Headnote by the COURT.

The facts are stated in the opinion Mr. H. G. Cant for Board of Law Examiners.

Messrs. V. L. Power, M. H. McMahon, and S. S. Dahl for respondent. Per Curiam:

In this application for the disbarment of Axel B. Dahl, Hon. C. W. Stanton, a judge of the district court, was duly appointed referee to take the evidence and find the facts in respect to the charges of misconduct made against the respondent Dahl. Upon the report and findings of the referee, oral arguments were presented on May 15, 1924, in this court, by Harold G. Cant in behalf of the board of law examiners and by respondent in person.

An attentive examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the findings of the referee are

of the court.

amply supported. They are lengthy and go into detail concerning transactions in which respondent was accused of misconduct towards his clients. Abbreviated, they are as follows: (1) A collection of $21.70 was made for a client in Pennsylvania in December, 1921. No report or remittances were made until a check was sent June 9, 1922, for the full amount without deduction of any collection fees; but the check was dishonored for want of funds. However, on September 22, 1922, it was paid. In regard to this collection the finding is that respondent negligently failed to respond to letters of inquiry sent by the client and negligently failed to make reasonably prompt remittance. (2) An attorney in Michigan sent a claim of $61.14 to respondent to

This

draft, apparently indorsed by the payee, was left with respondent, who deposited it to his own credit in the bank on February 5, 1919, and afterwards appropriated the proceeds to his own use. Aku Laitinen often sought information as to the status of his claim, but respondent disclaimed that a settlement had been effected until the spring of 1922, when Laitinen, learning that the insurance company had paid the money to respondent, placed the matter in the hands of other attorneys, who sued respondent. He defaulted; judgment was entered for $562.61 on April 29, 1922, and upon execution $379.09 was collected July 29, 1922. The balance was paid by respondent June 7, 1923. (5) In April, 1921, one Schweiger bought a bakery at Keewatin from one Grcevich for $2,500. Both were foreigners and inexperienced. They came to respondent for assistance, and the purchaser placed $2,300 in the hands of respondent to first pay therefrom all just claims against the seller arising out of the prior operation of the bakery and then pay the rest, if any, to the seller. This money respondent merged with his own funds, and on April 14, 1921, paid $484.80 to one of the

199 N. W. 429.)

seller's creditors, "and at some later date, not satisfactorily disclosed by the evidence, paid $1,200 to the seller," so that respondent now has in his possession $615.20 of the fund so intrusted to him. On April 26, 1921, respondent was notified that a milling company at Kensington, Minn., had a claim of $650 for flour sold Grcevich that it wished to place in the hands of an attorney. Respondent wired the company that he would collect it for a 20 per cent. commission, or fee. The company accepted the proposition. On May 27, 1921, respondent wrote the company that he would have to begin an action, and inclosed two blank verifications, requesting the same to be executed and returned. This was declined. declined. Subsequently the claim of the company appears to have been transferred to another corporation which went into the hands of a receiver. The receiver on September 8, 1922, brought an action against respondent to recover said sum of $650 and interest, alleging that respondent had collected the same from Greevich and had promised to pay it over, but had neglected to do so. Respondent defaulted, and judgment was rendered on September 29, 1922, for $709.89, which is still unpaid, except $200 obtained under an execution levied upon respondent's salary.

The above facts so clearly demonstrate respondent's unfitness to continue to practice his profession that comment is, perhaps, unnecessary. Clients are entitled not only to have their claims prosecuted diligently and skillfully by the attorney to whom they are intrusted, but to receive prompt remittance when collected, and assuredly without the necessity of employing other attorneys to collect from the attorney first engaged. It should be said that in his testimony as well as in the oral argument respondent sought to excuse failure to remit or settle with the clients on the ground that he thought he had remitted, or forgot that he had collected. These excuses do not bear scrutiny. The first

item above referred to was continually called to his attention by the client without receiving any response until the time his conduct came before the board of law examiners for investigation. If the check for claim No. 4 herein was sent, it should have been easy for respondent to have proved it, or to satisfy himself that it never reached its destination and arrange for paying by duplicate. He does not claim that it has been paid. It is not likely that a young lawyer will forget having received a collection of nearly $500 deposited by him to the credit of his personal account in the bank; at least, when the importunate client is repeatedly inquiring about its collection. And when, as he admits, he finally discovered that he had received the money, instead of making prompt amends, he delays until suit is started and judgment entered, which could not be fully enforced until more than a year after its rendition. Respondent presents a somewhat plausible

