plishment of these fundamental necessaries of democracy-the training of the people in the spirit of the Constitution of democracy. All this because it is right. Nothing less than this because the divine spirit in man requires it.

Let Plato, Aristotle's teacher, develop the God-ward side of the matter. It is John Ruskin who points to the fact. Ruskin, as he comes to quote Plato, has been contending for the theocracy, as against the prevailing philosophy of expediency in these words:

"All our hearts have been betrayed by the plausible impiety of the modern economist, that, 'To do the best for yourself is finally to do the best for others.' Friends, our great Master said not so; and most absolutely we shall find this world is not made so. Indeed, to do the best for others, is finally to do the best for ourselves; but it will not do to have our eyes fixed on that issue. The Pagans had got beyond that. Hear what a Pagan says on this matter; hear what were, perhaps, the last words of Plato:

66

"Through many generations, so long as God's nature in them was yet full, they were submissive to the sacred laws, and carried themselves lovingly to all that had kindred with them in divineness; for their uttermost spirit was faithful and true, and in every wise great; so that in all meekness with wisdom, they dealt with each other, and took all the chances of life; and despising all things except virtue . they bore lightly the burden of gold and of possessions; for they saw that, if only their common love and virtue increased, all these things would be increased with them; but to set their esteem and ardent pursuit upon material possession would be to lose the first, and their virtue and affection with it

But when God's and the human

part of them faded and became extinct nature at last exceeded, they then became unable to endure the course of fortune; and fell into shapelessness of life, and baseness in the sight of him who could see, having lost everything that was fairest of their honor being filled with inordinate possession and power. Whereupon the God, the god of gods, whose Kinghood is laws, beholding a once just nation thus cast into misery, and desiring to lay such punishment upon them as might make them repent into restraining, gathered together all the gods into his dwelling-place, which from heaven's centre overlooks whatever has part in creation; and having assembled them, he said'

"The rest is silence. Last words of the chief wisdom of the

heathen, spoken of this idol of riches; this idol of yours: this idol forbidden us, by our own Master and faith; forbidden to us also by every human lip that has ever, in any age or people, been accounted of as able to speak according to the purposes of God." 123

There remains the main question: Why has Adam Smith, the man who is destined "to persuade one parliament and rule the next," ignored entirely the ancient prophets of Israel, who spoke as the mouthpiece of the Almighty, and in witness of the code of laws that were proclaimed as inspired of the Almighty? Smith's silence in this particular argues merely for a 'tolerable' treatment of his subject. In the case of Plato and Aristotle Smith gets on very unsatisfactorily with his claim that

"In none of the ancient moralists, do we find any attempt towards a particular enumeration of the rules of justice."

In the case of his silence concerning the rules particularly enumerated in the Bible, Smith fails to get on with his claim at all. Why this hesitation to give the laws of God their deserved audience? The answer to the question is simple. Smith is anxious for his theories to get on. Their success depends on giving a fair field, and one as legitimate as possible, for the play of injustice. Injustice must be made plausible, must even be made to seem necessary, and not out of keeping with the constitution of this world. Every door in the Bible is shut full in the face of any such supposition.

But a class in the eighteenth century was demanding open doors for their laissez faire'-let-us-alonepolicy. Nothing was left to Smith, therefore, but to take up with convenient expedients that were at hand to this purpose. The determined class were not atheists; they believed in a God. And out of their be

lief could be projected a Deity not altogether out of keeping with their every-day-creed of conduct. Simply a class-God this, of course; but with a deal of plausibility behind the creation. We turn to see how this creation is effected by Smith, and to find out the school of theologians to whom Smith was indebted, and whom Smith eventually made even more famous.

