We could mention facts which have come to our knowledge, sufficient to encourage the meek, patient, courageous soldier of the cross. What has been achieved is only an earnest of what might be done.

But who shall do this? Shall any one? We would not say a word to deter any who choose, from emigrating to a new, and fertile, and interesting part of the country. But if called upon to select, we would say, that those who are wanted there are of a peculiar description. They should be peculiar in the degree and combination of piety, devotedness, sound sense, good information, self-denial and industry. And in self-denial we would especially include a willingness,-nay, a determination,—to yield their own prejudices in favor of the prejudices of others. One thing is indispensable to their success in doing good; and that is, that they studiously avoid all affectation of superior intelligence. Instances could be named, not a few, in which men of excellent intentions, and really capable, have defeated their own intentions, and marred their success, by a display of acquirements beyond the necessity of the case. None of us like to have our neighbors feel, that they know more than we do; while at the same time we may have no difficulty in acknowledging the fact ourselves, provided they do not seem to claim it of us. There are sectional prejudices also, which are real obstacles in the way. These must be removed, or at least mitigated, before any important benefit can be conferred. Shall these be aggravated, then, and rendered incurable by exciting personal prejudice in addition? We could insist largely on this point, for it is of vast importance. But let the good sense and piety of our friends who are called to engage in the enterprise, have free exercise. Let them ply the task of schooling their prejudices and their self-importance, and so come down to the point from which they may hope to rise to usefulness. We will just hint, only, that while they "go about doing good," it is unnecessary to tell every one whom they meet, that this is their employment.

If the inquiry be made, shall men go in colonies, or singly? We answer, let them go as Providence directs. Have a general plan, but subject to indefinite variation. Abraham went out, not knowing whither. In a sense, let our lay missionaries do likewise. Go "to the land that I shall show thee."

In conclusion, we call upon those who have forsaken all and followed Christ in heart, to reflect upon the foregoing statements and reasonings, pray over them, ask direction of God, and follow the directions which He may give,

ART. II.-PHRENOLOGY.

[Concluded from p. 509.]

THE leading and fundamental principles of phrenology, we have already said, may be conveniently embraced under the following heads. 1. The mind is dependent, in this life, upon organization, and more particularly upon the brain as its special organ. 2. The faculties are innate. 3. The brain is a congeries of organs, each organ being the appropriate instrument of a fundamental faculty. 4. The size of the brain measures, OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, the power of the whole mind; and the size of the individual cerebral organs measures, in like manner, the energy of the individual mental faculties. 5. The situation of the individual organs is susceptible of ascertainment, and has been made known by the labors of phrenologists. 6. Mental character, or the absolute and relative strength of the elementary faculties, may be readily discovered, by observing the prominence or development of certain regions of the head, which have been marked out.

The first of these propositions, and practically the most important, as we conceive, was considered at some length in our last number, and shown to be founded in truth. We shall now proceed, in such order as is found to be most convenient, to make brief explanatory and critical remarks upon some other points embraced in the phrenological doctrine.

The idea, that the brain is a congeries of organs, and that each organ is the instrument of a fundamental faculty, is not, nor is it claimed to be, new, or the original and exclusive property of Gall. It was entertained by many able and observing philosophers, long before his day; indeed, it is distinctly announced, and attempted to be developed, in the works of Aristotle, where is to be found the germ of many discoveries which have immortalized the names of more recent experimenters and speculators. The celebrated Dr. Thomas Willis, in 1681, contended, that the medullary part of the brain is the seat of memory and imagination, the corpus callosum, that of reflection, the corpora striata, of perception, etc. It may be added, that nearly all the physiologists of the present day concur in the opinion, that the anterior lobes of the cerebrum* situated principally beneath the arch of the forehead, are the special residence of one class of the mental faculties, to wit,

*The cerebrum, occupying by far the greater part of the cavity of the cranium, is situated before and above the cerebellum and medulla oblongata, the remaining contents of this cavity, and is divided, upon each side of the median line, into three lobes, named from their relative position, anterior, middle, and posterior.

the intellectual or rational; thus recognizing the principle, that the brain is not a single organ, and that powers so fundamentally distinct as those comprehended under the terms intellect and passions, require for their exercise distinct portions of cerebral matter. It is fair, too, and in perfect accordance with a law of living systems, a law which assigns different functions to different organs, to suppose, that constituent parts of mind, so essentially unlike as understanding and propensity, employ separate organs, and occupy separate compartments of the brain. Functions not more dissimilar, such as seeing, hearing, smell, taste, touch, digestion, respiration, circulation, etc., have each a special instrument or apparatus. If the perception of color depends upon one portion of nervous matter, that of sound upon another, and odors upon another, ought we not to expect, that simple judgment, and the emotion called anger, would also be connected with separate parts of the great cerebral center? Certainly, there is no more resemblance between the two latter mental affections, than between any of the former.

Great

Again, did reason and feeling depend upon the same material instrument, we should expect, that they would always bear some fixed proportion to each other; because, being in that case the manufacture of a common organ or apparatus, they must be both, and both alike too, influenced by any circumstance which can affect such organ,-vigorous when that is vigorous, weakened when that is weakened, and destroyed when that is destroyed; whereas the contrary is known to be the fact. A man of strong judgment is not necessarily a man of acute feeling, and vice versa. philosophers very frequently have feeble passions, and idiots are often possessed of vehement desires. The domestic affections, compared with reason, are always disproportionately developed in children. A person may have a natural talent for music, or drawing, or calculation, or mechanical contrivance, without being at all distinguished for mental power in general. How can these things be, unless intellect and propensity, the faculty for music and abstract reasoning, reside in different portions of cerebral matter, which portions may be unequally developed, or separately influenced by those various causes on which function depends?

