deliberated upon; but if the killing is not the instant effect of impulse, if there is hesitation or doubt to overcome, a choice made as the result of thought, however short the struggle between the intention and the act, it is sufficient to characterize the crime as deliberate and premeditated murder.63 By the weight of authority, evidence of drunkenness of the accused is admissible to negative the existence of deliberation and premeditation and thus show that the homicide is not murder in the first degree.64 It is to be observed that while fixed insanity produced by habitual drunkenness excuses acts otherwise criminal, one who while sober deliberately resolves to kill another, and gets drunk for the purpose of nerving himself to perform the deed, and kills such person while he is so drunk as to be incapable of forming such design, and temporarily insane and unconscious of what he is doing, is still guilty of murder in the first degree.65 As a general rule, drunkenness will not reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter, when the same offense, if committed by a sober man, would be murder.66 A sufficient provocation in the case of a sober man, will reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter; and exactly the same. principle is applicable to a drunken man. Voluntary drunk 63 Leighton v. People, 88 N. Y. 117. 64 Hopt v. People, 104 U. S. 631, 26 L. ed. 873; People v. Corey, 148 N. Y. 476, 42 N. E. 1066; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412; Hopt v. People, 104 U. S. 631, 26 L. ed. 873; State v. Rumble, 81 Kans. 16, 105 Pac. 1, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 376. See also note to 36 L. R. A. 470. 65 State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 799. See also State v. Garvey, 11 Minn. 154; Marshall V. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 222, 132 S. W. 139, 31 L. R. 66 Rafferty v. People, 66 Ill. 118. See also Rex v. Carroll, 7 Car. & P. 145; Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. St. 55, 84 Am. Dec. 414; People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484; Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (Mass.) 463; McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 514; State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483; Shannahan v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush (Ky.) 463, 8 Am. Rep. 465; Malone v. State, 49 Ga. 210; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835, 29 Am. St. 232; State v. Morris, 83 Ore. 429, 163 Pac. 567. enness which merely excites the passions of a man and stimulates him to the commission of a homicide, without any provocation, neither reduces the grade of the crime nor mitigates the punishment. $83. The rule as to intoxication in Illinois.-The criminal code of Illinois provides that, "Drunkenness shall not be an excuse for any crime or misdemeanor, unless such drunkenness be occasioned by the fraud, contrivance or force of some other person, for the purpose of causing the perpetration of an offense."67 Voluntary drunkenness in Illinois may be a complete defense to any crime an essential element of which is specific criminal intent.68 It may be a complete defense to a charge of larceny, robbery, burglary or any aggravated assault, as each of these crimes involves a specific intent, and drunkenness may produce a state of mind such as to negative any positive or particular intent.69 On the other hand, when, without intoxication, the law imputes to an act a criminal intent, as in the case of wanton killing without provocation, drunkenness of the accused may not be shown to disprove such intent.7 70 Whether, in a given case, the intoxication of the accused was voluntary or involuntary is always a question of fact for the jury to determine; but the legal effect of voluntary intoxication upon a criminal act is a question of law.71 § 84. Intoxication of insane person.-Voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for a criminal act. An insane person can become drunk as well as a sane person. His drunkenness however, will not withdraw from him his shield of insanity. "If a man is insane when sober, the fact that he increased the insanity, by the superadded excitement of liquor, makes no difference. An insane person is irresponsible, whether drunk 67 Illinois: Hurd's Rev. Stat. (1916) ch. 38, 291. 68 Schwabacher v. People, 165 Ill. 618, 46 N. E. 809. 69 Crosby v. People, 137 I11. 325, 27 N. E. 49; Mooney v. State, 33 70 Rafferty v. People, 66 Ill. 118. or sober."72 It is to be observed that it is the original insanity which constitutes a defense, and not the drunkenness.73 § 85. Involuntary intoxication.