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Digest of the Law of Evidence. Sir James Fitz-James Stephen. Macmillan & Co. 1877.

Hints to Courts-Martial. By T. C. O'Dowd. London. Clowes & Son. 1883.

The work of the Deputy-Judge-Advocate.

Military Law. By Lieut.-Colonel S. C. Pratt, R.A. London. Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co. 1889.

A valuable précis.

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NOTE.-In my preface I have spoken of the effect of the introduction of "high explosives." I reserve, however, for this note to Major Clarke's volume a reference to the changes in fortification which are now rapidly taking place on the Continent in consequenee of the introduction of the new explosives. Both France and Germany are spending enormous sums of money in altering their fortifications. The purpose is to relieve them from that condition which a few years made many of the most experienced officers of both armies believe, as I have put it in the preface, that in their former condition the fortifications might be destroyed even by field-artillery armed with high explosives. Major Clarke, in his very able work, appears to me to have passed the subject by with an indifference which does not inspire confidence in the conclusions at which he has in this matter arrived. Neither France nor Germany spend vast sums of money under the advice of men who are likely to be affected by "unreasoning panic" (p. 113). Moreover, I happen to have been the "recent speaker at the R.A.S. Institution who appeared to contemplate the practicability of clearing the Channel by picrates."

If "practicability" means that I suggested that the thing was at present reduced to a condition of mathematical precision, certainly that neither represented my views nor my argument. But I do share with many of our ablest sailors considerable anxiety on the subject, and I should have been very grateful to Major Clarke if he could have relieved my doubts about it. He has, however, shown conclusively that he misunderstands the cause of the anxiety which he pooh-poohs. He thinks it sufficient to pass the subject by, saying that it is "by no means certain that the French have overcome the difficulties which surround the use of this material." Those difficulties consist in the fact that it is deteriorated and made dangerous by much transport from point to point, and that no one has yet discovered a picrate or other high explosive which is permanent for a lengthened period.

Now the French are meeting this difficulty by vast storage at different

centres of the materials of mélinite. They make it fresh, and they load their shells fresh each year.

That being so, the point to which I want to get an answer, for which I have as yet asked in vain, is this: What is there to prevent a French Channel fleet being stored with shells recently filled with fresh-made explosives? Would those shells not, under those circumstances, be good for a week's work? Would any Admiral like to meet a fleet armed with them if he had no high explosive shells himself? Could an English fleet, which must necessarily be gathered from many distant points, be as easily supplied with fresh-made roborite and fresh-filled shells as a French fleet, which had only to issue direct from ports in which mélanite is made, could be stored with shells freshly filled with new mélanite?

The subject is not one which directly concerns either my subject or Major Clarke's; but the indirect effect which its solution will have upon all warfare in which an English army may be engaged induces me to notice it in this note. It is therefore important that, as I have done so, I should state the purpose for which, in the discussion to which Major Clarke refers, I raised the point about the risks involved for us in the present condition of the high-explosive question. It was only as an illustration, though a serious one, of the uncertainties which attend the future of naval warfare. This particular danger may or may not be serious. I think it very serious. I shall continue to think so as long as I cannot succeed any better in getting an answer to my question about it than Lord Charles Beresford succeeded when he tried to draw the attention of the House of Commons to it as a matter vital to the interests of the country. But even if there be an answer to this point, it would not affect the value of it as an illustration of the uncertainties which hang over the whole future of naval warfare. It is very difficult to foresee what will happen in the next land-war; but there the future is open and certain if it be compared with the utter darkness into which our best sailors have to gaze when they contemplate the circumstances of the next great naval engagement. That is

a fact with which I am not sorry to close this volume, because the public, for whom it is chiefly intended, is apt to think that they may safely ignore the questions which are raised in it, because of their confidence in the security provided by the "silver streak."

K

INDEX.

ABILITY, military, not to be gauged | Army. See also British, Prussian,

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Adrianople, 33

Advanced and rear guards, 89

Aims of strategy, 32
Aldershot, not Pall Mall, place for
working out drill, 55; and Pre-
face, vi.

