fhew Mankind, not only the principle that
ought to unite them, but what is of no less im-
portance, the form under which they ought to
be united. And the Philofopher, when he con-
fiders the conftant fate of civil Societies amongst
Men, and obferves the numerous and powerful
causes which feem as it were unavoidably to con-
duct them all to a state of incurable political
Slavery, takes comfort in feeing that Liberty
has at length disclosed her fecret to Mankind,
and fecured an Afylum to herfelf.

INDEX.

INDE

X.

AMERICAN Colonies, their claim of voting fupplies
to the crown, hurtful, if obtained, to the English
conftitution, 522, 527. What ought to have been the
general conduct of minifters in regard to the colonies,
527, 528.

*

Appeal, in cafe of murder, its effects, and to whom allow.
ed, 89.
Army, restrictions on the power of the king in regard to
the keeping of it, 90, 91. The appropriated funds for
the paying
of the fame, 91. If not in England, a means
of fupporting the authority of the crown, 444, 471,
paffim. How little its affiftance was ufeful to James II.
468, 469. See Military Power and Crown.

Arreft, method of, in civil caufes by the English laws, 113,

116. By the Roman laws, 116, 118. The alterations
in the English law in that refpect, 119.

Affemblies, popular, the difadvantages they lie under in re-
gard to their coming to any deliberate well weighed refo-
lution, 249, 251. The advantages a few diftinguifhed ci-
tizens have over them, 251, 257, 262, 263, 265. Tully's
paffage concerning them, 266. See People, Common--
wealths, Rome.

Athens, the people do not feem to have really enjoyed much
liberty in that republic, 275. An inftance of the pro-
ceedings of the magiftrates, ibid.

Aula Regis, what kind of court, 15. The court of Com-
mon Pleas difinembered from it, III. The court of

King's Bench may be confidered as the remains of it,

118.

Author, occafional perfonal remarks of his, 377, 426, 444.
452. His Memorials of human Superftition quoted, 513.
His converfation with Dr. Franklin, 525.

B.

Barons, originally in a great meafure independent on the
crown, in France, 12.
Not fo in England, 15, 21.

Unite in a common caufe with the people, 21, 23, 338,

454, 455.

Beauchamp, lord, procures the paffing of a bill for limiting
perfonal arrests, 119.

Bills, how deliberated upon and framed, 67, 68, 226, 234,
268. See Commons and Parliament.

Bill of Rights, an account of, 58, 59. Remarkable impar-
tiality and univerfality of its provifions, 342.

Blackflone, judge, quoted, 69, 82, 145, 182, 187, 362,
380.

Burnet, bishop, quoted, 367, 397, 469.

C..

Cafar, public fpeech of his quoted, 382, 383.

Cenforial power, that established in Rome only a fenatorial
artifice, 393. See Prefs, liberty of the.

Cenfors, in Rome, might remove a man from one tribe into
another, 277, and elect fenators, ibid. See Rome.
Chancery, court of, its office in regard to the framing of
writs, 129, 130. See Equity, courts of.

Charles I. a sketch of his reign, 48, 52. Maintains his
ground eleven years against the violent, political, and
religious fpirit of his times, 459. His attempt to feize
the five members; the period of the beginning of the
civil wars, 462.

Civil English laws, divided into unwritten, and written
law, 107.
The fources of the unwritten law, 107, 109.
How far the civil law is a part of the fame, 110. What
the written law is, ibid. Peculiarities of the English civil
laws, 113, 120. Refinements and fubtilties in them,
120, 122, 128, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136. Compared
with the old Roman civil laws, 127, 128.

Civil power in England, how superior to the military, 462,
472.

Civil Roman laws, the conftant diflike of the English
lawyers for them, 105, 106. Formalities in the ancient
Roman laws, 124, 127. Divided into civil and præto-
rian laws, 142, 143. The different collections of them,
149. See Prætor.

Coke, fir Edward, quoted, 145, 176, 187, 227, 295.
Comines, Philip de, quoted, 30, 40.

Commons, English, their first origin, under Henry III. and
Edward I. 3, 32. How inconfiderable their weight at.

