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Verbs. still commonly employed. In English, therefore, the foregoing process of inferring a command from an assertion of futurity seems to have been reversed; and the word shall, from denoting a command or obligation, has come to denote futurity simply.

86

of verbs, as they are

sive, or -neuter.

80. Having considered the verb in its essence, its tenses, and its modes, we might seem to have exhausted the active, pas-subject; but there is still something more to be done. Grammarians have distinguished verbs into several species and it remains with us to inquire upon what principle in nature this distinction is made, and how far it proceeds. Now it must be obvious, that if predication be the essence of verbs, all verbs, as such, must be of the same species; for predication is the same in every proposition, under every possible circumstance, and by whomsoever it is made. But the greater part of verbs contain the predicate as well as the predication of a pro.

position; or, to speak in common language, they denote an attribute as well as an affirmation. Thus, lego is "I am reading;" ambulo, "I am walking;" sto, "I am standing;" verbero, “I am striking ;” verberor, “I am stricken." But the attributes expressed by these verbs are evidently of different kinds; some consisting in action, some in suffering, and some in a state of being which is neither active nor passive. Hence the distinction of verbs, according to,the attributes which they denote, into active, passive, and neuter. Lego, which is an assertion that I am employed in the act of reading, is an active verb; verberor, which is an assertion that I am suffering under the rod, is a passive verb, because it denotes a passion; and sto, which is an assertion that I am standing still, is said to be a neuter verb, because it denotes neither action nor passion. But it is self-evident that there cannot be action without an agent, nor passion without

Verbs.

by means of it, may be expressed in synonymous and convertible phrases, in different languages, by means of
other parts or moods of the verb." Of these synonymous and convertible phrases he gives several examples,
of which the first is taken from Hamlet's soliloquy. "To be or not to be, that is the question," he thinks
equivalent in meaning to, "The question is, whether we shall be or shall not be ?" But we are persuaded he is
mistaken. "Whether we shall be or shall not be," is a question asking, whether we shall exist at some future
and indefinite time? but the subject of Hamlet's debate with himself was not, Whether, if his conscious existence
should be interrupted, it would be afterwards at some future and indefinite time restored? but whether it was to
continue uninterrupted by his exit from this world? This, we think, must be self-evident to every reader of the
Soliloquy. It is likewise very obvious, that the word question in this sentence does not signify interrogatory, but
subject of debate or affair to be examined; and that the word that serves for no other purpose than to complete
the verse, and give additional emphasis, perhaps, to an inquiry so important. "To be or not to be, that is the
question," is therefore equivalent in all respects to "The continuance or non-continuance of my existence, is the
matter to be examined ;" and the infinitive is here indisputably used as an abstract noun in the nominative case.
Should it be said, that the Doctor may have taken the sentence by itself, unconnected with the subject of
Hamlet's soliloquy; we beg leave to reply that the supposition is impossible; for, independent of the circum-
stances with which they are connected, the words "To be or not to be," have no perfect meaning. Were it not
for the subject of the soliloquy, from which every reader supplies what is wanting to complete the sense, it might
be asked, "To be or not to be"What? A coward, a murderer, a king, or a dead man! Questions all equally
reasonable, and which in that case could not be answered.

With the same view, to prove the infinitive to be truly a verb, the Doctor proceeds to remark upon the fol-
lowing phrases, Dico, credo, puto, Titium existere, valere, jacere, cecidisse, procubuisse, projecisse Mævium, pro-
jectum fuisse a Mavio; which, he says, have the very same meaning with dico, &c. quod Titius existat, quod jaceat,
quod ceciderit, &c. He adds, that "the infinitives, as thus used, acquire not any further meaning, in addition
to the radical import of the verb with tense, like the proper moods; but the subjunctives after quod lose their
peculiar meaning as moods, and signify no more than bare infinitives." In the sense in which this observation
is made by the author, the very reverse of it seems to be the truth. The infinitives, as thus used, acquire, at
least in the mind of the reader, something like the power of affirmation, which they certainly have not when
standing by themselves; whereas, the subjunctives neither lose nor acquire any meaning by being placed after
quod. Dico, credo, puto, Titium existere, valere, jacere, &c. when translated literally, signify, I say, believe, think,
Titius to exist, to be well, to lie along; a mode of speaking which, though now not elegant, was common with
the best writers in the days of Shakespeare, and is frequently to be found in the writings of Warburton at the
present day. Dico, credo, puto, quod Titius existat, quod jaceat, &c. signifies literally, I say, believe, think, that
Titius may exist, may lie along, &c. Remove the verbs in the indicative mode from the former set of phrases,
and it will be found that the infinitives had acquired a meaning, when conjoined with them, which they have not
when left by themselves: for Titium existere, jacere ; "Titius to exist, to lie along," have no complete meaning,
because they affirm nothing. On the other hand, when the indicative verbs are removed, together with the won-
der-working quod, from the latter set of phrases, the meaning of the subjunctives remains in all respects as it was
before the removal; for Titius existat, jaceat, &c. signify, Titius may exist, may lie along, as well when they
stand by themselves as when they make the final clauses of a compound sentence. Every one knows that quod,
though often called a conjunction, is always in fact the relative pronoun. Dico, credo, puto, quod Titius existat,
must therefore be construed thus: Titius existat (est id) quod dico, credo, &c. "Titius may exist is that thing,
that proposition, which I say, believe, think." In the former set of phrases, the infinitives are used as abstract
nouns in the accusative case, denoting, in conjunction with Titium, one complex conception, the existence, &c. of
Titius: Dico, credo, puto; I say, believe, think;" and the object of my speech, belief, thought, is Titium ex-
istere, the existence of Titius."
+