There are some strong, at least unanswered arguments, bearing upon the point under consideration, to be drawn from the abnormal manifestations of mind. How, for instance, can we reconcile the phenomena of insanity, particularly that variety of it called monomania, with the theory that the brain is a single organ, every part of which is concerned in every mental act? In the case of partial madness, there is great and morbid activity of one or two faculties; in consequence of which, the mind dwells habitually and exclusively upon a single train of ideas or objects, while eve

ry other faculty is in a state of wonted integrity, an integrity which is proved by consistency of conversation and conduct in relation to matters not connected with existing hallucinations. In such cases, the reasoning powers are often found to be entire, while one or more of the propensities or sentiments is in a state of high and unnatural excitement. Now, says the phrenologist, if these powers and the propensities have a common instrument,-if they reside in the same parts of the brain, and make use of one identical set of organized nervous particles; and if the deranged manifestation of a faculty proves or implies disease of its organ, and vice versa, (a thing which cannot be disputed ;) then, it is wholly inconceivable how the two sets of faculties in question, reason and passion, depending, according to the supposition, upon the same organic structure, can be in the different or opposite states of health and disease at the same time, can be separately or unequally invigorated, debilitated, or annihilated; how the judgment, whenever called into exercise, may be clear, acute, and profound, while there may be exhibited the wildest extravagance, and the grossest inconsistency of conduct, so often as the springs of some diseased affection or desire are touched. If an organ is in a sound and perfect state, it is fitted to discharge all its functions perfectly; if it is unsound, it is unable to execute any of them aright. Such is the argument; and it seems to us plausible, if not valid. If the intellect and the feelings have their seat in the same indivisible mass of nervous matter, or collection of cerebral particles, then it is in accordance with known facts, analogy and just reasoning, that any change in the condition of that mass, or injury sustained by it, should be perceived equally in the intellect and the feelings; in the same manner, that the musical powers of the violin would be impaired or destroyed throughout their entire range, and in every possible form of manifestation, by any cause which should affect generally the due tension of the strings, or the vibrating qualities of the instrument; or in the manner, that the hearing would be blunted in relation to every possible variation and succession of sounds, by any thing which should impair the sensibility of the auditory nerve.

What may be said of monomania, as proof that the brain is a congeries of organs, may be affirmed of dreaming, partial genius, injuries of the head, etc., as evidence of the same fact. In the latter cases, as in the first instance, there is great activity of certain faculties, with a corresponding inactivity of others; or at least, an unnatural inequality of the mental powers, the consequence of cerebral derangement. In dreaming, certain faculties and their corresponding organs A, are asleep, and therefore do not act; certain other faculties and their organs B, are awake, and act as usual. This partial cessation of the fundamental powers of the mind, pro

duces the irregularity and inconsistency to be observed in our sleeping thoughts. Now, if the set of faculties A, and that other set B, have a single indivisible organ, we are compelled to suppose, that this organ is both asleep and awake at the same time,-asleep as proved by the suspension of that class of its functions called A, and awake as evinced by the operation of that other class called B,-which is, of course, a contradiction.

Both observation and correct reasoning then, would appear to establish the position, that the brain is not a single organ. The opinion of many of the ancients, and of most modern physiologists, that intellect and passion at least occupy different compartments of the brain, would seem to be based upon the soundest philosophy. And if the great cerebral mass is thus divided into two regions or parts, each part having a separate function or office, it is not absurd to suppose that these parts may themselves be divided, so that each faculty of the intellect, (if the intellect be allowed to be composed of separate elementary faculties, as it generally is,) and each primitive affection or passion, may itself have a compartment or special organ, designed exclusively for its own occupation and use. Indeed, such a supposition is the only one which is at all consistent with the analogy of our other organs and functions. Thus say the phrenologists.

And here it may be well perhaps to state, that Dr. Spurzheim supposes the brain to be an aggregate of thirty-five distinct organs, each being the instrument of a fundamental faculty. These organs are said to be cone-shaped, their bases towards the circumference, and their apexes in the middle of the base of the brain. Twenty-one of these are the residence of as many faculties which are called FEELINGS, and fourteen of as many other faculties which are termed collectively, INTELLECT. The feelings are subdivided into propensities and sentiments, and the intellect into perceptive faculties and reflective faculties. The propensities are situated in the inferior-lateral and posterior parts of the head, and are nine in number,-destructiveness, amativeness, philoprogenitiveness, adhesiveness, inhabitiveness, combativeness, secretiveness, acquisitiveness, constructiveness! Of the class of faculties termed sentiments, there are twelve, occupying the crown' and superior-lateral parts of the head,-cautiousness, approbativeness, self-esteem, benevolence, reverence, firmness, conscientiousness, hope, marvelousness, ideality, mirthfulness, imitation! The twelve perceptive faculties are seated in the inferior parts of the forehead, and are known by the names of individuality, configuration, size, weight and resistance, coloring, locality, order, calculation, eventuality, time, tune, language! The reflective faculties-two only in number-are called comparison and causality. They are found in the superior parts of the forehead.