not found wanting amongst the lower class of literary scribblers, persons who scoff at the Pronoun, and attempt to ridicule its use by recounting the number of times per page it occurs; yet its more abundant employment would have saved the world from much sophistry, deceit, and falsehood.

(102). Almost all untrue statements are based upon arguments by words, and the person who writes never gives his opinion unequivocally. His arguments in words throw the responsibility of the conclusion on his readers, from the facts which he has recorded; and there is nothing to show how many other facts or parts of facts he has suppressed. But if he makes an assertion of his own belief, his readers have the result of the natural process of thought, if he be but trustworthy.

(103). By avoiding the use of the word I, a newspaper editor in America actually conducted two journals of totally opposite politics at the same time. In both cases he shewed certain arguments, and the conclusion legitimately deducible from the premises; but he took care not to include the little word I, or in other words, to shew the belief which his own natural process of thought led him to adopt.

(104). In all professional subjects the opinion of the professional person should be obtained. If you

judge from a long report, you have a result of far less value than if you judge from his own opinion of the case. In the case of a lawyer, he should distinctly give his opinion upon the whole facts of the case, so a medical man should be expected to state a definite opinion from all the materials which he can collect upon the subject. In giving this opinion, a result is obtained which has been derived from the mind, the immediate work of God. In setting out an argument by words or symbols, a result is obtained by a process of mechanism devised by man.

CHAPTER X.

ON EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY.

(105) Trials.—(106) Theoretical Perfection of.—(107) Verdict generally only one of probability.—(108) Example.—(109) Remarks. (110) Use of the Jury.-(111) Civil Cases.(112) The use of Words.- (113) Defendant.-(114) Contradictory Testimony.-(115) Imperfection of Trials.

(105.) Trials are employed to determine the truth of an accusation against a certain person or persons, that is, whether he or they at a certain place did something which constituted a cause which produced an effect, the whole occurrence having taken place between certain times. This constitutes the charge, for instance, "John, at No. 1, Peaceful Cottage, beat James, last Monday, at 10 o'clock." For the purpose of ascertaining whether the offence was really committed, a number of witnesses are called, and the evidence which they each received, through the medium of their senses, is recorded. If the images received upon the sensorium of the witnesses, according to their statements, correspond entirely with the images which

such a charge should have produced, the guilt of the party is said to be proved by the concurrence.

(106.) In carrying this process to the very utmost possible perfection to which the system is capable, every word should be so described that no possibility of wrong interpretation could occur. Then and only till then can the statements of the witnesses, when they express that which they receive upon the brain by symbols or words, be relied upon, and no error be likely to occur from ambiguity. When the sets of words or symbols derived from the witnesses, are compared with the words or symbols constituting the charge, and are found to exactly concur, then a mere piece of mechanism would be sufficient to show the guilt of the party.

(107.) But we rarely can procure the evidence of witnesses to prove charges in serious offences. The eye of man is shunned at such periods, and thus no one sees the deed, and the entire evidence is scarcely ever procured. In these cases, the guilt of the party must of necessity be one of probability or possibility as there cannot be an absolute concurrence between the symbols of the evidence and the symbols of the charge. Nevertheless, upon that possibility the law has wisely ordained that criminals should be convicted, and expiate their crimes by the highest punishment.

(108.) Suppose, for instance, "John is charged with killing Thomas with a knife, at 1, Miniver Place, at 2 o'clock on Monday." In this case, evidence might be adduced that John was there at that time, and that John's knife actually killed Thomas. Now, in this instance, the mode of the act of killing would not be proved but from the concurrence in all other particulars, and the total want of disagreement. John is probably guilty, and the jury would doubtless return such a verdict.

(109.) This verdict, however, is only one of high probability, and we must not forget that James, of whom no evidence was given, and against whom no charge was made, might have taken the knife from John's pocket, killed Thomas, and then put the knife back again, totally unknown to John. There can be no question but that in the annals of English jurisprudence, notwithstanding all its care, innocent persons have fallen victims from probable or possible guilt having been confounded with actual guilt.

(110.) The laws of affirmation, negation, possibility and probability, might be turned with good account to prevent this serious mischief. The accusation might be clearly set out; the evidence of the witnesses might be taken before the jury, who are manifestly the proper persons to assign a right word or symbol to the impression which the