fresh-made explosives? Would those shells not, under those circumstances, be good for a week's work? Would any Admiral like to meet a fleet armed with them if he had no high explosive shells himself? Could an English fleet, which must necessarily be gathered from many distant points, be as easily supplied with fresh-made roborite and fresh-filled shells as a French fleet, which had only to issue direct from ports in which mélanite is made, could be stored with shells freshly filled with new mélanite? The subject is not one which directly concerns either my subject or Major Clarke's; but the indirect effect which its solution will have upon all warfare in which an English army may be engaged induces me to notice it in this note. It is therefore important that, as I have done so, I should state the purpose for which, in the discussion to which Major Clarke refers, I raised the point about the risks involved for us in the present condition of the high-explosive question. It was only as an illustration, though a serious one, of the uncertainties which attend the future of naval warfare. This particular danger may or may not be serious. I think it very serious. I shall continue to think so as long as I cannot succeed any better in getting an answer to my question about it than Lord Charles Beresford succeeded when he tried to draw the attention of the House of Commons to it as a matter vital to the interests of the country. But even if there be an answer to this point, it would not affect the value of it as an illustration of the uncertainties which hang over the whole future of naval warfare. It is very difficult to foresee what will happen in the next land-war; but there the future is open and certain if it be compared with the utter darkness into which our best sailors have to gaze when they contemplate the circumstances of the next great naval engagement. That is a fact with which I am not sorry to close this volume, because the public, for whom it is chiefly intended, is apt to think that they may safely ignore the questions which are raised in it, because of their confidence in the security provided by the "silver streak." K INDEX. ABILITY, military, not to be gauged | Army. See also British, Prussian, Adrianople, 33 Advanced and rear guards, 89 Aims of strategy, 32 Algerian campaigns injurious to All past wars worthy of study, II supply of artillery, 74 "Arm blanche," the proper weapon Armies, modern, compared in power - modern, effect of increased power, spirit of modern, affecting stra- co-operation of, from different movements of, as affected by not mere gatherings of armed See also Modern Armies. determine nature of fighting, I Prussian, effect on, of peace article on, in Encyclopædia and Russian Armies. Art of war, result of accumulated or study of war, great generals war as an, 22 Artillery, field, v. permanent fortifica- 147 French evidence on, 78 alone unable to cause abandon- ment of a position, 81 to prepare the way for assault fire at Waterloo, destructive Hoff bauer on, III BASE of supply, 14-28 Battery fire, regulated, 73 Battle, organisation replaces drill in, 6 | Cavalry weapon, the proper, 63 normal course of a modern, 77 Benedek, Austrian commander, 39 Boers, an ideal body of mounted in- Boguslawshi's "Tactical Deductions,” III Bohemia, campaign in, 110 Breech-loader, exaggerated impres- fight does not admit of manœu- British army, disadvantages of, as perfection of Peninsular trans- CESAR at Dyrrachium and Phar- of 1813, 15 of 1870, 33, 46, 47 of 1877-78 in Asia, 33 of 1877-78 in Europe, 33, 34 of Waterloo, 36, 39 of 1866, 39, 40 in Crimea, 107 of 1859, 107 in Western Germany, 109 criticism on, by Von Moltke Cavalry action, views of Russian horse artillery in, 75 under Stuart and Sheridan, 31 in modern fight, false deduc- interfering with mobilisation, 80 Century Magazine, value of articles Change in modern fight due to scien- in strategy due to changes of Changes in tactics affected by intro- since 1815 in general condi- Chesney, Waterloo lectures, 104 Circumstances tending to change the 66 Colley, Sir George, quotation from, 45 51 higher, now limited to direction importance of large units of, 5 |