witnesses received of the event in question. Having arranged these symbols, one by one, opposite the corresponding symbols of the accusation, a mere engine would describe the possible, probable or actual guilt of the person accused.

(111.) Although I have assumed a criminal case for the purpose of my argument, yet the same reasoning would hold good in every civil case. One man sustains a damage at the hands of a second; the charge is set out, the witnesses give their testimony, and the question of identity between the charge and testimony is one which may be determined by mechanical contrivances when the words in the two instances are accurately set

out.

(112.) In every case the intervention of the jury is necessary to assign a word to express that which the witness describes, because it would be impossible to obtain witnesses who shall be enabled to declare the particular nervous fibres which were excited when the event occurred. Moreover, the examination of every word with such minuteness, would be too tedious, though it might admit of minute investigation. The meaning of every important word should be fully unravelled in every instance.

(113.) When the defendant answers a charge,

he should, if it be unfounded, admit every circumstance which is true, and deny only the circumstances which are false. By this proceeding, the attention of the jury is likely to be concentrated upon the immediate point in dispute, and thus be enabled carefully to estimate the value of the testimony adduced. By this course, the accused destroys the apparent effect of that high probability which is likely to be produced by an extensive concurrence between the charge and the evidence.

(114.) In most cases of testimony the assertions of all the witnesses do not agree. Some give evidence of one kind, some of the opposite, so that the evidence upon the same point is contradictory. In these cases, the laws of induction and deduction are applied by the jury, to judge of the value of the testimony, and that which affords most probability, or that which most coincides with former know, ledge, is received.

(115.) We thus perceive how imperfect, at bestare our conclusions, even when based upon the most approved evidence. We cannot fail to observe, that however carefully a jury may investigate a case, however unbiassed and unprejudiced they may be, yet, nevertheless, their verdict, in a majority of cases, can only be considered as

proving the probability or possibility of the guilt of any person. In every instance the result is obtained by the artificial means afforded by words and language, and we should never forget that wherever words are employed, there errors may creep in.

CHAPTER XI.

ON LOGIC OR THE ART OF QUIBBLING.

(116). Logic applicable to Quibbling.-(117, 118). Quibbles by Puns.-(119). By Qualified Nouns.-(120). By Variations in Number.-(121). By the Question involving Two Answers. (122.) By Constitution of Words.—(123). By the Verb.— (124). By General Principles, with Exceptions.-(125). By Two Words for the same Thing.-(126). By Cause and Effect. (127). By using Words contrary to well-known Principles. (128). By Action conjoined with the use of Words.(129). By Variations of Emphasis.-(130.) By Exalting a Probability.—(131). By Circular Reasoning.-(132). By a Question involving a False Premiss.-(133). By reasoning upon that which may be known.-(134). By changing the Word for the same thing.—(135), By a Variation of Punctuation.-(136). By begging the Question.-(137, 142). Other forms of Quibbling.-(142). Conclusion.

(116). Logic has now been the means for so many ages employed by mankind for quibbling, deceiving, and leading to wrong conclusions, that we cannot do better than restrain its application to the same derogatory purposes, and instead of shewing how, by extraordinary acumen and a high

exercise of mental power, it may serve to a good object, we shall at once describe the usual methods by which it serves for a contrary purpose.

(117). For proving what is false from any given premiss, logic is extremely convenient, as the system does not note with sufficient accuracy the signification of various words, and their mutual relations, unless, indeed, we except any very gross ambiguity in the middle term. A pun consists of good reasoning upon words having one sound or spelling, but two senses. By the natural process of thought, unless the individual is, indeed, exceedingly obtuse, the mind, as soon as the conclusion is brought before it, perceives the joke, and the auditor laughs at the deception. Example, "John, as you are light you can illuminate this passage."

(118). Puns, however, are such glaring cases of using apparently the same word in different senses, that a deception could very seldom be practised by them, yet in a less degree errors may certainly arise in that manner.

(119). One great and frequent deception which can be effected under the logical system, is by using a noun in one term, and a qualified noun in a second. But to be successful, the qualification must not be apparent, it must be under