Vindi-

first, 33. This foon increafes, 34. Farther advances,
41, 42. How the house is conflituted, 61, 62.
cate the right of taxation against the attempts of the
crown, 45, 51. And of the lords, 85. Their exist-
ence wholly depends upon that right, ibid. The first
inftance of a misunderstanding between them and the
lords in regard to money bills, 86. Commonly grant
the king's revenue for life, 79. See Taxation. They
cannot vote by proxy, 227. Enjoy a freedom of de-
bate fuperior to that ever poffeffed by any popular af-
fembly, 235. See Propounding. They are debarred
from any fhare in the executive authority, 280, 281.
Are thence led to ferve the people faithfully, 283, 284.
Striking inftances of this in the laws they have framed
at particular times, 340, 359, 362. And in their
watching afterwards on their execution, 363. Have im-
peached the fervants of the crown and judges, 363,
366. Their proceedings in the cafe of fir John Coven-
try, 367. See Parliament and Reprefentative. Abridge
their own perfonal privileges, 370. In what these privi-
leges now confiit, ibid. Do ftrict juftice on their own
members, 371, 373. Onwhat occafion theyr epealed the
ftatute De Hæretico Comburendo, 384. Their attacks on
the crown's prerogative defeated by the lords, 395, 398.
They in their turn defeat the like attempts from the
lords, 397, 398.

Commonwealths, the people in them apt to be misled by
favourite leaders, 198, 200. The divifion of the ex-
ecutive authority that takes place in them, makes it very
difficult to lay it under proper restraints, 215, 216.
The people unavoidably betrayed by thofe whom they
truft with power, 271, 277, 278, 284. Revolution
always concluded in them in a difadvantageous manner
to public liberty, 325. See Revolutions. The laws to
fecure the liberty of the citizens, befides being imper-
fect, are not even carefully executed, 342, & feq. See
Rome. Cannot fubfift without certain arbitrary powers,
contrary to the liberty of the citizens, 421, 422. Do
not admit the liberty of fpeaking and writing, and per-
haps cannot, 425, 426. Refpect of perfons cannot be
prevented in them in the adminiftration of juftice, 441,
442. The power of the government fuppofed by law
to be unbounded till ftopped by fome politive and de-

clared regulation, 451, & feq. By what means com
monwealths generally lofe their liberties, 481. Real
great difficulty for the people in them to preferve their
rights, 482, 484. See Rome, and Geneva.

Conqueft, the, is the real æra of the formation of the prefent
English government, 7.

Conftitution English, the eras of its formation, 40, 59.
Being different from that of all other free ftates, cannot
fall into ruin from the fame caufes, 473. Causes that
operate for its prefervation, 481, 487. Endangered by
the offers of Columbus to Henry VII. 487, 488. Far-
ther reafons of its future preservation, 488, 494. How
1t rifes again, after being in a manner overwhelmed, 495.
Dangers to which it may be exposed, 496, 497. In
what circumstances it may be looked upon as annihil-
ated, 498. Meddling with it, upon the fcore of im-
provement, may prove very dangerous experiments,
471, 506, 507. See Crown. Would have been altered
by granting the Americans their claims, 522, 527. See
Taxation. Seems to diffufe a fpirit of order and justice
among the lower claffes of people, 534, 535. Such a
one wished for by the politicians of antiquity, 537,
538.

Confuls, the era of their creation, and nature of their office,
336. Unrestrained power, 345. See Rome.
Coronation oath, 92.

Coventry, fir John, his cafe, 367.
mons, and bill they pafs, ibid.
bill, 369, 370.

Refentment of the com
An obfervation on that

Courts of law, in England, their names and functions, 111,
112. Kept by parliament under ftrict rules, 375, 376.
The great impartiality of their proceedings, 376, 379,
A few remarkable inftances, 377, 379, 380. See Law,
and fury.

Cromwell, his fruitless attempts to form a popular affembly
obedient to him, 430, 432.

Crown, its power much fuperior in England after the Con-
queft, to what it was in France, 10, 20. The barons
compelled to unite with the commonalty, to reftrain its
power, 21, 24. Its prefent conftitutional prerogative,
72, 73. Reftraints it lies under, 87, 91. See King.
Totally dependent on the people for its fupplies, 74, 77.
Ufefulness of its power in preventing any citizen or po