1845, Said Bey assembled a grand meeting of his feudatories for the purpose of arranging measures to assert and maintain the Druze supremacy. The Christians, justly alarmed at such a significant conference, began at once to take steps for mutual defence, and, if necessary, for aggressive warfare; and with such effect, that when the crisis came, they within twenty-four hours succeeded in burning seventeen villages in Said Bey's district, in defeating all the Druze detachments in the neighbourhood, and in advancing up to the very walls of Muctara, which they would have certainly destroyed had they not been checked by a regiment of Turkish troops which had been most fortunately sent thither for Said Bey's protection. The cessation of hostilities, and the tranquillity which continued to exist in the Lebanon for the next fifteen years, enabled Said Bey at last to improve his property, to increase his wealth, and to strengthen his importance.

Under the political régime which had now been established in the Lebanon, the Druze sheiks were placed in a position of virtual independence, which they had not for centuries enjoyed. They were governed by a Kaimakam of their own nation. Each feudal sheik had undisputed control over his own district. The Christians scattered throughout it, some in Druze villages, some in villages exclusively occupied by their own community, were nominally represented near his person by a deputy, paid by the Turkish Government, supposed to watch over and protect their interests, but whose representations were treated with indifference and contempt, and whose office soon became a sinecure, the emoluments of which the sheik kept to himself. Had the same spirit now existed between the Druzes and the Christians which existed in days of yore, when the Cabinets of Europe seemed to be utterly unconscious of the latter's existence, and certainly had not as yet dreamt of urging the amelioration of their condition;' when the Christians of the East

kept their own as best they could, and purchased a comparatively endurable condition by uncompromising submission to hostile sects, who despised while they tolerated them, the Christians of the Lebanon would still no doubt have enjoyed the same exemption from tyranny, the same general capability of well-being which had been the lot of their forefathers under Druze supremacy.

But the character and the prospects of these Christians had of late years undergone a striking change. They saw themselves regarded, patronized, and countenanced by the Powers of Europe, and by one in particular, whose officious and over-zealous agents were constantly encouraging them to hold up their heads, to look for better days, for days of emancipation from a barbarous and degrading yoke of equality, and even of superiority. As a logical result, they had begun to talk loudly of their rights, and even to menace their assertion by force of arms. In some parts of the Druze mountains they had congregated in villages which might almost be called cities, both for size and solidity. Many were intriguing, restless, wealthy, and arrogant. The Druzes were perfectly alive to the probable and not remote consequences of the introduction of such an ominous tone and feeling into the relations existing between themselves and the Christians. The cuckoo's egg had, in fact, been laid in their nest, and in the course of nature the right to the nest would be disputed. It is not surprising therefore that the Druzes, and the Druze sheiks especially, who felt that their very existence depended on the maintenance of their power and the free exercise of their prerogative, viewed the Christians in general, and more than all, those living under their own rule, with jealousy and mistrust; or that they endeavoured, as far as they could, to make them feel their dependence, and to teach them the practical lesson, that it was by courting and being obedient to them, rather than by indulging

in wild hopes of foreign aid and assistance, that they could ever obtain the peaceable fruition of their labours, or the enjoyment of their social rights.

Such was their general principle of action, modified or exaggerated at the same time, according to their several dispositions. Some treating their Christian tenants and dependents with kindness and consideration, others with a severity amounting to oppression. Of the latter class was Said Bey Jumblatt. Allowing himself to be guided by a worthless and unprincipled Druze Ockal, of the name of Kassim Hosnedeen, he acted towards the Christians as though they were his serfs, and in numerous instances laid outrageous hands on their private property. Upon the most frivolous pretexts, he would make claims on this man's mulberry grounds, on another's olive plantation, another's vineyard, have them arbitrarily valued, and then take forcible possession. Like Ahab, he would say to these Naboths, 'I will give thee the worth of it in money,' yet never keep his word, though he took good care to keep his money's worth.

on

Through the friendly interest of Mr. Wood, her Majesty's Consul for Damascus, he succeeded in having restored to him the numerous villages in the Bekaa, which had been such a source of pecuniary advantage to his father. The merciless exactions he inflicted on their unfortunate peasants almost drove them distracted; and indeed, he made them feel that his little finger was thicker than his father's loins.' From the Turkish authorities they could get no redress. These had been bribed by their oppressor into collusion; while the ostentatious patronage afforded him by the British Government, rendered all appeal in that quarter equally useless. Many of them got beaten within an inch of their lives, and more than one assassinated for daring to complain. The impunity thus afforded to Said Bey not only rendered him utterly reckless in his procedures, but had a most deleterious effect on his less

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scrupulous colleagues, who, encouraged by his example, indulged in all those violent excesses against the Christians which drove their co-religionists to proffer them relief even by force of arms.

In due course of time, the ruined palace at Muctara arose from its state of desolation with increased strength and development. Many apartments were built and fitted up in European style. Becoming one of the lions of the Lebanon, it was visited by travellers, much as in former days the residence of Lady Esther Stanhope, at Tour. English noblemen and gentlemen were sure to meet there with an exuberant hospitality, for Said Bey was of course most anxious that they at least should go away favourably impressed, and sound his praises in influential quarters. As they only saw the dazzling drop curtain, and nothing of the scenes behind, the illusion very naturally was complete. Even to this day, in the eyes of such admirers, Said Bey is a martyr! Notwithstanding his profuse expressions of devotion to the English, the remonstrances which his unprincipled conduct failed not to elicit from the English consular authorities, were uniformly treated with indifference; and as he found that their countenance and protection were not withdrawn, the only measure which would really have affected him, he began to imagine himself a political necessity in that quarter, and like the Ottoman Turks, made use of, while he laughed at them.

