by any methods, and. under any names whatfoever, have acquired the means of turning against each individual the collective ftrength of all, and have fo ordered things around themselves, that whoever attempts to refift them, is fure to find himself engaged alone against a thousand.

CHA P. X.

Fundamental difference between the English Government, and the Governments juft defcribed.-In England all Executive Authority is placed out of the hands of thofe in whom the People truft. Ufefulness of the Power of the Crown.

N what manner then, has the English Con

Iftitution contrived to find a remedy for evils

which, from the very nature of Men and things, feem to be irremediable? How has it found means to oblige thofe perfons to whom the People have given up their power, to make them effectual and lafting returns of gratitude? those who enjoy an exclufive authority, to feek the advantage of all?-thofe who make the laws, to make only equitable ones?It has been by fubjecting themselves to thofe laws, and for that purpofe excluding them from all fhare in the execution of them.

Thus, the Parliament can establish as numerous a ftanding army as it pleases; but immediatly another Power comes forward, which takes the abfolute command of it, which fills all the pofts in it, and directs its motions at its pleasure. The Parliament may lay new taxes; but immediately another Power feizes upon the produce of them, and alone enjoys the advantages and glory arifing from the difpofal of it. The Parliament may even, if you please, repeal the laws on which the fafety of the Subject is grounded; but it is not their own. caprices and arbitrary humours, it is the caprice and paffions of other Men, which they will have gratified, when they fhall thus have overthrown the columns of public liberty.

And the English Conftitution has not only excluded from any fhare in the Execution of the laws, those in whom the People trust for the enacting of them, but it has alfo taken from them what would have had the fame pernicious influence on their deliberations---the hope of ever invading that executive authority, and transferring it to themselves.

This authority has been made in England one fingle, indivifible prerogative; it has been made for ever the unalienable attribute of one

one perfon, marked out and afcertained beforehand by folemn laws and long established cuftom; and all the active forces in the State have been left at his difpofal.

In order to fecure this prerogative ftill farther against all poffibility of invafions from individuals, it has been heightened and ftrengthened by every thing that can attract and fix the attention and reverence of the people. The power of conferring, and withdrawing, places and employments has also been added to it, and ambition itself has thus been interested in its defence, and fervice.

A fhare in the Legiflative power has also been given to the Man to whom this prerogative has been delegated: a paffive share indeed, and the only one that can, with fafety to the State, be trusted to him, but by means of which he is enabled to defeat every attempt against his conftitutional authority.

Laftly, he is the only felf-exifting and permanent Power in the State. The Generals, the Minifters of State, are fo only by the continuance of his pleafure. He would even difmifs the Parliament themfelves, if ever he faw them begin to entertain dangerous defigns; and he needs only fay one word to difperfe

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every power in the State that may threaten his authority. Formidable prerogatives these; but with regard to which we shall be inclined to lay afide our apprehenfions, if we reflect, on the one hand, on the great privileges of the People by which they have been counterbalanced, and on the other, on the happy confequences that refult from their being thus united together.

From this unity, and, if I may fo exprefs myfelf, this total fequeftration of the Executive authority, this advantageous confequence in the first place follows, which has been mentioned in a preceding Chapter, that the attention of the whole Nation is directed to one and the fame object. The People, befides, enjoy this most effential advantage, which they would vainly endeavour to obtain under the government of many, they can give their confidence, without giving power over themfelves, and against themselves; they can appoint Trustees, and yet not give themselves Mafters.

Those Men to whom the People have delegated the power of framing the Laws, are thereby made fure to feel the whole preffure of them. They can increase the prerogatives

of the executive authority, but they cannot inveft themselves with it-they have it not in their power to command its motions, they only can unbind its hands.

They are made to derive their importance, nay they are indebted for their existence, to the need in which that Power ftands of their affiftance; and they know that they would no fooner have abused the trust of the People, and complated the treacherous work, than they would fee themselves diffolved, fpurned, like inftruments now spent, and become useless.

This fame difpofition of things alfo prevents in England, that effential defect, inherent in the Government of many, which has been defcribed in the preceding Chapter.

In that fort of Government, the cause of the People, as has been obferved, is continually deferted and betrayed. The arbitrary prerogatives of the governing Powers are at all times either openly or fecretly favoured, not only by those in whofe poffeffion they are, not only by thofe who have good reafon to hope that they fhall at fome future time share in the exercise of them, but also by the whole croud of thofe Men who, in confequence of the natural difpofition of Mankind to

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