CHAPTER IX

Class-God of Expediency

"To whom then will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare unto him? To whom then will ye liken me, that I should be equal? saith the Holy One . . . To whom will ye liken me, and make me equal, and compare me, that we may be like?" 124

"Modern English economists have usually assumed that every man is guided by self-interest; that every one is moved by the desire of wealth. They explain that in so doing they do not imply any moral approbation of such motives; they take human nature as they find it, and this assumption they urge is sufficiently near the truth to serve as a basis of reasoning. Whatever may be their opinions as individuals, their attitude as economists is one of mere observation. Yet, beyond all question, the general educated public, who have no special acquaintance with the subject, have somehow received the impression that economists and political economy not only assume, but inculcate, the pursuit of material self-interest." 125

WE

give audience directly to Adam Smith, that with the least interruption, he may build up for us a doctrine of the Almighty perfectly convenient to buttress his theory of expediency.

The credulity required in this direction, as the founder of the prevailing system takes us into his confidence, is strictly amazing. We strike in on his famous doctrine of the "Invisible Hand."

"The rich only select from the heap what is more precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which

they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ be the gratification of their own insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants; and thus, without intending it, without knowing it, advance the inteerst of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species. When Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, 126 it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in the partition. These last too enjoy their share of all that it produces. In what constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much above them. In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings are fighting for." 127

This is all fine, and just as false. And Smith's fundamental error lies in just this glowing melodrama of theological untruth. He follows on in entertaining fashion:

"The idea of that divine Being, whose benevolence and wisdom have, from all eternity, contrived and conducted the immense machine of the universe, so as at all times to produce the greatest possible quantity of happiness, is certainly of all the objects of human contemplation by far the most sublime. Every other thought necessarily appears mean in the comparison. The man whom we believe to be principally occupied in this sublime contemplation, seldom fails to be the object of our highest veneration; and though his life should be altogether contemplative, we often regard him with a sort of respect much superior to that with which we look upon the most active and useful servant of the commonwealth." 128

But now the keystone that supports the arch of this faith-Smith's fanaticism for "the natural course of things."

"Though man is employed to alter that distribution of things which natural events would make, if left to themselves; though, like the gods of the poets, he is perpetually interposing, by extraordinary means, in favor of virtue, and in opposition to vice, and, like them, endeavouring to turn away the arrow that is aimed at the head of the righteous, but to accelerate the sword of destruction that is lifted against the wicked; yet he is by no means able to render the fortune of either quite suitable to his own sentiments and wishes. The natural course of things

cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavours of man; the current is too rapid and too strong for him to stop it; and though the rules which direct it appear to have been established for the best and wisest purposes, they produce effects which shock all his natural sentiments. That a great combination of men should prevail over a small one; that those who engage in an enterprise with forethought and all necessary preparation, should prevail over such as oppose them without any; and that every end should be acquired by those means only which Nature has established for acquiring it, seems to be a rule not only necessary and unavoidable in itself, but even useful and proper for arousing the industry and attention of mankind." 129

Smith in his Digression on the corn merchants in his "Wealth of Nations," applies this rule in defense of positive malpractices; thus:

"It is the interest of the people that their daily, weekly and monthly consumption should be proportioned as exactly as possible to the supply of the season. The interest of the inland corn dealer is the same. By supplying them, as nearly as he can judge, in this proportion, he is likely to sell all his corn for the highest price, and with the greatest profit; his knowledge of the state of the crop, and of his daily, weekly and monthly sales, enable him to judge with more or less accuracy, how far they are really supplied in this particular. Without intending the interest of the people, he is necessarily led, by a regard to his own interest, to treat them, even in years of scarcity, pretty much in the same manner as the prudent master of a vessel is sometimes obliged to treat his crew. When he foresees that provisions are likely to run short, he puts them upon short allowance. Though from excess of caution he should sometimes do this without any real necessity, yet all the inconveniences which his crew can thereby suffer are inconsiderable, in comparison of the danger, misery and ruin, to which they might sometimes be exposed by a less provident conduct. Though from excess of avarice, in the same manner, the inland corn merchant should sometimes raise the price of his corn somewhat higher than the scarcity of the season requires, yet all the inconveniencies which the people can suffer from this conduct, which effectually secures them from a famine in the end of the season, are inconsiderable, in comparison of what they might have been exposed to by a more liberal way of dealing in the beginning of it." 130

Smith here is really leading us into the underworld to support his "means which Nature has established for her ends." This because, contrary to known facts,