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113 C. Cls.

offsets against that enhancement which so reduce it as to render the construction of the Act an abstract question. Cf. Ashwander v. Valley Authority, 297 Ú. S. 288, 324. The inadequacies in the findings are due to the erroneous construction of the Act by the Court of Claims.

Mr. Chief Justice Vinson dissented.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Burton joined.

INDEX DIGEST

ACCRUAL OF CLAIM.

See Veterans Disability II.

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION.

See Pay and Allowances III.

AGENT, REPRESENTATION BY.

See Contracts X.

AIR CORPS ACT.

See Patents VI, VII, VIII, IX, X.

AIRCRAFT.

See Patents VI, VII, VIII, IX, X.
AMORTIZATION.

See Taxes VIII.

APPEAL, FAILURE TO.

See Contracts XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL, XLI, XLII.

ASSETS, SALE OF.

See Taxes XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII.

BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See Contracts I, II, III, IV, XV, LIII, LIV, LV, LVI, LVII,
LVIII, LIX, LX.

BREATHING COMPOUND.

See Patents I, II, III, IV, V.

BOMBSIGHTS.

See Patents VI, VII, VIII, IX, X.

CANCELLATION OF CONTRACT UNAUTHORIZED.

See Contracts I, II, III, IV.

CAPITAL GAINS.

See Taxes X, XI, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII.

CAPITAL, RETURN OF.

See Taxes XII.

CEILING PRICE.

See Eminent Domain I, II, III, IV.

CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS.

See Suit For Salary I, II, III, IV, V, VI.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

See Taxes VII.

CONGRESS, DISCRETION OF.

See Report to Congress I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII.
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.

See Jurisdiction III.

CONTRACT SETTLEMENT ACT.

See Contracts XXVI, XXXIII.

113 C. Cls.

CONTRACTING OFFICER.

See Contracts XVIII, XXI, XXIV.

CONTRACTING PARTIES, INTENTION OF.

See Contracts VII.

CONTRACTS

I. Where plaintiff, pursuant to previous invitations for
bids, on July 1, 1941, entered into a contract with
the Government for the sale of a stated amount of
scrap iron; and where, thereafter, on August 15,
1941, an amendment to the contract was entered
into increasing the amount of scrap iron to be sold
and delivered by the plaintiff to the Government;
and where neither the contract nor the supplemental
agreement authorized the United States to cancel
the contract or agreement; it is held that under the
provisions of the contract and agreement and on the
evidence adduced the defendant's cancellation of
the contract, by letter of October 3, 1941, consti-
tuted a breach of the contract and plaintiff is entitled
to recover. Joseph Company, 3.
II. An unqualified and positive refusal to complete per-
formance of a contract, though the performance is
not yet due, may be treated as a complete breach
and entitle the injured party to bring his action at
once and be compensated therefor (Roehm v. Horst,
178 U. S. 1). In the instant case the court holds
that the cancellation of the contract was a total
breach of the contract by the defendant as to the
undelivered quantity of scrap. Id.

III. Where during the life of the contract plaintiff did not
receive from the defendant or its agents any com-
plaint regarding the performance; and where, even
on the date the contract was cancelled, no comment
was made as to the character of plaintiff's perform-
ance up to that date and such performance was not
suggested as the reason for cancellation; it is held
that defendant is now estopped from asserting that
the plaintiff was guilty of a breach of contract. Id.
IV. In the instant case the measure of plaintiff's damages
is the amount of profit it would have earned had the
contract not been cancelled. Anvil Mining Com-
pany v. Humble, 153 U. S. 540; Roehm v. Horst,
178 U. S. 1. Id.