VOL. X. Part I.

F

In

Verbs.

57

All verbs

have a necessary re

without a passive being; neither can we make a predica tion of any kind, though it denote neither action nor passion, without predicating of something. All verbs, therefore, whether active, passive, or neuter, have a necessary reference to some noun expressive of the substance, of ference to a which the attribute, denoted by the verb, is predicated. noun in the This noun, which in all languages must be in the nominative nominative case, is said to be the nominative to the verb; and in those languages in which the verb has person and number, it must in these respects agree with its nominative.

case.

83

Active

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Of action, and consequently of verbs denoting action, verbs tran- there are obviously two kinds. There is an action which sitive or intransitive. passes from the agent to some subject, upon which he is employed; and there is an action which respects no object beyond the agent himself. Thus lego and ambulo are verbs which equally denote action; but the action of lego refers to some external object as well as to the agent ; for when a man is reading, he must be reading something, a book, a newspaper, or a letter, &c. whereas, the action of ambulo is confined wholly to the agent ; for when a man is walking, he is employed upon nothing beyond himself,—his action produces no effect upon any thing external. These two species of verbs have been denominated transitive and intransitive; a designation extremely proper, as the distinction which gave rise to it

&e.

is philosophically just. Verbs of both species are active; Participles,
but the action of those only which are called transitive
respects an external object; and therefore in those lan-
guages of which the nouns have cases, it is only after,
verbs which are transitive as well as active, that the
noun denoting the subject of the action is put in the ac-govern
cusative or objective case. Verbs which are intransitive, nouns in
though they be really active, are in the structure of the accusa-
sentences considered as neuter, and govern no case.

And so much for that most important of all words
the VERB. We proceed now to the consideration of
participles, adjectives, and adverbs; which as they have
a near relation to one another, we shall treat of in the
same chapter.

CHAP. V. Of Participles, Adjectives, and Adverbs.
SECT. I. Of Participles.

89 The former only

tive case.

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In confirmation of the same idea, that the infinitive is truly a verb, the author quotes from Horace a passage, which, had we thought quotations necessary, we should have urged in support of our own opinion :

-

Nec quicquam tibi prodest

Aërias TENTASSE domos, animoque rotundum
PERCURRISSE polum, morituro.

To our apprehension, nothing can be clearer than that TENTASSE and PERCURRISSE are here used as nouns; for if
they be not, where shall we find a nominative to the verb prodest? It was certainly what was signified by TENTASSE
aerias domos, animoque rotundum PERCURRISSE polum, that is said to have been no advantage to Archytas at his
death. This indeed, if there could be any doubt about it, would be made evident by the two prose versions,
which the professor subjoins to these beautiful lines. The first of which is as follows: Nec quicquam tibi prodest
quod aërias domos TENTAVERIS, et animo PERCURRERIS polum; which must be thus constructed: TENTAVERIS
aërias domos, et PERCURRERIS animo polum (est id) quod nec quicquam tibi prodest. This version, however, is not
perfectly accurate for it contains two propositions, while Horace's lines contain but one. The second, which,
though it may be a crabbed inelegant sentence, expresses the poet's sense with more precision, is in these words:
Nec quicquam tibi prodest morituro tua TENTATIO domuum aëriarum, et CURSUStuus circa polum. Having observed,
with truth, that this sentence has the very same meaning with the lines of Horace, Dr Gregory asks, "Why are
not tentatio and cursus reckoned verbs as well as tentasse and percurrisse?" Let those answer this question who
believe that any of these words are truly verbs; for they are surely, as he adds, all very near akin; indeed so
near, that the mind, when contemplating the import of each, cannot perceive the difference. Meanwhile,
we beg leave in our turn to ask, Why are not tentasse and percurrisse reckoned abstract nouns as well as tentatio
and cursus? To this question it is not easy to conceive what answer can be returned upon the Doctor's
principles. In his theory there is nothing satisfactory; and what has not been done by himself, we expect
not from his followers. On the other hand, our principles furnish a very obvious reason for excluding
tentatio and cursus from the class of verbs; it is, because these words express no predication. Tentasse and
percurrisse indeed denote predication no more than tentatio and cursus; and therefore upon the same principle
we exclude them likewise from a class to which, if words are to be arranged according to their import, they cer-
tainly do not belong.

