years; and a new one was to be always formed in the same manner at the end of the same period. In this plan, one of the wisest articles perhaps is that which excludes the primary assemblies from the right of directly choosing the representatives of the nation, and confines their privilege to that of naming the electors of the representatives; for although the lower classes in society are not supposed to be adequate judges of the qualities requisite for a member of the national assembly, or to have opportunities of being acquainted with those who possess them, yet they are fully competent to know what men in their own districts are reputed men of integrity and good sense, and will of course be inclined to choose those as the properest for electing the national representatives.

In the opinion of many, the French would have done well to have fixed on the British constitution as the entire model of theirs. In the opinion of some, the British nation would do well to reform their representation in the house of commons according to the French system of election. Those who are of the first opinion quote the happy and prosperous state of Great Britain: those who are of the second do not mention the present state of France as a corroboration of theirs.

Previous to the secession of M. Lally-Tolendal and M. Mounier, there was some disposition in the assembly to have modelled the French constitution as nearly according to the British as possible. Perhaps pride or prejudice may have had some weight in preventing this idea from being adopted; if so, it is to be regretted. But that national pride, or something of a prejudice in favour of their own opinions, should have influenced the minds of Frenchmen, ought not greatly to surprise those worthy Englishmen, who are persuaded not only that their own form of government is the happiest effort of human genius, but also that it would, without the least variation, suit the inhabitants of every nation on earth, however different from themselves in manners, situation, and character.

That Great Britain has increased in power in a great er proportion than any other nation in Europe since the revolution 1688; that its inhabitants have acquired more wealth; that this wealth is more equally diffused, and that their persons and property are better protected and secured than those of the inhabitants of any other coun try, is known to all the world; that all those advantages were derived from that blessed portion of liberty which belongs to the British constitution, and of which most other governments are devoid, has long been the opinion of many enlightened men in France, which they have been at great pains to render manifest, and to circulate among their countrymen. That exhilarating spirit of activity, enterprise, and ardour, which a love of freedom conveys to the heart of man, was felt by the whole French nation at the time of calling the states-general; but many of those elected as legislators, thinking they never could have too much of it, rashly intermingled such a quantity into their constitution, that, instead of an invigorating cordial, it had the most fiery, intoxicating, and destructive effects.

This observation, however, is not so applicable to the first constituent assembly as to the assemblies which succeeded. In the first there were undoubtedly a greater number of men of distinguished talents and eminence, in every sense of the word, than in any of the others; and although on some occasions, from a dread of the agents of despotism and a suspicion of the court, they behaved with harshness to the king, yet it seems evident that the views and wishes of the majority were to give an equitable government to their country, by which both the prince and people would have been gainers. That they were friends to monarchy, as well as to freedom, they gave the strongest proof, in reinstating the king, and presenting him with the constitution after his flight to Varennes, notwithstanding the cry which was raised for the Dechéance, and the attempts made by the republican party for oversetting the monarchy and establishing a republic at that

time. But the second, or, as it is called, the legislative assembly, acted in a very different manner from their predecessors. Although one of the greatest errors in the form of election of the deputies was, that the qualification of the electors in point of property was too small, which rendered the elections tumultuous, and accompanied with more of a republican spirit than, in the opinion of some, is consistent with a monarchical form of government however limited; yet the legislative assembly could not trust that form of election, because they feared it was not suf ficiently republican; and therefore, after the 10th of August 1792, they decreed that in the election of members for the convention it should be departed from; and that, instead of the small share of property formerly requisite to entitle any man to vote, all that should be necessary was a year's residence in the department, and that he should be of the age at which the law presumes a capability of exercising personal rights: the consequence of which, and of other manoeuvres that took place during the general election, was, that the most zealous republicans that were to be found in France were chosen members of the convention, and monarchy was abolished par acclamation as soon as it met.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Decree respecting Bankrupts―Opinion of Mirabeau on that Subject-of the Duke of Rochefoucault-Abolition of Monasteries -for appropriating the Church-Lands-Abolition of TitlesReflections on that Subject, and on Armorial Bearings—Respect derived from Antiquity of Family-The effect which the Creation of Peers has on it.

