of time very scurvily used by the two others, and might therefore have been suspected of being disposed to indulge in retaliation; especially as the Christian religion, and the divine precept of doing good for evil, seemed to make less impression than ever on the minds of the French nation at this period.

M. Necker proceeds to assure the king, that he will on the whole be a gainer by the diminution of his own power and the augmentation of that of the people. In the language of philosophy he tells the monarch, La satisfaction attachée à un pouvoir sans limite est toute d'imagination.-Votre majesté, en s'entourant des députés de la nation, se délivre d'une suite cruelle d'incertitudes et de balancemens, de defiances et de regrets, qui doivent faire le malheur d'un prince, tant qu'il demeure sensible au bien de l'état et à l'amour de ses peuples.'

*

This argument to persuade a king to abridge his power, because of the solicitudes which attend it, however ingenious and just it may be, is not more successful than the common one against riches. Men have been long told, that money is the root of all evil, and that heaping up riches is heaping up care. Nobody disputes the truth of the maxims; but nobody gives away money, on purpose to be relieved from care: on the contrary, we see men of immense wealth, whose only pangs and vexations in life arise from money; yet, like the man who put a serpent in his bosom, they hug it, although it stings them, and the more it stings them, they hug it the more.

The argument is seldom used, therefore, in the hope of prevailing on people to resign their riches voluntarily; it is only applied to those who by some accident have lost part of their fortune, to console them for what cannot be helped; and in this sense M. Necker's reasoning must be understood-not as intended to persuade the king to give

The pleasure of unlimited power is imaginary. By surrounding your person with the national deputies, you will be freed from much anxiety and solicitude, and many of those sources of regret which create the unhappiness of every prince endowed with sensibility for the good of the state and the love of his subjects.

up power which he could keep, but to comfort him under the loss of what he could not retain.

M. Necker concludes with a supposition of the possibility that the tiers might not act with all the moderation that was to be wished; in which case he mentions, as his last advice, a measure from which it is difficult to imagine that any great comfort could flow. Cependant,' continues he, si une difference dans le nombre de dé putés du tiers-etat devenoit un sujet ou un pretexte de discorde; si, par des vues particulieres, on cherchoit à lasser l'honorable constance de V. M.; si votre volonté, sire, n'étoit pas suffisante pour lever ces obstacles; alors quel conseil pourrai-je donner à V. M.? Un seul, et ce seroit le dernier, celui de sacrifier le ministre qui auroit eu le plus de part à votre deliberation.'*

As this last measure could remedy none of the mischiefs supposed to be done by the advice which the minister had prevailed on the king to follow; and as it will appear of small importance in the eyes of most people, it is a little surprising that M. Necker mentions it with so much emphasis.

Sensible that his influence in the cabinet depended on his popularity, and believing that his popularity would be ruined, if the favourite point of a double representation of the tiers was not carried, he persuaded the king into that measure; yet it is not difficult to perceive his fears, lest a bad use should be made of it, breaking through his reasoning in its favour.

His ambition lulled his fears, and tempted him to risk all the evils which threatened, but which his vanity made him believe he had ability to overcome. Had he foreseen with certainty half the mischiefs that were the consequence of that measure, no consideration could have pre

• Nevertheless, if a difference in the number of deputies of the tiersetat becomes a subject or a pretence of discord; if, from private views, they tried to tire your majesty's constancy; if your will, sire, should not be sufficient to remove these obstacles; what advice can I then give to your majesty? Only one, and it shall be the last,—namely, to sacrifice the minister who has had the principal share in advising you to this measure.

vailed on M. Necker to advise it; for he unquestionably had the prosperity of the French nation sincerely at heart, as his greatest ambition was to be the instrument of it. Although born a republican, he was of opinion that a republican form of government neither suited the extent of the French empire, nor the character of the French people. He was the friend of liberty; but thought she could be sure of a permanent and happy residence in France under a limited monarchical form of government only; yet his conduct immediately before the assembling of the states-general, and for some time afterwards, has been thought to have greatly contributed to the destruction of monarchy in France, and to the establishment of a republic which hitherto seems of a more terrible nature than any government that ever was known, inasmuch as it seems to combine all the tyranny of which republicans accuse monarchy, with all the anarchy of which the friends of monarchy accuse republics.

