information. No court however seems since to have acted on this precedent. Slander imputing immorality or unchastity.-Though the law has long ceased to be considered a means of enforcing or even protecting general morality, still morality enters so largely into the composition of the higher standards of character, that to say or write of a third person, that he or she violates morality, either habitually or in some isolated act of conduct, might well be thought to be equivalent to attacking the reputation in a vital particular. But this is by no means the view of the law. The law at best is contented with a very coarse standard of conduct in this respect, and to impute immorality by spoken words is not like imputing an indictable offence or conduct savouring of fraud, for immorality per se is often neither an offence nor an actionable wrong. Yet to some professions this imputation is such an attack on character as will support an action for slander, and when made on the female sex will, when coupled with special damage, also be treated as slanderous or libellous. Under the head of imputations of professional misconduct on men or women an illustration will be found of such actionable wrong. As regards the spoken imputation of immorality or unchastity in the female character, the law does not regard this as actionable per se, however fatal it may be to the reputation of the female attacked, whether married or unmarried. Therefore to say, however falsely, of a woman that she is unchaste is not actionable, unless the words are written, or there is what is called special damage flowing from such imputation.2 De Grey, C. J., said, that for imputation of ignorance to one in a profession or an office of profit an action will certainly lie, though perhaps for imputation of ignorance to a justice of the peace, being only an office of credit, an action will not lie. But to impute by words to any man the mere defect or want of moral virtue, moral duties, or obligations which render a man obnoxious to mankind, is not actionable. And hence, to say of a physician, that he had committed adultery with a married woman was not 11 St. Tr. 422. Horne, 3 Wils. 187. 2 Wilby v Elston, 8 C. B. 142. 3 Onslow v actionable, because it was not spoken of his relations with one of his patients.1 The kind of special damage following a charge of immorality. The nature of this special damage, which makes all the difference whether spoken words imputing immorality are actionable or not, is difficult to be defined beyond this, that it is some species of pecuniary loss resulting naturally, and not merely accidentally, from the depreciation of character involved in the slander. It has been said, that if some such special damage arose from laudatory words it would give rise to no action, for the words must be more or less by themselves sounding in detraction. Moreover the special damage must not be too remote. Thus, where an actress had been libelled as immoral, and was so shaken in her nerves that she could not do her part well, the proprietor of the theatre sued the libeller; but Lord Kenyon said the damage was not sufficiently shown to be an immediate result so as to found an action.3 2 The only kind of special damage required to be proved in order to sustain an action for such spoken words is usually this, that some person declined to marry the female in consequence of the slander. And it is true she must do more than say, she lost her reputation and several suitors, for she must name these suitors.5 And a man may sue also for loss of marriage with a specified female in consequence of a like slander of his morality." Thus a widower clergyman was seeking in marriage a lady "by whom he was likely to have had a good preferment, and was in possibility to obtain her," when he was met with the following strictures: "He is a sharking fellow and getteth his living by deceit, and used himself violently to his former wife and denied her necessaries; and is a needy fellow, and his conditions are wicked; and for his religion, he is a Brownist." He lost the lady and sued the slanderer. The defendant could not prove anything to justify the slander, and the court held the special damage made it a ↑ Davis 2 Littledale, J., Kelly v 3 Astley v Harrison, Peake, 256; v Gardiner, 4 Rep. 16; Reston v 5 Barnes v Prudlin, 1 Vent. 4. 1 Ayre v Craven, 2 A. & E. 2. Partington, 5 B. & Ad. 645. 2 Camp. C. JJs. 65. Pomfret, Cro. Eliz. 639. 6 Mathew v Crass, Cro. Jas. 323. good cause of action. In one case an innkeeper, in consequence of an imputation of gallantry with a married woman, alleged, that he lost his customers, or what is equivalent, lost his trade, and this was held sufficient special damage, though he did not specify the names of the customers lost.2 So where it was said of a shopkeeper's wife, that she had committed adultery on the premises. And for a like reason a dissenting minister suffered special damage by a like slander, whereby persons ceased to frequent his chapel, for he could not be expected to name all those who so left him.1 But the mere loss of the society of friends by itself is not deemed this description of special damage, which the law takes notice of. And hence also the mere loss of becoming a member of some society or congregation of dissenters, which refused admittance to a candidate on account of a slander on her chastity, was held no substantial special damage. So, as already observed, the mere loss of suitors without naming them will not amount to special damage." A slander of chastity causing special damage. But if the loss of society is accompanied with some substantial temporal loss of meat and drink supplied by the hospitality of friends, then the law will recognise it, and enable the slandered female to sue the slanderer. In one case a spinster lady sued M for saying of her that she was incontinent, whereby, as she alleged, she had lost the society and hospitality of friends who used to invite her to their houses and to entertain her with meat and drink, and thereby enabled her to live more cheaply than she could do without such help; and the court held, this was a substantial pecuniary loss, and being proved, she was entitled to sue and recover damages. And a married woman may sue on the same ground, if she allege and prove the same loss. But except a married woman has lost meat and drink in the houses of her friends, she has no claim to any redress for spoken words imputing unchastity to her. In 1 Exch. D. 91. 