Nevertheless, for the last two years he had been gradually withdrawing from his 'protectors,' and throwing himself into the arms of the Turkish authorities. Their ideas of right and wrong were not inconveniently sensitive, their moral feelings not over-refined; and so far from thwarting or upbraiding, they courted him. It is not surprising, therefore, that Said Bey grasped the friendly hand that was thus held out to him, accepted the good offices of his legitimate masters, allowed himself to be allured into their confidence, and promised to give efficiency as much as lay in

his power to all their secret designs.

The story of the part which Said Bey took in the late civil war, has been enveloped in such a maze of apparent contradictions by the absurd proceedings of the tribunal appointed to try the Druze criminals, that it is only by keeping completely outside the vicious circle described by those proceedings, and looking at his antecedents, bearing in mind his general character, and more than all, looking at undeniable facts, that an approximation can be made to the extent of his culpability. To follow Said Bey through all the tortuous paths of cunning and ferocity in which he played his part as joint conspirator with Kurchid Pasha for the destruction of the Christians, would be far beyond our present limits. It has never been denied that it was his Druzes-or those such as the bands of Ismail il Uttrush, from the Houran, whom he called in-who were the principal perpetrators of all the massacres; that his confidential agents were the leaders in all the atrocities committed on the Christians throughout his districts; and that so completely were these agents under his control, that it needed but one word from him to make them desist from their

butcheries. So much so, that the chief of them, Kassim Bey Hamadi, after having spent three weeks in the work of indiscriminate slaughter, stayed his hand, and conducted two hundred Christians, by Said Bey's order, in perfect safety to Sidon. A passage in one of Lord Dufferin's despatches so correctly describes the motives which actuated Said Bey at this awful period, that we cannot forbear from quoting it: With the duplicity in which Orientals are such adepts, he secretly fomented the troubles he pretended to appease; and while he saved some (Christians) to bear witness in his favour in case a day of retribution should arrive, he secretly incited the less cautious of his chiefs to commit the crimes he was too prudent to engage in himself.' Though his Lordship advances this as a theory, he may depend upon it, in thus expressing himself, he has taken the right sow by the ear. He had for some time been labouring under an affection of the lungs, and he died in imprisonment on the 10th of May last, leaving one daughter and two sons of tender age. It is devoutly to be hoped that the latter will be educated in such a manner as to induce them to avoid treading in the steps of their father.

LIBANUS.

the state of war, of a remedy to which the injured merchant could appeal. The victim was deprived of the means of redress owing to the cessation of those relations between the belligerent Governments, through which alone redress could be obtained. It was a species of international outlawry. The ordinary tribunal was closed against the injured party, and everybody who was responsible only to that tribunal might plunder him with impunity. The circumstance that the produce of the capture was divided among the actual captors, and not appropriated by the Government whose subjects they were, seems to indicate that the plunder of an enemy's commerce was not a measure to which the belligerent Government condescended, but one which the circumstance of war enabled its subjects to indulge in with impunity. If this was the case in the early ages of modern Europe, certainly the ancients never considered that in confiscating the property of an enemy they were justified only upon the principle that by so doing they reduced him to such a state of distress as obliged him to come to terms. So far were they from imposing the limitation upon this right of war, which is now appealed to as the principle from which that right is derived, that the civil law treats capture as a mode of acquiring property by occupation of a res nullius, or, in other words, denies that as between enemies there can be any property at all. Their theory was evidently of the most primitive descriptionthat whatever may be the occasion of war, its objects have no limits, and that consequently its rights are subject to no corresponding checks. And even up to the time of Grotius, these and still less humane views of belligerent rights were theoretically maintained. In affirming the principle that the rights of war are to be measured by the objects of a war, the later jurists adopted a rule according to which both the ancient and modern usages of war could be justified, but which was of a date far posterior to the first, and which had no practical influence in

establishing the latter. The appeals of statesmen to the writings of the jurists, are rather citations of their authority as depositories of consuetudinary public law, than as expounders of an imaginary law of nature. The truth is, that the gradual limitation of belligerent rights has been the result, not of juster views of natural law, but of the influence of civilization, Christianity, humanity, and convenience. All history, whether of single races or of tribes in different stages of civilization, shows a constantly progressing limitation of the exercise of armed power. First, and among the most savage tribes, not only is the property of the foe confiscated by wholesale, but the prisoners taken in warfare are put to death, often with the most shocking tortures. Afterwards, and in more civilized ages, we find the life of the prisoner spared, but his liberty forfeited. Next, the conquered are deprived only of their property. In the warfare of the Middle Ages this usage disappears as regards the territorial possessions of the subjects of a vanquished State. The conquest of England by William I. is the last instance in which this practice was exercised. As society advances, we find national monuments and masterpieces of art exempted from the spoliation of the invader. Private property on land is at last, except in the now rare practice of sacking a fortified town, in all cases sacred. Private property at sea only remains unprotected, and this last relic of barbarous usage has survived, not because its character is exceptional, but because the causes which have made it the interest of all nations to abandon the rest, have not acted equally upon all with respect to this. The fear of reprisal and retaliation which has been the motive with every State for the surrender of its former belligerent usages, has not, in this particular, operated equally upon all. England, and perhaps France, are unwilling to surrender the advantage which superiority of their naval armaments would give them against the commerce of other