Should the reader be inclined to think that we have dwelt too long on this point, we beg him to reflect, that if
our ideas of the essence of the verb and of the nature of the infinitive be erroneous, every thing which we have
said of modes and tenses is erroneous likewise. We were therefore willing to try the solidity of those principles
which hold the essence of the verb to consist in energy: and we selected Dr Gregory's theory for the subject of
examination, not from any disrespect to the author, whom the writer of this article never saw; but because we be-
lieve his abilities to be such, that

Si Pergama dextrá

Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent.

belong to me by means of the verb; and the time at Adjectives. which it belonged to me is pointed out by the tenses of that verb, am, was, and shall be. All this is so plain, that it could not have escaped Dr Beattie's penetration, had he not hastily adopted the absurd and contradictory notion of a definite present.

Adjectives. ed PARTICIPLES. Thus, take away the assertion from the verb yeapu writeth, and there remains the participle year writing; which, without the assertion, denotes the same attribute and the same time. After the same manner, by withdrawing the assertion, we discoverygaas written in sygays wrote; yeawy about to write in yeau shall be writing. This is Mr Harris's doctrine respecting participles; which, in our opinion, is equally elegant, perspicuous, and just. It has, however, been controverted by an author, whose rank in the republic of letters is such, that we should be wanting in respect to him, and in duty to our readers, were we to pass his objections wholly unnoticed.

82. It is acknowledged by Dr Beattie, that this, which we have taken, is the most convenient light in which the participle can be considered in universal grammar: and yet he affirms that present participles do not always express present time, nor preterite participles past time; nay, that participles have often no connection with time at all. He thus exemplifies his assertion, in Greek, in Latin, and in English.

When Cebes says, Ετυγχανομεν περιπατούλες εν τω Fav Xgorov iɛgw • We WERE WALKING in the temple of Saturn, the participle of the present WALKING, is, by means of the verb WERE, applied to time past; and therefore of itself cannot be understood to signify any sort of time." Again, after observing, that in English we have but two simple participles, such as writing and written, of which the former is generally considered as the present and the latter as the past, the Doctor adds, But the participle writing, joined to a verb of different tenses, may denote either past or future action; for we may say not only, I AM writing, but also, I WAS writing yesterday, and I SHALL BE writing tomorrow;" whence he infers that no time whatever is denoted by the present participle. But surely this is a hasty inference, drawn from the doctrine of absolute time and a definite present, which we have already shown to be groundless and contradictory. When we speak simply of an action as present, we must mean that it is present with respect to something besides itself, or we speak a jargon which is unintelligible, but we do not ascertain the time of its presence. From the very nature of time, an action may be present now, it may have been present formerly, or it may be present at some future period; but the precise time of its presence cannot be ascertained even by the present of the indicative of the verb itself; yet who ever supposed that the present of the indicative denotes no time? The participle of the present represents the action of the verb as going on; but an action cannot be going on without being present in time with something. When, therefore, Cebes says, "We were walking in the temple of Saturn," he represents the action of the verb walk as present with something; but by using the verb expressive of his assertion in a past tense, he gives us to understand that the action was not present with any thing at the period of his speaking, but at some portion of time prior to that period: what that portion of time was, must be collected from the subsequent parts of his discourse. The same is to be said of the phrases I was writing yesterday, and I shill be writing to-morrow. They indicate, that the action of the verb WRITE was present with me yesterday, and will again be present with me to-morrow. The action, and the time of action, are denoted by the participle; that action is affirmed to