1 Wicks v Shepherd, Cro. Ch. 155; Southold v Daunceston, Ibid. 269. 2 Collins v Mathews, 3 Keb. 242. 3 Riding v. Smith, 5 Roberts 6 Barnes v Prudlin, 1 Sid. 396. 8 Davies v Solomon, L. R., Hartley v Herring, 8 T. R. 130. v Roberts, 5 B. & S. 384. one case, owing to a slander against a wife that she had. been before her marriage all but seduced by B (a third person) and asserting, that the husband should not allow B to visit his house, the husband in consequence of this slander sent her home to her parents. The wife (adding the name of the husband) sued the slanderer, alleging the loss of the husband's society as the special damage; but the court doubted whether an action would lie for such loss of society by a wife; and at all events in this case the special damage was not the natural consequence of the slander, because a prudent husband would not on account. of it have acted so unreasonably as to separate from the wife, for all that he would have done would be to watch her conduct a little more carefully. And as a wife could. not lose her maintenance from the husband, owing to a mere slander of that kind, she was thus practically without any redress. And for a like reason the increased expense caused to a husband in medical attendance required by a wife, whose health suffers from a false slander in her chastity, is deemed no special damage, being too fanciful and remote.2 If words imputing unchastity are written, then they are actionable. But while spoken slanders on the chastity of women are thus only actionable when pecuniary loss follows, it is altogether different when one puts the words. in writing or in print. Thus when a newspaper about 1792 published of a young girl, a daughter of a peer, that "she had made a faux pas with a gentleman of the shoulderknot," for which imputation she sued the publisher, and no justification of the truth of such libel was offered, Lord Kenyon told the jury, that the cause of injured innocence was in their hands, and that they should teach by their verdict that class of publishers who traded in scandal the peril of their vocation. And the jury at once gave a verdict of 40007,3 Slander and libel of professional misconduct or incompetency.-Another head of slander as well as libel is where the professional or business character of a person is involved. In order to make this kind of imputation actionable, whether the words are spoken or written, no Parkins v Scott, 1 H. & C. 153. 3 Camp, C. JJs. 66. 2 1 Lynch Knight, 9 H. L. C. 599; Alsop v Alsop, 5 H. & N. 534. 5 4 special damage need be shown, for indeed the livelihood of any man is thereby directly attacked, and hence damage is presumed to follow naturally and inevitably. Words therefore, imputing misconduct or gross ignorance connected with some trade or business which is exercised with profit or capable of being so, are actionable without alleging special damage, though the same words might not be actionable if not used in connection with such trade or business. Such are words of the following tenor: imputing that he (a tradesman) constantly cheats his customers;1 or sells articles he knows to be bad; 2 or uses false weights;" or is bankrupt or insolvent, or can be made so; or that he (a physician) is a quack; that he (an apothecary) killed a patient with physic; that he (a physician) is so wanting in skill or character that other physicians refuse to meet him; that he (a counsel) gives corrupt and deceitful advice only to fill his own pocket, or disclosed his case to the adversary 8 that he (a solicitor) is no lawyer, no more lawyer than the devil is; or is well known to be corrupt; or that he hath no more law than C's bull, or than a goose;11 or cheats his clients; 12 or had been reprimanded for sharp practice.13 So if it is said of a clergyman beneficed, that his conduct in paying a curate so savoured of fraud that he ought to be degraded; 14 or of a beneficed clergyman that he was the father of a bastard child, and yet if the clergyman was not beneficed this would not be actionable per se 15; or that he performed divine service in a towering passion, and his conduct made infidels of his congregation. 16 So it is to say of a Roman Catholic bishop, that he converted a priest by offers of money and preferment ;17 that a captain has an unseaworthy ship; 18 that an exhibitor of flowers at exhibitions secures prizes by tricks and dirty .11 9 1 Reeve v Holgate, 2 Lev. 62. 3 Griffiths v Lewis, 7 Q. B. 65. 10 2 Evans Harlow, 5 Q. B. 633. 4 Brown Smith, 13 C. B. 599; Robinson Marchant, 7 Q. B. 918; Shepheard v Whitaker, 4 R., 10 C. P. 502. 5 Goddart v Haselfoot, 1 Rol. Ab. 54. 6 Tutty v Alewin, 11 Mod. 221. 7 Southee v Denny, 1 Exch. 196. 8 Snag v Gray, 1 Rol. Ab. 57; King v Lake, 2 Ventr. 28. 9 Day Buller, 3 Wils. 59. 10 Birchley's Case, 4 Rep. 16a. 11 Baker v Morfue, Sid. 327. 12 Alleston v Moor, Het. 167. 13 Boydell v Jones, 4 M. & W. 446. 14 Pemberton v Colls, 11 Q. B. 461. 15 Gallway v Marshall, 9 Exch. 294. 16 Walker v Brogden, 19 C. B., N. S. 65. 17 Tuam Robeson, 5 Bing. 21. 18 Ingram v Lawson, 8 Scott, 478. |