offsets against that enhancement which so reduce it as to render the construction of the Act an abstract question. Cf. Ashwander v. Valley Authority, 297 Ú. S. 288, 324. The inadequacies in the findings are due to the erroneous construction of the Act by the Court of Claims.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson dissented.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Burton joined.
ACCRUAL OF CLAIM.
See Veterans Disability II.
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION.
See Pay and Allowances III.
AGENT, REPRESENTATION BY.
See Contracts X.
AIR CORPS ACT.
See Patents VI, VII, VIII, IX, X.
See Patents VI, VII, VIII, IX, X. AMORTIZATION.
See Taxes VIII.
APPEAL, FAILURE TO.
See Contracts XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL, XLI, XLII.
ASSETS, SALE OF.
See Taxes XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII.
BREACH OF CONTRACT.
See Contracts I, II, III, IV, XV, LIII, LIV, LV, LVI, LVII, LVIII, LIX, LX.
BREATHING COMPOUND.
See Patents I, II, III, IV, V.
BOMBSIGHTS.
See Patents VI, VII, VIII, IX, X.
CANCELLATION OF CONTRACT UNAUTHORIZED.
See Contracts I, II, III, IV.
CAPITAL GAINS.
See Taxes X, XI, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII.
CAPITAL, RETURN OF.
See Taxes XII.
CEILING PRICE.
See Eminent Domain I, II, III, IV.
CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS.
See Suit For Salary I, II, III, IV, V, VI. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
CONGRESS, DISCRETION OF.
See Report to Congress I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
See Jurisdiction III.
CONTRACT SETTLEMENT ACT.
See Contracts XXVI, XXXIII.
CONTRACTING OFFICER.
See Contracts XVIII, XXI, XXIV.
CONTRACTING PARTIES, INTENTION OF.
See Contracts VII.
CONTRACTS
I. Where plaintiff, pursuant to previous invitations for bids, on July 1, 1941, entered into a contract with the Government for the sale of a stated amount of scrap iron; and where, thereafter, on August 15, 1941, an amendment to the contract was entered into increasing the amount of scrap iron to be sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the Government; and where neither the contract nor the supplemental agreement authorized the United States to cancel the contract or agreement; it is held that under the provisions of the contract and agreement and on the evidence adduced the defendant's cancellation of the contract, by letter of October 3, 1941, consti- tuted a breach of the contract and plaintiff is entitled to recover. Joseph Company, 3. II. An unqualified and positive refusal to complete per- formance of a contract, though the performance is not yet due, may be treated as a complete breach and entitle the injured party to bring his action at once and be compensated therefor (Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1). In the instant case the court holds that the cancellation of the contract was a total breach of the contract by the defendant as to the undelivered quantity of scrap. Id.
III. Where during the life of the contract plaintiff did not receive from the defendant or its agents any com- plaint regarding the performance; and where, even on the date the contract was cancelled, no comment was made as to the character of plaintiff's perform- ance up to that date and such performance was not suggested as the reason for cancellation; it is held that defendant is now estopped from asserting that the plaintiff was guilty of a breach of contract. Id. IV. In the instant case the measure of plaintiff's damages is the amount of profit it would have earned had the contract not been cancelled. Anvil Mining Com- pany v. Humble, 153 U. S. 540; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1. Id.
V. Where plaintiff on August 3, 1944, entered into a contract with the Government for the installation of outside steam and air lines at the Badger Ordnance Works, in Wisconsin, the work to be completed by December 1, 1944; and where the contract provided
that the defendant or its agents were to furnish the drawings for the several piers and poles and were to determine their location from time to time; and where the drawings were not furnished and the loca- tions not designated in time for plaintiff to complete its work by the contract completion date, December 1, and as a result plaintiff was compelled to erect some of the piers and poles in frozen ground at an increase in cost; it is held that plaintiff is entitled to recover. F. H. McGraw and Company, 29.
VI. In the instant case, where December 1, 1944, had been set as the completion date, it was undoubtedly the duty of defendant or its agents to furnish the neces- sary drawings in time for plaintiff to complete its contract by that date (see George A. Fuller Company v. United States, 108 C. Cls. 70, 94, et seq.), and if plaintiff's costs were increased by defendant's failure to do so, plaintiff is entitled to recover the excess, unless additional facts excuse such failures. Id.
VII. Upon the evidence adduced it is found that, where the original contract was modified by several supple- mental contracts which extended the completion date to September 1, 1945, it was not the intention of the parties that the time for the installation of the piers and poles covered by the original contract should be extended. See Henry Erickson v. United States, 104 C. Cls. 397, 428. Or if it was the inten- tion to extend the time for completion of the work under the original contract, then the defendant breached it by requiring the plaintiff to complete earlier and during the winter season. Id.
VIII. Where plaintiff based its bid on doing the work prior to December 1, 1944; and where defendant pre- vented plaintiff from completing the job by that date, and it cost the plaintiff more to do it there- after; plaintiff is entitled to recover the excess costs.
IX. Where it was provided in the specifications that tem- porary electric power would be made available at no cost to the contractor in the immediate vicinity of the contemplated work; and where it is shown that electric power was not at all times made avail- able to the plaintiff in accordance with the inter- pretation given to plaintiff by the Government's authorized representative as to the meaning of the phrase "immediate vicinity of the contemplated
work"; and where it is shown that on account of defendant's failure to supply electric power for the use of plaintiff's electric welding machines it was at times necessary for plaintiff to use gasoline welding machines, at increased cost; it is held that plaintiff is entitled to recover. Id.
X. A representation made to plaintiff, preliminary to submission of its bid, by defendant's representative who had prepared the plans and who was on the site, and to whom plaintiff had been referred by defendant for information, was binding on defend- ant. See Max J. Kuney v. United States, 95 C. Cls. 512, et seq.
XI. Where in response to a request from the U. S. Coast Guard on December 26, 1944, plaintiff submitted a bid for a type of propeller for use on ice-breaking vessels; and where it is alleged that plaintiff made an error and submitted a bid for one set of 2 pro- pellers and a bow propeller, rather than two sets of 2 propellers and a bow propeller each; and where after plaintiff's acceptance of defendant's purchase order was deposited in the mail and before its receipt by the Coast Guard, plaintiff telegraphed the Coast Guard that he had made the mistake of quoting the price on one set instead of two sets and that the price should be doubled; and thereupon plaintiff's acceptance was returned and a new con- tract was negotiated; the court holds that in view of the many telegraphic communications, modifi- cations, and changes, it is doubtful whether any formal contract or meeting of the minds really occurred during the process of the negotiations, and at any rate the court is unable to determine from the allegations in the petition, without proof, that a definite contract was made. Harvey Franklin Dick, 94.
XII. Under the Post Office Regulations (1913) presently in effect any one depositing a letter in the mail may reclaim it, upon proper identification, and may even require the postmaster at the point of sending to wire the postmaster at destination to return the letter and the Post Office Department is required to return it to the sender (17 C. J. Sec. 405). See Traders National Bank v. First National Bank, 217 S. W. 977; First National Bank of Murfreesboro v. First National Bank of Nashville, et al., 154 S. W. 965. Id.
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