V. Where plaintiff on August 3, 1944, entered into a
contract with the Government for the installation
of outside steam and air lines at the Badger Ordnance
Works, in Wisconsin, the work to be completed by
December 1, 1944; and where the contract provided

113 C. Cls.

CONTRACTS-Continued

that the defendant or its agents were to furnish the
drawings for the several piers and poles and were
to determine their location from time to time; and
where the drawings were not furnished and the loca-
tions not designated in time for plaintiff to complete
its work by the contract completion date, December
1, and as a result plaintiff was compelled to erect
some of the piers and poles in frozen ground at
an increase in cost; it is held that plaintiff is entitled
to recover. F. H. McGraw and Company, 29.

VI. In the instant case, where December 1, 1944, had been
set as the completion date, it was undoubtedly the
duty of defendant or its agents to furnish the neces-
sary drawings in time for plaintiff to complete its
contract by that date (see George A. Fuller Company
v. United States, 108 C. Cls. 70, 94, et seq.), and if
plaintiff's costs were increased by defendant's
failure to do so, plaintiff is entitled to recover the
excess, unless additional facts excuse such failures.
Id.

VII. Upon the evidence adduced it is found that, where the
original contract was modified by several supple-
mental contracts which extended the completion
date to September 1, 1945, it was not the intention
of the parties that the time for the installation of the
piers and poles covered by the original contract
should be extended. See Henry Erickson v. United
States, 104 C. Cls. 397, 428. Or if it was the inten-
tion to extend the time for completion of the work
under the original contract, then the defendant
breached it by requiring the plaintiff to complete
earlier and during the winter season. Id.

VIII. Where plaintiff based its bid on doing the work prior
to December 1, 1944; and where defendant pre-
vented plaintiff from completing the job by that
date, and it cost the plaintiff more to do it there-
after; plaintiff is entitled to recover the excess
costs.

Id.

IX. Where it was provided in the specifications that tem-
porary electric power would be made available at
no cost to the contractor in the immediate vicinity
of the contemplated work; and where it is shown
that electric power was not at all times made avail-
able to the plaintiff in accordance with the inter-
pretation given to plaintiff by the Government's
authorized representative as to the meaning of the
phrase "immediate vicinity of the contemplated

113 C. Cls.

CONTRACTS-Continued

work"; and where it is shown that on account of
defendant's failure to supply electric power for the
use of plaintiff's electric welding machines it was at
times necessary for plaintiff to use gasoline welding
machines, at increased cost; it is held that plaintiff
is entitled to recover. Id.

X. A representation made to plaintiff, preliminary to
submission of its bid, by defendant's representative
who had prepared the plans and who was on the
site, and to whom plaintiff had been referred by
defendant for information, was binding on defend-
ant. See Max J. Kuney v. United States, 95 C. Cls.
512, et seq.

Id.

XI. Where in response to a request from the U. S. Coast
Guard on December 26, 1944, plaintiff submitted
a bid for a type of propeller for use on ice-breaking
vessels; and where it is alleged that plaintiff made
an error and submitted a bid for one set of 2 pro-
pellers and a bow propeller, rather than two sets
of 2 propellers and a bow propeller each; and where
after plaintiff's acceptance of defendant's purchase
order was deposited in the mail and before its
receipt by the Coast Guard, plaintiff telegraphed
the Coast Guard that he had made the mistake of
quoting the price on one set instead of two sets and
that the price should be doubled; and thereupon
plaintiff's acceptance was returned and a new con-
tract was negotiated; the court holds that in view
of the many telegraphic communications, modifi-
cations, and changes, it is doubtful whether any
formal contract or meeting of the minds really
occurred during the process of the negotiations,
and at any rate the court is unable to determine
from the allegations in the petition, without proof,
that a definite contract was made. Harvey Franklin
Dick,
94.

XII. Under the Post Office Regulations (1913) presently
in effect any one depositing a letter in the mail may
reclaim it, upon proper identification, and may
even require the postmaster at the point of sending
to wire the postmaster at destination to return the
letter and the Post Office Department is required
to return it to the sender (17 C. J. Sec. 405). See
Traders National Bank v. First National Bank, 217
S. W. 977; First National Bank of Murfreesboro v.
First National Bank of Nashville, et al., 154 S. W.
965. Id.

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