CHAPTER VI.

The Nobility of Great Britain and Ireland-The Noblesse of France.

THE deputies to the states-general being elected were, in the terms of the king's proclamation, to assemble at Versailles, and the assembly was to be opened on the 5th of May 1789.

The public at large expected the redress of many grievances, and the reformation of many abuses, from this assembly; but as the noblesse and clergy enjoyed many privileges and immunities at the expense of the tiers-etat, it may easily be imagined that a number of those would appear abuses in the eyes of the latter, which were regarded as wise institutions by the former.

The privileges possessed, and the superiority assumed, by the noblesse of France over the inferior orders, were evils of greater magnitude than they may seem to those

Englishmen who judge by the impression which the privileges and conduct of the nobility of their own country make on the minds of their countrymen.

The precedency and distinctions which the nobility enjoy in common society in England are never refused, unless when arrogated; and therefore are seldom or never assumed, but always granted.

When the peerage is possessed by persons of truly great and amiable characters, which sometimes happens, all the world are pleased to see honours so well bestowed. When the reverse is the case, those who afford the example generally have the privileges and distinctions of the peerage so cruelly counterbalanced by other moral and physical circumstances, that on the whole they are far from being the objects of envy..

It has been asserted, that those British peers who form examples of the first alternative were not born to the peerage, but obtained it on account of their distinguished me rit, and therefore form no exception to the pernicious effect of hereditary honours. But there is more satire than truth in this observation; for, after all that can be alleged of the torpor which the certainty of enjoying honourable distinction independent of personal merit may throw on the mind, there are instances of men born to the highest titles and greatest fortune, who nevertheless have added lustre to their country and to human nature by the most powerful virtuous exertions.

The privileges of the British nobility, when compared with those of the noblesse of France before the Revolution, will in general be found at once more valuable and less invidious: they are ascertained by the known laws of the land, fully understood, and, for the most part, cheerfully acquiesced in.

The most important of those privileges consists in the hereditary share they have in the legislature; not in their forming a part of the pageantry of a court, or in having their lands exempt from taxation.

The peers of Great Britain are few in number. The

peerage being confined to the person who has the patent, and not passing to more than one of his descendants, the brothers and sons of a peer, whether baron, earl, or duke, are commoners. This naturally forms a strong connec tion between the peers and commons, which is constantly cemented by intermarriages, by friendship, by the reci procal power of being of service to each other, and of course by mutual attentions and good offices.

So great a portion of the commons of Great Britain being connected by these various bonds with the peerage, should ever the privileges of the latter be attacked, a strong phalanx of the former would immediately appear in their defence.

The situation of the French noblesse, with respect to the commons, or, as they call them, roturiers, was very different. The privileges of the former were in many instances vague, unascertained by positive law, and depending merely on ancient usage.

The importance of a British peer, and the consideration in which he is held at court, particularly by the minister, depend in a great measure on his influence and popularity in the country. The importance of a French nobleman depended entirely on court favour, and dwindled into no❤ thing at the frown of his sovereign.

A British peer, therefore, has a strong motive to culti vate the good-will of all the inhabitants around his estate whereas a French marquis or duke had no motive but the sentiments of benevolence and humanity, to behave with attention and kindness to the peasantry. Motives of that nature were no doubt sufficient with many; but the infe rior orders of mankind always were, and always will be, treated with more regard by their superiors, when they have something in their power to bestow in return, than when that is not the case.

The noblesse of France were not legislators, nor did they form a court of law in the last resort, as the peers of Great Britain; but they had the right of appointing judges for the decision of both criminal and civil causes