-Involuntary drunkenness, resulting from the fraud or stratagem of another, or the negligence of his physician, which renders the person unconscious of right and wrong as to the particular act, constitutes a defense. But drunkenness, which results from satisfying an irresistible appetite which overcomes the will and amounts to a disease, is no excuse for a criminal act, nor is it material on the question of premeditation.75 It has been held that "if a person be subject to a tendency to insanity of which he is ignorant, which is liable to be excited by intoxication, and if, in consequence of intoxication, though voluntary, his mental faculties become excited to diseased action to such an extent that he does not know what he is doing nor why he is doing it, or if conscious of this, he is not conscious of any object in doing it, or if he does not know that what he is doing or the means he is using are adapted or likely to kill; or, though conscious of all these, yet, if the diseased action of his mind has so far overcome or perverted his reason that he does not know that what he is doing is wrong, then he will not be responsible for the intoxication, nor its consequences."76 This is also Wharton's view." The intoxication in such a case is regarded as involuntary. § 86. Corporations. It was once doubted whether a corporation could be liable for a crime; but later decisions hold that a corporation is subject to common-law indictment.78 The difficulties about bringing a corporation into court for a crime because of the impossibility of its arrest, have been removed by statute.79 There are certain crimes involving personal malicious intent which can not be committed by corporations.80 But a corporation may be indicted for a breach of duty, and for maintaining a nuisance,81 keeping a disorderly house,82 obstructing a highway,83 libel, violating Sunday laws, 85 selling intoxicating liquors, 86 or for public wrongs generally. Corporations may also be punished for criminal contempts.87 The method of punishment is by fine;88 but there can be no punishment of the members unless proceeded against personally.89 Stockholders are not criminally liable for offenses of officers.90 Under statutes defining homicide as the killing of one human being by another, a corporation can not be indicted for manslaughter or murder.o1 79 State v. Western, &c. R. Co., 89 N. Car. 584. 80 Whart. Crim. L. (11th ed.), § 116. 81 Reg. v. Great North of England R. Co., 9 Q. B. 315, 2 Cox Cr. C. 70, 7 Eng. Rul. Cas. 466; People v. Albany, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 539, 27 Am. Dec. 95. 82 State v. Passaic County Agr. Soc., 54 N. J. L. 260, 23 Atl. 680. 83 State v. Ohio, &c. R. Co., 23 Ind. 362; Commonwealth v. Vermont, &c. R. Co., 4 Gray (Mass.) 22; State v. Morris, &c. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 360. 84 State V. Atchison, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 729, 31 Am. Rep. 663. 85 State v. Baltimore, &c. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 362, 36 Am. Rep. 803. 86 Stewart V. Waterloo Turn verein, 71 Iowa 226, 32 N. W. 275, 60 Am. Rep. 786. 87 State v. Baltimore, &c. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 362, 36 Am. Rep. 803; Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445, 44 L. R. A. 159, 70 Am. St. 280. 88 Whart. Crim. L. (11th ed.), § 122; Reg. v. Birmingham &c. R. Co., 3 Q B. 223. 89 Whart. Crim, L. (11th ed.), § 116. 90 In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104; Union P. Cool Co. V. United States, 173 Fed. 737. 91 People v. Rochester R. & L. Co., 195 N. Y. 102, 88 N. E. 22, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 998, 133 Am. St. 770, 16 Ann. Cas. 837, Derby's Cases 207. § 90. Classes of cases in which question of compulsion arises. The question of compulsion, as a defense to a criminal charge, arises in the following classes of cases: (1) Where a wife does a criminal act in her husband's presence; (2) where a subordinate does a criminal act by command of his superior; (3) where a person does a criminal act owing to actual duress by persons having no semblance of authority; (4) where a person does a criminal act for self-preservation in other cases; and (5) where a person does a criminal act owing to inability on his part to perform a legal duty These various classes will be next discussed in the order given. § 91. Coercion of husband.-A married woman who commits a crime in the presence of her husband is presumed to act by his command and under the impulse of fear. For this reason the husband's coercion is usually a defense to a criminal charge against the wife for an act committed by her in his presence.1 The presumption of coercion is not conclu 1 Commonwealth V. Neal, 10 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Dec. 105; State v. Kelly, 74 Iowa 589, 38 N. W. 503; Davis v. State, 15 Ohio 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559; Commonwealth v. Daley, 148 Mass. 11, 18 N. E. 579; |