Of the truth of his assertion respecting past participles, he gives a Greek and a Latin example. The former is taken from St Mark: missvous owencil; and the latter is that which is commonly called the perfect future of the passive verb amor, amatus fuero. In the first instance, he says that the participle, though belonging to the aorist of the past time, must be rendered either by the indefinite present," he who believeth;" or by the future," he who will believe ;" and the reason which he gives for this rendering of the word is, that "the believing here spoken of is considered as posterior in time to the enunciation of the promise." This is indeed true, but it is not to the purpose; for with the enunciation of the promise, the time of the participle has no manner of concern. The time of oliveas depends entirely upon the time of oatnosras, with respect to which it must undeniably be past. Our Lord is not here asserting, that he who shall believe at the day of final retribution, shall be saved; but that he who shall on that day be found to have believed in time past, shall be saved: and if the participle had not been expressive of a finished action and a past time, the whole sentence would have conveyed a meaning not friendly to the interests of the gospel. In like manner, the time of amatus is referred, not to the time of speaking, but to the time of fuero, with respect to which, who sees not that it is past? The two words, taken together, contain a declaration, that he who utters them shall, at some time posterior to that of speaking, have BEEN loved; shall have been loved denotes two times, both future with respect to the time of speaking; but when the time, denoted by shall have, comes to be present, that of the participle loved must be past, for it is declared that the action of it shall then be complete and finished.

We conclude, then, that it is essential to a participle to express both an attribute and time; and that such words as denote no time, though they may be in the form of participles, as doctus, "learned," eloquens, "eloquent," &c. belong to another part of speech, which we now proceed to consider.

SECT. II. Of Adjectives.

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tributes as

to substan

83. The nature of verbs and participles being un- Adjectives derstood, that of ADJECTIVES becomes easy. A verb denote atimplies (as we have said) an attribute, time, and anassertion; a participle implies only an attribute and time; and belonging an ADJECTIVE implies only an attribute as belonging to ees. some substance. In other words, an ADJECTIVE has no assertion, and it denotes only such an attribute as has not its essence either in motion or its privation. Thus, in general, the attributes of quantity, quality, and relation, such as many, few, great, little, black, white, good, bad, double, treble, &c. are all denoted by ADJECTIVES.

92

84. To understand the import and the use of this speThey have the import cies of words, it must be observed that every adjective is of abstract resolvable into a substantive and an expression of connec- nouus, toge tion equivalent to of. Thus, a good man is a man of ther with goodness; where we see the attribute denoted by the ad. the power jective fully expressed by an abstract noun. But it is of a conevident

F 2

nective.

Adjectives. evident that the noun goodness does not express the whole meaning of the adjective good; for every adjective expresses not only an attribute, but also the connection between the attribute and its substance; whereas in the abstract noun, the attribute is considered as a substance unconnected with any other substance.

In the next place it is to be observed, that the connection expressed by adjectives, like that expressed by of, is of a nature so general and indefinite, that the particular kind of connection must, in some languages, be infer red from our previous knowledge of the objects be. tween which it subsists, or it will for ever remain unknown. This might be proved by a variety of examples, but will perhaps be sufficiently evident from the following. Color salubris signifies colour that indieates health; exercitatio salubris, exercise that preserves health; victus salubris, food that improves health; medicina salubris, medicine that restores health. In all these examples the connection expressed by the adjective form of salubris is different; and though it may be known from previous experience, there is nothing in any of the expressions themselves by which it can be ascertain ed. Thus, adjectives are each significant of an attribute and connection; but the particular kind of connection is ascertained by experience.-The usual effect of adjectives in language, is to modify or particularise a general term, by adding some qualityor circumstance which The usual may distinguish the object meant by that term, from effect of ad- the other objects of the same species. I have occasion, jectives is for example, to speak of a particular man, of whose to modify a general name I am ignorant. The word man is too general for my purpose, it being applicable to every individual of the human species. In what way then do I proceed, in order to particularize it, so as to make it denote that very man whom I mean to specify? I annex or conjoin to it such words as are significant of objects and qualities with which he is connected, and which are not equally applicable to others from whom I mean to distinguish him. Thus I can say, a man of prudence or a prudent man, a wise man, a good man, a brave man, &c. By these additions the general term man is limited, or modified, and can be applied only to certain men to whom belong the attributes expressed by the adjectives prudent, wise, good, and brave. If it be still too general for my purpose, I can add to it other qualities and circumstances, till I make it so particular as to be applicable to but one individual man in the universe.

term.

93

94 The reverse of this is

the case.