Algerian campaigns injurious to
French army? 94

All past wars worthy of study, II
American Civil War, cavalry in, 65
Civil War, literature of, 109
Ammunition, increased expenditure
of, as affecting strategy, 16

supply of artillery, 74

"Arm blanche," the proper weapon
of cavalry, 63

Armies, modern, compared in power
with those of Napoleon, 16

- modern, effect of increased power,
on strategy, 16

spirit of modern, affecting stra-
tegy, 17

co-operation of, from different
bases, 20

movements of, as affected by
transport, 27

not mere gatherings of armed
men, 29

See also Modern Armies.
Arms, changes in, have affected
nature of discipline, I

determine nature of fighting, I
men organised for employment
of, essence of army, I
Army, essence of, connected with
arms in use, varies with them, I

Prussian, effect on, of peace
practice, 3

article on, in Encyclopædia
Britannica, referred to, Part I., first
line, 5

and Russian Armies.

Art of war, result of accumulated
experience, 7

or study of war, great generals
on, II

war as an, 22

Artillery, field, v. permanent fortifica-
tions, 10

147

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French evidence on, 78
General Sheridan on, 79
fire, moral effect of, 80

alone unable to cause abandon-

ment of a position, 81

to prepare the way for assault
on a position, 82

fire at Waterloo, destructive
effects of, 83

Hoff bauer on, III
Austerlitz, artillery formation at, 68

BASE of supply, 14-28
Bases of supply, co-operation from
different, 20

Battery fire, regulated, 73
Battle action, how prepared for by
Germans, 4, 5

Battle, organisation replaces drill in, 6 | Cavalry weapon, the proper, 63

normal course of a modern, 77
Battlefield the province of tactics, 7
Battles brought on in 1870 by subor-
dinate leaders, 18
Bayazid, 33, 34

Benedek, Austrian commander, 39
Blucher, 39

Boers, an ideal body of mounted in-
fantry, 65

Boguslawshi's "Tactical Deductions,”

III

Bohemia, campaign in, 110
Brackenbury, Colonel C. B., on forti-
fication, 118

Breech-loader, exaggerated impres-
sion produced by, 2

fight does not admit of manœu-
vring, 46

British army, disadvantages of, as
regards transport, 26

perfection of Peninsular trans-
port, 26

CESAR at Dyrrachium and Phar-
salia, I; a student, 121
Cæsar's campaigns worthy of study, 12
Campaign of Fredericksburg worthy
of study, 12

of 1813, 15

of 1870, 33, 46, 47

of 1877-78 in Asia, 33

of 1877-78 in Europe, 33, 34

of Waterloo, 36, 39

of 1866, 39, 40

in Crimea, 107

of 1859, 107

in Western Germany, 109
of 1877-78, 114
Campaigns, British, beyond sea, 41
in uncivilised countries, 41
of 1854 and 1859 of less interest
than those of Napoleon, &c., 107

criticism on, by Von Moltke
and Prince Hohenlohe, 187
Carelessness apt to be engendered by
series of small wars, 95
Catalepsy in modern fight, 50
Preface, viii

Cavalry action, views of Russian
leaders on, 68

horse artillery in, 75
raids, 31

under Stuart and Sheridan, 31
the strategical arm, 35
attack on artillery or infantry
impossible without cover, 62
tactics, 62

in modern fight, false deduc-
tions from peace manoeuvres, and
from 1870 campaign, 66

interfering with mobilisation, 80
modern German books relating
to, 117

Century Magazine, value of articles
on American Civil War in, 108
Chance success not a gauge of mili
tary ability, 21

Change in modern fight due to scien-
tific invention, I ; has affected army
spirit and discipline, I; not fore-
seen by those who forced it on, I ;
rendered possible by change in men
composing armies, 4; essential na-
ture of, 5; has led to dispute as to
value of past experience, 6; implies
a higher effort and less perfect suc-
cess, 6; has it affected strategy as
well as tactics? 7

in strategy due to changes of
its implements, 14; caused by in-
creased size of modern armies, 15
in tactics, Napoleon on, 13
Changed spirit of armies affecting
strategy, 18

Changes in tactics affected by intro-
duction of breech-loader, 13

since 1815 in general condi-
tions of war, 14

Chesney, Waterloo lectures, 104
Choice of position, 84

Circumstances tending to change the
character of the larger tactics, 84
Clausewitz on difficulty of raiding, 31
Close formations, how broken up into
open order," 3

66

Colley, Sir George, quotation from, 45
Colonel Macdonald on fire discipline,

51
Columns, how broken into "
"open
order," 3
Combined action of the three arms, 76
Command, difficulty of, in modern
action, 3

higher, now limited to direction
and object of attack, 3

importance of large units of, 5
Commanders, great, have judged
moral force of armies, I
Communications, line of, 14
Comparison of power of modern
armies and of those of Napoleon's
time, 16
Compressed food and forage affecting
stragetic movement, 17

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