mon-law crimes. There are, however, certain statutory crimes which are exceptions to it. No act is a crime unless so declared by positive law. A legislature may declare an act a crime irrespective of the element of criminal intent. Thus, where a statute imposes a penalty upon any person who shall keep, or offer for sale, naptha under any assumed name; or shall wilfully place an obstruction on any railroad so as to endanger the safety of any train; or shall fell any timber, brush, or any other obstruction into a certain river and allow the same to remain in said river for five days;5 or shall permit a person under twenty-one to remain in his dance house; or shall unite in wedlock persons whose marriage is declared invalid,' guilty knowledge is not an essential element of the crime. Where a statute in general terms makes an act indictable, criminal intent need not be shown unless, from the language of the statute, a purpose to require the existence of such intention is apparent. If a statute makes criminal an act not malum in se, or infamous, without requiring the act to be knowingly done, a criminal intent need not be proved.9

§ 102. Criminal negligence.-Every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts. And neglect in the discharge of a duty, or indifference to consequences, is, in many cases, equivalent to criminal intent.10 Where a person recklessly discharges a gun, regardless of the lives of others, and kills or wounds a person, 3 Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 118 Mass. 441.

4 People V. Adams, 16 Hun (N. Y.) 549.

5 State V. White Oak River Corp., 111 N. Car. 661, 16 S. E. 331.

6 State v. Rosenfeld, 111 Minn. 301, 126 N. W. 1068, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 331, 137 Am. St. 557.

7 Territory v. Harwood, 15 N. Mex. 424. 110 Pac. 556, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 504n.

8 Halsted v. State, 41 N. J. L. 552, 32 Am. Rep. 247.

9 Gardner v. People, 62 N. Y. 299; State V. Southern Express Co. (Ala.), 75 So. 343.

10 1 Bish. New Crim. L. (8th ed.) § 313; United States v. Thomson, 12 Fed. 245, 8 Sawy. 122; People v. Connors, 253 I11. 266, 97 N. E. 643, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 143n, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 196; Belk v. People, 125 Ill. 584, 17 N. E. 744.

his acts will be construed as implying general malice, and render him criminally liable." If a person negligently, but without criminal intent, delivers flour for export, without having the same inspected as required by a penal statute, his negligence may be so gross as to be equivalent to criminal intent. 12

§ 103. Criminal intent implied.-Where a person voluntarily commits an unlawful act the law presumes a general criminal intent.13 A person recklessly doing an act calculated to injure persons or property, is presumed to have intended to do what his act is calculated to accomplish.14 One who does an act in violation of law is presumed to have done it wilfully; and the lack of intention to violate it will not release him from criminal liability.15 It has been asserted by Lord Mansfield that, "Where an act in itself indifferent, if done with a particular intent becomes criminal; there the intent must be proved and found; but where the act is in itself unlawful, * * the proof of justification or excuse lies on the defendant; and in failure thereof, the law implies a criminal intent."16

§ 104. Criminal intent conclusively presumed. In some cases criminal intent is conclusively presumed. If a statute, for example, forbids the doing of an act under certain circumstances, and the statute is violated, criminal intent is conclusively presumed. 17 Where a common carrier, in direct violation of a statute, discriminates in the transportation of

11 Vandermark v. People, 47 Ill. 122; State v. Tucker, 86 S. Car. 211, 68 S. E. 523, Derby's Cases 150. 12 Sturges v. Maitland, Anth. N. P. (2d ed.) (N. Y.) 208.

13 State v. Hall, 85 Mo. 669; State v. Jones, 70 Iowa 505, 30 N. W. 750.

14 State v. Neville, 2 Ohio Dec. 358

15 Marmont v. State, 48 Ind. 21.

16 Rex v. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 2667. See also Slattery v. People, 76 Ill. 217; State v. Goodenow, 65 Maine 30.

17 Commonwealth v. New York Cent. &c. R. Co., 202 Mass. 394, 88 N. E. 764, 132 Am. St. 507; State v. Gilmore, 80 Vt. 514, 68 Atl. 658, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 786n, 13 Ann. Cas. 321.

goods or passengers, criminal intent is conclusively presumed.18 Where a person, in direct violation of a statute, opens a grave for the purpose of removing a body interred therein, criminal intent is conclusively presumed.19

§ 105. Specific criminal intent.-Some crimes involve a specific, or particular, criminal intent. In larceny, robbery, burglary, and in all of the aggravated assaults, a specific criminal intent is an essential ingredient. And where, a specific criminal intent is an essential ingredient of a crime such intent must be shown.20 Moreover, such intent should be alleged in the indictment. But if the offense consists merely in doing an unlawful or criminal act and no particular intention is essential, an evil intention is presumed and need not be alleged or proved.21

§ 106. Motive.-A bad motive is not an essential element of any crime. The existence of a motive is a circumstance to be considered with all the other evidence by the jury in reaching a conclusion of guilt or innocence and the lack of proof of it may be a circumstance tending to show innocence; but proof of motive is not necessary to convict, nor is its absence ground for acquittal; for crimes may be thoroughly established and no motive appear.22 Indeed, the very absence of known motive may aggravate the offense. On the other hand, a good motive is no defense. A wilful wrong inflicted on others, unwarranted by law, is malicious, though committed in pursuance of a general good purpose and sin