85. This is the way in which ADJECTIVES are commonly used, but this is not the only way. Instead of besometimes ing employed to modify a substantive, they sometimes appear as the principal words in the sentence, when the sole use of the substantive seems to be to modify the abstract noun, contained under the adjective to which that substantive is joined. In order to understand this, it will be necessary to attend to the following observations.

It may be laid down as a general proposition, that when any term or phrase is employed to denote a complex conception, the mind has a power of considering, in what order it pleases, the simple ideas of which the complex conception is composed. To illustrate this observation by an example: The word eques in Latin denotes a complex conception, of which the constituent simple ideas are those of a man and a horse; with this connection subsisting between them, that the man is conceived as on the back of the horse. In the use of this word, it is

2

well known that the idea first in order, as being the Adjectives.
principal subject of the proposition, is commonly the MAN
on the back of the horse; but it is not so always, for the
mind may consider the HORSE as the principal object.
Thus when Virgil says,

Fræna Pelethronii Lapithe gyrosque dedere,
Impositi dorso; atque EQUITEM docuere sub armis
INSULTARE SOLO, et GRESSUS GLOMERARE superbos—

the energies attributed to the object signified by EQUI
TEM, make it evident that the horse and not the man
is meant; for it is not the property of a man, insultare
solo, et gressus glomerare superbos.

The same observation holds true where the complex object is denoted by two or more words; an adjective, for instance, and a substantive. Thus in the phrase summus mons se inter nubila condit, the words summus mons represent a complex conception, of which the constituent ideas are those of height and mountain, connected toge ther by the adjective form of summus. Either of these ideas may be the subject of the proposition; and the expression will accordingly admit of two different signifi cations. If mons be made the subject of the proposition, the meaning will be," the highest mountain bides itself among the clouds." If the substantive included in the radical part of summus be made the subject of the proposition, the expression will signify, "the summit, or highest part of the mountain, hides itself among the clouds." The latter is the true import of the sentence. 95 86. From these observations and examples, we shall Two uses be enabled to understand the two uses of the adjective, of the It is either employed, as has been already observed, to restrict or modify, a general term; or the abstract substantive contained in the adjective is modified by the noun, with which, in the concrete or adjective form, that abstract substantive is joined. The first may be called the direct, the second the inverse, acceptation of adjectives.

The inverse acceptation of adjectives and participles (for both are used in the same manner) has not, except in a very few instances, been noticed by any grammarian; yet the principle is of great extent in language. In order to explain it, we shall produce a few examples; which on any other principle it is impossible

to understand.

Livy, speaking of the abolition of the regal authority at Rome, says, Regnatum est Romæ ab URBE CONDITA ad LIBERATAM annos ducentos quadraginta quatuor, "Monarchy subsisted at Rome, not from the city built (which would convey no meaning), but from the building of the city, to its deliverance," &c. Both the participles condita and liberatam are here used inversely; that is, the abstract substantives contained in condita and liberatam are modified or restricted by the substantives urbe and urbem, with which they unite. Again, Ovid, speaking of the contest between Ajax and Ulysses for the arms of Achilles, has these lines:

Qui, licet cloquio fidum quoque Nestora vincat,
Haud tamen efficiet, DESERTUM ut NESTORA CRIMEN
Nullum esse rear.-

Here also the adjective or participle DESERTUM is taken
inversely, and the general notion of desertion contained
in it is modified or rendered particular by being joined
with the substantive NESTORA. The meaning of the

passage

of the ad

Adjectives. passage is, "I will never be induced to believe that the desertion of Nestor was not a crime." Were desertum to be taken directly as an adjective modifying its substantive, the sentence must be translated, "I cannot believe that Nestor deserted was not a crime." But it is evident that this is nonsense: as NESTOR, whether déserted or not deserted, could not be a crime.

96 Adjectives formed from substantives,

It were easy to produce many more examples of adjectives taken inversely; but these may suffice to illustrate the general principle, and to show, that without attending to it, it is impossible to understand the ancient authors. We shall adduce one instance of it from Shakespeare, to evince that it is not confined to the ancient Janguages, though in these it is certainly more frequent than in the modern :

"Freeze, freeze, thou bitter sky;
"Thou canst not bite so nigh
"As benefits forgot:

"Though thou the waters warp,

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Thy sting is not so sharp

"As friends remember'd not." Here it is evident, that the adjective FORGOT is taken inversely; for it is not a benefit, but the forgetting of a benefit, which bites more than the bitter sky and therefore, in this passage, the adjective serves not to modify the noun; but the noun benefits is employed to modify the abstract substantive contained in the adjective for got, which is the subject of the proposition, and the principal word in the sentence.

