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In a word, thofe who are acquainted with Republican Governments, and, in general, who know the manner in which bufinefs is tranfacted in numerous Affemblies, will not fcruple to affirm, that the few who are united together, who take an active part in public affairs, and whose station makes them con

In the year 1738, the Citizens enacted at once into laws a small Code of forty-four Articles, by one fingle line of which they bound themfelves for ever to elect the four Syndics (the Chiefs of the Council of the Twenty-five) out of the Members of the fame Council; whereas they were before free in their choice. They at that time suffered also the word approved to be flipped into the law mentioned in the Note (a) p. 185, which was tranfcribed from a former Code; the consequence of which was to render the Magiftrates abfolute mafters of the Legislature.

The Citizens had thus been fucceffively ftripped of all their political rights, and had little more left to them than the pleasure of being called a Sovereign Affembly, when they met (which idea, it must be confeffed, preferved among them a fpirit of resistance which it would have been dangerous for the Magiftrates to provoke too far), and the power of at least refusing to elect the four Syndics. Upon this privilege the Citizens have, a few years ago, (A. 1765, to 1768.) made their last stand: and a fingular conjunction of circumftances having happened at the fame time, to raife and preferve among them, during three years, an uncommon fpirit of union and perfeverance, they have in the issue fucceeded in a great measure to repair the injuries which they had been made to do to themselves, for these last two hundred years and more. (A total change has fince that time been effected by foreign forces, in the Government of the Republic (A. 1782) upon which this is not a proper place to make any obfervation.)

fpicuous, have fuch an advantage over the many who turn their eyes towards them, and are without union among themselves, that, even with a middling degree of skill, they can at all times direct, at their pleasure, the general refolutions ;-that, as a confequence of the very nature of things, there is no propofal, however abfurd, to which a numerous affembly of Men may not, at one time or other, be brought to affent; and that laws would be wiser, and more likely to procure the advantage of all, if they were to be made by drawing lots, or cafting dice, than by the fuffrages of a multitude.

CH A P. VI.

Advantages that accrue to the People from appointing Reprefentatives.

fhall the People remedy the dif

Hadvantages that neceffarily attend their fitu

ation? How fhall they refift the phalanx of those who have engroffed to themselves all the honours, dignities, and power, in the State?

It will be by employing for their defence the fame means by which their adverfaries carry on their attacks it will be by ufing the fame weapons as they do, the fame order, the fame kind of discipline.

They are a small number, and confequently eafily united;-a fmall number must therefore he opposed to them, that a like union may also be obtained. It is because they are a fmall number, that they can deliberate on every occurrence, and never come to any refolutions but fuch as are maturely weighed--it is because they are few, that they can have forms which continually ferve them for general standards to refort to, approved maxims to which they invariably adhere, and plans which they never lofe fight of ---here therefore, I repeat it, oppose to them a small number, and you will obtain the like advantages.

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Befides, those who govern, as a farther consequence of their being few, have a more confiderable share, confequently feel a deeper concern in the fuccefs, whatever it may be, of their enterprizes. As they ufually profefs a contempt for their adverfaries, and are at all times acting an offenfive part against them, they impose on themselves an obligation of conquering. They, in fhort, who are all alive from the moft powerful incentives, and aim at gaining new advantages, have to do with a multitude, who, wanting only to preferve what they already poffefs, are unavoidably liable to long intervals of inactivity and

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fupineness. But the People, by appointing Representatives, immediately gain to their caufe that advantageous activity which they before ftood in need of, to put them on a par with their adverfaries; and thofe paffions become excited in their defenders by which they themfelves cannot poffibly be actuated.

Exclufively charged with the care of public liberty, the Reprefentatives of the People will be animated by a fenfe of the greatnefs of the concerns with which they are intrufted. Diftinguished from the bulk of the Nation, and forming among themselves a fe parate Affembly, they will affert the rights of which they have been made the Guardians, with all that warmth which the efprit de corps is used to inspire (a). Placed on an elevated theatre, they will endeavour to render themfelves ftill more confpicuous; and the arts and ambitious activity of those who govern, will now be encountered by the vivacity and perfeverance of opponents actuated by the love of glory.

(a) If it had not been for an incentive of this kind, the English Commons would not have vindicated their right of taxation with fo much viligance as they have done, against all enterprizes, often perhaps involuntary, of the Lords.

Laftly, as the Reprefentatives of the People. will naturally be felected from among thofe Citizens who are most favoured by fortune, and will have confequently much to preferve, they will, even in the midst of quiet times, keep a watchful eye on the motions of Power. As the advantages they poffefs, will naturally create a kind of rivalship between them and those who govern, the jealoufy which they will conceive against the latter, will give them an exquifite degree of fenfibility on every increase of their authority. Like thofe delicate inftruments which difcover the operations of Nature, while they are yet impereeptible to our fenfes, they will warn the People of those things which of themselves they never see but when it is too late; and their greater proportional fhare, whether of real riches, or of thofe which lie in the opinions of Men, will make them, if I may fo exprefs myself, the barometers that will difcover, in its first beginning, every tendency to a change in the Constitution (a).

(a) All the above reasoning effentially requires that the Representatives of the People fhould be united in intereft with the People. We shall foon fee that this union really obtains in the English Conftitution and may be called the mafter-piece of it.

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