18 State v. Southern R. Co., 122 N. Car. 1052, 30 S. E. 133, 41 L. R. A. 246.

19 State v. McLean, 121 N. Car. 589, 28 S. E. 140, 42 L. R. A. 721.

20 Ogletree v. State, 28 Ala. 693, Derby's Cases 126; State V. Meche, 42 La. Ann. 273, 7 So. 573, Derby's Cases 131.

21 Commonwealth v. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 173; State v. Thom

as, 127 La. 576, 53 So. 868, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1059; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193, Derby's Cases 101.

22 People v. Seppi, 221 N. Y. 62, 116 N. E. 793; People v. King, 276 Ill. 138, 114 N. E. 601; Stone v. State, 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. 114; People v. Zammuto, 280 Ill. 225, 117 N. E. 454.

cere design to bring about some altruistic end.28 The fact that a person has conscientious scruples against being vaccinated is no defense in an action against him for refusing to be vaccinated where a penal statute requires it to be done.24 Nor is the fact that a parent, who is financially capable, owing to conscientious religious scruples, wilfully fails to call a physician or supply proper medicines for his sick child, as a result of which the child dies, any defense.25 The parent in such a case is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The contrary doctrine has been held, 26 but such doctrine is not sound.27 "The nature of one's legal duties, and the extent of his legal responsibilities, both civil and criminal, must be governed by general rules of law which will apply to all alike."28 But evidence of motive is always admissible and frequently of great importance.

It matters little whether the motive be adequate, according to the standard of persons other than the defendant; but whether a motive is adequate to induce the commission of crime depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case, and the particular character of the defendant. Murders are often committed from motives comparatively trivial and slight, such as to obtain, by inheritance or otherwise, a small amount of property, or to remove some person who is an obstacle to a desired marriage.29

§ 107. Criminal intent usually transferable.-Many crimes involve only a general criminal intent, while others involve a

23 Commonwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 337; United States v. Harmon, 45 Fed. 414 (affd. 50 Fed. 921).

24 Commonwealth V. Pear, 183 Mass. 242, 66 N. E. 719, 67 L. R. A. 935 (affd. 197 U. S. 11, 49 L. ed 643, 25 Sup. Ct. 358).

25 State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N. E. 197. See also Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 664, 116 Pac. 345, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 633n.

26 Reg. v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox Cr. C. 530.

27 Reg. v. Downes, 13 Cox Cr. C. 111, Beale's Cases 195, Derby's Cases 97; State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N. E. 197; Reg. v. Senior, 19 Cox Cr. C. 219.

28 State v. Sandford, 99 Maine 441, 59 Atl. 597.

29 State v. Lentz, 45 Minn. 177, 47 N. W. 720.

specific or particular criminal intent. A general criminal intent is always transferable.29a A particular criminal intent is sometimes transferable and sometimes not. It is transferable from person to person or from thing to thing; but not from person to thing or from thing to person. The latter part of this rule is wholly arbitrary, but it is recognized and enforced by the courts. Thus, where a person recklessly shoots at another's cattle in his corn field to frighten and run them out, and unintentionally kills his neighbor's mule, he is criminally liable for his act.30 But a person who maliciously shoots at another person on horseback and kills his horse is not guilty of maliciously killing the horse, for malice implies intent and there is no intent to kill the horse.31 And a person who maliciously throws a stone, intending to hit other persons, and the stone misses them and hits and breaks a large plate-glass window, is not guilty of malicious mischief, since he did not intend to break the window.32 It has been held that one who, while assaulting another with intent to kill, injures unintentionally a third person, is not liable for assault with intent to kill such person.33 But the weight of authority is to the contrary,34

§ 108. Criminal liability for unintended result.-Since criminal intent is generally transferable, a person may render himself criminally liable for an unintended result. To do so, however, two things are essential: (1) The act intended must be at least malum in se; and (2) the unintended result must be the natural and probable consequence of the act intended.

29a People v. Hodge, 196 Mich. 546, 162 N. W. 966.

30 State v. Barnard, 88 N. Car. 661.

31 Rex v. Scully, 1 Craw. & D. 186.

32 Reg. v. Pembliton, 12 Cox Cr. C. 607, Beale's Cases 210, Derby's Cases 127.

33 State v. Thomas, 127 La. 576, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 172n, Ann. Cas.

1912A, 1059, and cases cited; Scott v. State, 49 Ark. 156, 4 S. W. 750; Derby's Cases 129.

34 State v. Gilman, 69 Maine 163, 31 Ann. Rep. 257, Derby's Cases 123; Reg. v. Latimer, 16 Cox Cr. C. 70; Derby's Cases 120; State v. Mulhall, 199 Mo. 202, 97 S. W. 583, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630, 8 Ann. Cas. 781.