Had Mr Harris attended to the principle, and reflected upon what he could not but know, that all adjectives denote substances ; not indeed subsisting by themselves, as those expressed by nouns, but concretely, as the attributes of other substances; he would not have classed adjectives with verbs, or have passed so severe a censure upon the grammarians for classing them with nouns. It matters very little how adjectives are classed, provided their nature and effect be understood; but they have at least as good a title to be ranked with nouns as with verbs, and in our opinion a better. To adopt Mr Harris's language, they are homogeneous with respect to nouns, as both denote substances; they are heterogeneous with respect to verbs, as they never do denote assertion. 87. Besides original adjectives, there is another class, which is formed from substantives. Thus, when we say, the party of Pompey, the style of Cicero, the philosophy of Socrates; in these cases, the party, the style, and the philosophy spoken of, receive a stamp and character from the persons whom they respect: Those persons, therefore, perform the part of attributes. Hence they actually pass into attributives, and assume as such the form of adjectives. It is thus we say, the Pompeian party, the Ciceronian style, and the Socratic philosophy. In like manner, for a trumpet of brass, we say a brazen trumpet, and for a crown of goid, a golden crown, &c. Even and from pronominal substantives admit the like mutation. Thus, pronouns. instead of saying the book of me, and of thee, we say my book, and thy book; and instead of saying, the country of us, and of you, we say our country, and your country. These words my, thy, our, your, &c. have therefore been properly called pronominal adjectives.

97

&c.

98

nature

should have

no varia

88. It has been already observed, and must be obvi- Adverbs, ous to all, that substances alone are susceptible of sex ; and that therefore substantive nouns alone should have distinctions respecting gender. The same is true with respect to number and person. An ATTRIBUTE admits Adjectives of no change in its nature, whether it belong to YOU from their or to ME, to a MAN or a WOMAN, to ONE man or to MANY; and therefore the words expressive of attributes, ought on all occasions, and in every situation, to be fix- tion to deed and invariable. For as the qualities good and bad, note sex, black and white, are the same, whether they be applied number, or to a man or a woman, to many or to few; so the word person. which expresses any one of these attributes ought in strictness to admit of no alteration with whatever substantive it may be joined. Such is the order of nature; and that order, on this as on other occasions, the English language most strictly observes: for we say equally, a good man or a good woman; good men or good women; a good house or good houses. In some languages, indeed, such as Greek and Latin, of which the nouns admit of cases, and the sentences of an inverted structure, it has been found necessary to endow adjectives with the threefold distinction of gender, number, and person; but as this is only an accidental variation, occasioned by particular circumstances, and not in the least essential to language, it belongs not to our subject, but to the particular grammars of these tongues.

99

There is, however, one variation of the adjective, They have which has place in all languages, is founded in the nature however of things, and properly belongs to universal grammar. one variation foundIt is occasioned by comparing the attribute of one sub-ed in the stance with a similar attribute of another, and falls na-nature of turally to be explained under the next section.

SECT. III. Of Adverbs, and the Comparison of Ad

jectives.

things.

100

89. As adjectives denote the attributes of substances, The import so there is an inferior class of words which denote the mo- of adverbs. difications of these attributes. Thus, when we "Cisay cero and Pliny were both of them eloquent ; Statius and Virgil both of them wrote;" the attributes expressed by the words eloquent and wrote are immediately referred to Cicero, Virgil, &c.; and as denoting the attributes of substances, these words, the one an adjective, and the other a verb, have been both called ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. But when we say, “Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent ;. Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably;" the words moderately, exceedingly, indifferently, and admirably, are not referable to substantives, but to other attributes; that is, to the words eloquent and wrote, the signification of which they modify. Such words, therefore, having the same effect upon adjectives that adjectives have upon substantives, have been called ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER. By gram- The reason marians they have been called ADVERBS; and, if we of their take the word VERB in its most comprehensive signi fication (A), as including not only verbs properly so called, but also every species of words, which, whether essentially or accidentally, are significant of the attributes of substances, we shall find the name ADVERB

to

(A) Aristotle and his followers called every word a verb, which denotes the predicate of a proposition. This classification was certainly absurd; for it confounds not only adjectives and participles, but even substantives, with verbs: but the authority of Aristotle was great; and hence the name of adverb, though that word attaches itself only to an adjective or participle, or a verb significant of an attribute: it does not attach itself to the pure verb..

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