which, by the way, comes with but little propriety from Writers who would have the People tranfact every thing in their own persons, this reproach, I fay, though true to a certain degree, is not however so much so as it is thought by certain perfons who have taken only a fuperficial furvey of the state of things.

Without doubt, in a Constitution in which all important caufes of uneafinefs are so effec, tually prevented, it is impoffible but that the People will have long intervals of inattention. Being then called upon, on a fudden, from this ftate of inactivity, to elect Reprefentatives, they have not examined, beforehand, the merits of those who afk them their votes ; and the latter have not had, amidst the general tranquillity, any opportunity to make themselves known to them.

The Elector, perfuaded, at the fame time, that the person whom he will elect, will be equally interested with himself in the fupport of public liberty, does not enter into laborious difquifitions, and from which he fees he may exempt himself. Obliged, however, to give the preference to fomebody, he forms his choice on motives which would not be excufable, if it were not that fome motives are

neceffary to make a choice, and that, at this inftant, he is not influenced by any other; and indeed it must be confeffed, that, in the ordinary courfe of things, and with Electors of a certain rank in life, that Candidate who gives the best entertainment, has a great chance to get the better of his competitors.

But if the measures of Government, and the reception of those measures in Parliament, by means of a too complying Houfe of Commons, should ever be such as to spread a serious alarm among the People, the. fame caufes which have concurred to establish public liberty, would, no doubt, operate again, and likewise concur in its fupport. A general combination would then be formed, both of those Members of Parliament who have remained true to the public cause, and of perfons of every order among the People. Public meetings, in fuch circumstances, would be appointed, general fubfcriptions would be entered into, to fupport the expences whatever they might be, of fuch a neceffary oppofition; and all private and unworthy purposes being fuppreffed by the fenfe of the National danger, the choice of the electors would then be wholy determined by the confider

ation of the public spirit of the Candidates, and the tokens given by them of such spirit.

Thus were those Parliaments formed, which fuppreffed arbitrary taxes and imprisonments. Thus was it, that, under Charles the Second, the People, when recovered from that enthufiafm of affection with which they received a King fo long perfecuted, at last returned to him no Parliaments but fuch as were compofed of a majority of Men attached to public liberty, Thus it was, that, perfevering in a conduct which the circumftances of the times rendered neceffary, the People baffled the arts of the Government; and Charles diffolved three fucceffive Parliaments, without any other effect but that of having those fame Men re-chofen, and fet again in oppofition to him, of whom he hoped he had rid himself for ever.

Nor was James the Second happier in his attempts than Charles had been. This Prince foon experienced that his Parliament was actuated by the fame fpirit as those which had oppofed the defigns of his late brother; and having fuffered himself to be led into meafures of violence, inftead of being better taught by the difcovery he made of the real, fentiments of the People, his reign was terminated

by that catastrophe with which every one is acquainted.

Indeed, if we combine the right enjoyed by the People of England, of electing their Representatives, with the whole of the English Government, we fhall become continually more and more fenfible of the 'excellent effects that may refult from that right. All Men in the State are, as has been before obferved, really interested in the fupport of public liberty;-nothing but temporary motives, and fuch as are quite peculiar to themselves, can poffibly induce the Members of any House of Commons to connive at measures deftructive of this liberty: the People, therefore, under fuch circumftances, need only change thefe Members in order effectually to reform the conduct of that Houfe; and it may fairly be pronounced beforehand, that a Houfe of Commons, compofed of a new set of perfons, will, from this bare circumftance, be in the interefts of the People.

Hence, though the complaints of the People do not always meet with a speedy and immediate redrefs (a celerity which would be the fymptom of a fatal unsteadiness in the Constitution, and would fooner or later bring on its ruin) yet, when we attentively confider

the nature and the refources of this Conftitution, we fhall not think it too bold an affertion to fay, that it is impoffible but that complaints in which the People perfevere, that is, to repeat it once more, well-grounded complaints, will fooner or later be redreffed.

CHA P. XIV.

Right of Refiftance.

UT all those privileges of the People, con

fidered in themselves, are but feeble defences against the real ftrength of those who govern. All those provifions, all those reciprocal Rights, neceffarily suppose that things remain in their legal and fettled courfe: what would then be the refource of the People, if ever the Prince, fuddenly freeing himfelf from all reftraint, and throwing himself as it were out of the Conftitution, fhould not longer refpect either the perfon or the property of the fubject, and either should make no account of his conventions with his Parliament, or attempt to force it implicitly to fubmit to his will ?-It would be refiftance.