reason for not remitting for the claim of the mill company against Grcevich, namely, that he had not sufficient money in his hands for that purpose, and that Grcevich disputed part of the claim; but, unfortunately for respondent, his default when sued is a confession that he had collected the claim or should have paid it out of the money left in his hands to discharge the claims against Greevich. The facts found, and the correctness of which cannot be doubted, require that respondent be disbarred for the protection of the public and the profession which he has dishonored.

Attorneys

collections.

The findings of the referee are approved and adopted, and as conclusion of law respondent is found disbarmentguilty of misconduct failure to remit in the practice of his profession as an attorney at law, and it is ordered that the respondent be removed from his said office, and formal judgment of disbarment entered.

I. Scope, 54.

II. General rule, 54.

III. Application of rule, 58.

IV. Matters of defense, 65.

1. Scope.

This annotation, in discussing the conversion of a client's funds as ground for the disbarment of an attorney, does not consider questions of procedure, since the procedure in such cases differs in few particulars from that in proceedings to disbar for other causes. As to the right to trial by jury, see 22 A.L.R. 1501. The annotation also excludes cases of disbarment for retaining an advance payment of fees while neglecting to perform the services agreed on, the gravamen of the professional offense in such a case being in the neglect of

V. Matters of mitigation, 72.

VI. Liability for act of partner or clerk, 76.

VII. Money not received in professional capacity, 77.

professional duty, rather than in the retention of the money.

II. General rule.

An attorney who, being in possession of money intrusted to him by his client, or collected for the client in the course of professional work, converts the money to his own use, is guilty of professional misconduct for which he is subject to disbarment or such lesser penalty as the court may see fit to impose.

United States.-Jeffries v. Laurie (1886; C. C.) 27 Fed. 195.

Alabama.-Peters v. State (1915) 193 Ala. 598, 69 So. 576.

(1907) 120 App. Div. 378, 105 N. Y. Supp. 84; Re O'Sullivan (1907) 122 App. Div. 527, 107 N. Y. Supp. 462; Association of Bar v. Chappell (1909) 131 App. Div. 69, 115 N. Y. Supp. 868; Re Rockmore (1999) 130 App. Div. 586, 117 N. Y. Supp. 512, s. c. on subsequent appeal (1910) 139 App. Div. 71, 123 N. Y. Supp. 928; Re Rosenthal (1910) 137 App. Div. 772, 122 N. Y. Supp. 471; Re Feuchtwanger (1910) 139 App. Div. 36, 123 N. Y. Supp. 798; Re Ironside (1911) 143 App. Div. 921, 128 N. Y. Supp. 125; Re Spenser (1911) 143 App. Div. 229, 128 N. Y. Supp. 168, affirmed in (1911) 203 N. Y. 613, 96 N. E. 1131; Re Sayer (1911) 146 App. Div. 928, 131 N. Y. Supp. 381; Re Schwarzkopf (1911) 146 App. Div. 930, 131 N. Y. Supp. 385; Re Steckler (1911) 146 App. Div. 827, 131 N. Y. Supp. 766; Re Levine (1911) 148 App. Div. 297, 132 N. Y. Supp. 124; Re Smith (1911) 148 App. Div. 291, 132 N. Y. Supp. 304; Re Lash (1912) 150 App. Div. 467, 135 N. Y. Supp. 370; Re Lent (1912) 152 App. Div. 868, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1052, affirmed in (1914) 210 N. Y. 553, 104 N. E. 1133; Re Kisselburgh (1912) 153 App. Div. 884, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1060; Re Kenney (1913) 155 App. Div. 890, 140 N. Y. Supp. 314; Re Buchlor (1913) 155 App. Div. 246, 140 N. Y. Supp. 324; Re Feinblatt (1914) 162 App. Div. 896, 146 N. Y. Supp. 304; Re Hartridge (1914) 162 App. Div. 877, 146 N. Y. Supp. 421; Re Smith (1914) 161 App. Div. 638, 146 N. Y. Supp. 906; Re Avrutis (1914) 161 App. Div. 549, 146 N. Y. Supp. 741; Re Jones (1914) 163 App. Div. 880, 147 N. Y. Supp. 583; Re Weill (1914) 165 App. Div. 675, 150 N. Y. Supp. 802; Re Levien (1915) 165 App. Div. 883, 151 N. Y. Supp. 279 (appeal dismissed in (1917) 220 N. Y. 569, 115 N. E. 1043); Re Levor (1915) 169 App. Div. 642, 155 N. Y. Supp. 426; Re Osgoodby (1915) 169 App. Div. 626, 155 N. Y. Supp. 465; Re Lichtenberg (1915) 169 App. Div. 505, 155 N. Y. Supp. 482; Re Ayler (1915) 169 App. Div. 494, 155 N. Y. Supp. 489; Re Evans (1915) 169 App. Div. 502, 155 N. Y. Supp. 491; Re Dressler (1916) 173 App. Div. 929, 158 N. Y.

