87. As we have thus established perfect harmony between two natural kingdoms, the one of efficient, the other of final causes, we should also notice here another harmony between the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace; that is, between God considered as an architect of the mechanism of the universe, and God, considered as monarch of the divine city of souls.

88. This harmony makes all things evolve toward grace by natural methods. This globe, for example, must be destroyed and repaired by natural means, at such times as the government of spirits may demand it, for the punishment of some and the reward of others.

89. It may be said, besides, that God the architect satisfies in every respect God the legislator, and that therefore sins, by the laws of nature and even the mechanical structure of things, must carry their punishment with them; and that good actions will obtain their rewards by mechanical ways through their relation to bodies, although this may not and ought not always take place at once.

90. Finally, under this perfect government, there will be no good action without its reward, no bad action without its atonement, and everything must result for the well-being of the good, that is, of those who are not out of harmony with this great State, who, after having done their duty, trust in providence, and who love and imitate as they ought the author of all good, pleasing themselves with the contemplation of His perfections,-according to the nature of truly pure love, which is happy in the happiness of the loved one. This is why the wise and virtuous work at all things which seem in harmony with the divine will, presumptive or antecedent, and yet content themselves with what God actually sends by His secret, consequent and decisive will, recognizing that if we could sufficiently comprehend the order of the universe we would find that it surpassed all the wishes of the wisest, and that it is impossible to make it better than it is, not only for all in general, but even for ourselves in particular, if we are attached, as we should be, to the Author of all, not only as the architect and efficient cause of our being, but also as our master and final cause, who should be the only aim of our efforts, and who can alone secure our happiness.

HOBBES

THOMAS HOBBES was born at Westport (now part of Malmesbury) April 5, 1588. His father, vicar of the place, got into trouble by quarrelling with a rival, and left his children to the care of his brother, a glover of Malmesbury. He early studied Greek and Latin and at fifteen entered Oxford, where he was graduated in 1608, although he seems to have taken little interest in the scholastic learning of the time.

For some years afterwards he was tutor, then secretary and friend to young Cavendish. Cavendish died in 1628, but in 1631 Hobbes became the tutor of the son.

In 1637 he became interested in the idea that everything, mind included, can be explained by being referred to motion in nature. Then came the Puritan revolution, and Hobbes took the side of the Stuart kings, in fact, in 1647 he was made instructor in mathematics of the exiled Prince of Wales. His Leviathan was published in 1651. In it he tried to apply mechanical principles to society as he had previously tried to assign them to nature. Society he thought to be an organism, its basis a contract by which the people had alienated their rights to the king in return for protection. He considered the best government to be a monarchy, but raised the question of the right of the subject to change allegiance when the power of the king to protect is gone. This brought him enemies on both sides, and he took the least dangerous course and returned to England. His doctrines of a mechanical nature and society offended the clergy, but after the Restoration he was received with some honor by the king, and the only punishment he received was the condemnation of his works by parliament as atheistic (1666). He died in 1679.

The question of what was the supreme power in the state was handed down along with the idea of the Social Contract to Locke and Rousseau.

The Leviathan besides containing the idea that society is an organism, and the theory of the Social Contract, given in the following volume, psychologically traces all sensation to motion in the body and its

environment. The carrying out of this theory of sense to its logical limit would make mental facts as entirely subject to natural laws as physical. Hence Hobbes' influence, which still persists, is on the side of materialism. Something of his idea that motion is the cause of all sensation follows.

OF MAN

CHAPTER I.

OF SENSE

CONCERNING the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are every one a representation or appearance, of some quality, or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man's body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances.

The original of them all, is that which we call SENSE, for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.

To know the natural cause of sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have elsewhere written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of sense, is the external body, or object which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the eye, in a light, or colour figured; to the ear, in a sound; to the nostril, in an odour; to the tongue and palate, in a savour; and to the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All which qualities, called sensible, are, in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions

of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion. But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the ear, produceth a din; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies, or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses, and in echoes by reflection, we see they are; where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And though at some certain distance, the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy, caused, as I have said, by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the philosophy-schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and say, for the cause of vision, that the thing seen sendeth forth on every side a visible species, in English, a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen; the receiving whereof into the eye, is seeing. And for the cause of hearing, that the thing heard sendeth forth an audible species, that is, an audible aspect, or audible being seen; which audible species, that is an audible aspect, or audible being seen; which entering at the ear, maketh hearing. Nay, for the cause of understanding also, they say the thing understood, sendeth forth an intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen; which, coming into the understanding, makes us understand. I say not this, as disproving the use of universities; but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one.

CHAPTER II.

OF IMAGINATION

THAT when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, that nothing can change

itself, is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves; and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every thing else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the schools say, heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite, and knowledge of what is good for their conservation, which is more than man has, to things inanimate, absurdly.

When a body is once in motion, it moveth, unless something else hinder it, eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it; and as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after: so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy; which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as waking.

The decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars; which stars do no less exercise their virtue, by which they are visible, in the day than in the night. But because amongst many strokes, which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible; therefore, the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved: so that distance of time, and of place, hath one and