NOTHING can give a higher idea of the assiduity with which the national assembly applied to the business of the state, than the regulations they made within a very few months after the king's arrival in the capital. They abolished lettres de cachet; suppressed the tax upon salt,

so oppressive to the poor; also that on tobacco, not equally so, but still very grievous, since habit has render. ed the use of that plant almost a necessary of life. Many other burdensome and impolitic taxes and impositions were either entirely suppressed, or regulated in a manner to render them less heavy on the lower orders in particular. A decree was passed, that all persons, whether professing the Roman Catholic religion or not, might be appointed to any office or employment; and the principle which attached infamy to the descendents of those who were executed for crimes was abolished.

Several new regulations respecting the fleet and army were made; and as it was thought of the greatest importance that the latter should be kept in good-humour, their pay was considerably augmented. The abolition of all the privileges, separate laws, and particular rights, which had been long enjoyed by certain provinces, to the injury of the rest of the kingdom, was universally approved of by the impartial.

In the republic of Geneva, bankrupts are excluded from the public council, the magistracy, or any office in the state: the children of bankrupts are by law subjecttheir ed to the same penalty till such time as they pay proportion of their father's debts. Montesquieu mentions this law in high terms of praise. Many who may have the same good opinion of this law that Montesquieu had, will still be surprised that Mirabeau should have recommended it. In the present situation of France,' said he, des loix pareilles sont non seulement utiles mais indispensables. Vainement, messieurs, vous avez aboli les privilèges et les ordres, si vous laissez subsister cette prérogative de fait qui dispense l'homme d'un certain rang de payer ses dettes ou celles de son père; qui fait languir la commerce, et qui trop souvent dévoue l'industrie laborieuse de l'artisan et du boutiquier, à soutenir le luxe effréné, de ce que nous appellons si improprement l'homme comme il faut.

Laissons à cette nation voisine, dont la constitution

nous offre tant de vues sages, dont nous craignons de profiter, cette loi injuste, reste honteux de la feodalité, qui met à l'abri de toutes poursuites pour dettes le citoyen que la nation appelle à la représenter dans son parlement. Profitons de l'exemple des Anglois; mais sachons éviter leurs erreurs; et, au lieu de recompenser le désordre dans la conduite, éloignons de toute place dans les assemblées, tant nationales que provinciales et municipales, le citoyen qui, par une mauvaise administration de ses propres affaires, se montrera peu capable de bien gérer celles du public.' *

The reader will be the less surprised at Mirabeau's declamation against bankrupts, after perusing Robespierre's against bloodshed; but the national assembly must have heard Mirabeau with more surprise than Robespierre ; because none of them at that time were acquainted with the vindictive and cruel disposition of the latter, but they all knew that the former was a bankrupt.

His proposal, however, that the assembly should adopt the law of Geneva, was received with applause; in the midst of which, the duke de la Rochefoucault rose to oppose that part of the law which regarded the children of bankrupts.

He delivered his opinion in terms worthy of the mode

In vain

Such laws are not only useful, but indispensably necessary. have you decreed the abolition of privileges and distinctions, if men in any situation are still to be tolerated in refusing to pay their own debts, or those of their father. This is hurtful to commerce, and too often obliges the laborious industry of the tradesman and shopkeeper to support the unbounded luxury of those improperly called good company.

Let us leave that neighbouring nation, whose constitution presents us with so many wise regulations, which we are afraid to adopt, in possession of this unjust law, a remnant of feudal injustice, which protects the persons of members of parliament from arrest on account of debt. We may in many things profit by the example of the English; but let us a void their errors; and, instead of rewarding extravagant and dissolute conduct, let us exclude from the national and provincial assemblies and the magistracy, every man who, by the mismanagement of his own private concerns, shews that he is incapable of conducting prudently the business of the public,