Supp. 191; Re Dobbs (1916) 173 App. Div. 605, 160 N. Y. Supp. 173; Re Walsh (1917) 177 App. Div. 659, 164 N. Y. Supp. 553; Re Coleman (1917) 178 App. Div. 580, 165 N. Y. Supp. 685; Re Wilkenfeld (1917) 180 App. Div. 286, 167 N. Y. Supp. 508; Re Rini (1918) 181 App. Div. 496, 168 N. Y. Supp. 859; Re Flowerman (1918) 181 App. Div. 488, 168 N. Y. Supp. 861; Re Hyman (1919) 186 App. Div. 263, 174 N. Y. Supp. 306; Re Tinney (1919) 187 App. Div. 569, 176 N. Y. Supp. 102; Re Earley (1919) 188 App. Div. 532, 177 N. Y. Supp. 347; Re Boughton (1920) 192 App. Div. 235, 182 N. Y. Supp. 440; Re Smythwick (1920) 193 App. Div. 459, 183 N. Y. Supp. 301; Re Steinberg (1920) 193 App. Div. 502, 184 N. Y. Supp. 450; Re MacWilliams (1920) 193 App. Div. 499, 184 N. Y. Supp. 343; Re McKee (1921) 197 App. Div. 192, 188 N. Y. Supp. 753; Re O'Brian (1921) 197 App. Div. 50, 188 N. Y. Supp. 506; Re McEveety (1922) 202 App. Div. 79, 195 N. Y. Supp. 345; Re Menzel (1922) 203 App. Div. 515, 196 N.. Y. Supp. 834; Re Steinfeld (1923) 204 App. Div. 508, 198 N. Y. Supp. 124; Re Brown (1923) 206 App. Div. 111, 200 N. Y. Supp. 661; Re Makay (1924) 208 App. Div. 44, 203 N. Y. Supp. 15; Re Goette (1924) 210 App. Div. 189, 205 N. Y. Supp. 388; Re White (1924) 209 App. Div. 340, 204 N. Y. Supp. 618; Re Tryon (1924) 209 App. Div. 793, 205 N. Y. Supp. 423; Re Enklewitz (1924) 211 App. Div. 268, 207 N. Y. Supp. 596; Re Simons (1925) 211 App. Div. 659, 208 N. Y. Supp. 51; Re McKenna (1925) 211 App. Div. 646, 208 N. Y. Supp. 127, affirmed without opinion in (1925) 240 N. Y. 703, 148 N. E. 766; Re Newman (1925) 211 App. Div. 654, 208 N. Y. Supp. 140. See also Re Woodburn (1925) 212 App. Div. 43, 208 N. Y. Supp. 331 (evidence held not to sustain charge); Re Vermilya (1925) 213 App. Div. 546, 211 N. Y. Supp. 36; Re Zahm (1925) 213 App. Div. 551, 211 N. Y. Supp. 144.

North Dakota.-Re Simpson (1900) 9 N. D. 379, 83 N. W. 541; Re Torson (1920) 46 N. D. 200, 183 N. W. 1016 (evidence held to show misappropria