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edge must be actual." But if one after obtaining knowledge undertakes to deprive the owner of the rightful use of the property, he may be convicted of receiving stolen goods.12 And a lawyer who aided the thieves who had stolen securities in getting a reward for their return and had the securities in his possession while the reward was being paid, was convicted of receiving stolen goods.1 13

§ 645. Doctrine of lucri causa.—As in the case of larceny, the doctrine of lucri causa is not applicable, as a rule, to the crime of receiving stolen goods. It is not essential that the recipient gain any benefit therefrom, or expect to do so.14 It is sufficient if he aids the thief to conceal the property.15 Guilty knowledge that the goods were stolen has been held sufficient.16 But where a statute expressly provides that the property must be received for "gain" of the recipient the foregoing rule does not apply.17

§ 646. Manual possession not essential.—It is not essential that the accused have manual possession of the stolen

210, 20 S. W. 356; Reg. v. White, 1 Fost. & F. 665; and note to 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 31 on statutes by which failure to inquire as to possessor's right is made equivalent to guilty knowledge. See also Frank v. State, 67 Miss. 125, 6 So. 842; People v. Zimmer, 160 N. Y. S. 459, 174 App. Div. 470. See also Kasle v. United States, 233 Fed. 878, 147 C. C. A. 552.

11 First Nat. Bank v. Gilbert, 123 La. 845, 49 So. 593, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 631n, 131 Am. St. 382; State v. Rountree, 80 S. Car. 387, 61 S. E. 1072, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 833; James v. State (Ala. App.), 74 So. 395. 12 Commonwealth V. Kronick,

196 Mass. 286, 82 N. E. 39, Derby's Cases 515.

13 People v. O'Reilly, 153 App. Div. 854, 138 N. Y. S. 776, Derby's Cases 519.

14 State v. Rushing, 69 N. Car. 29, 12 Am. Rep. 641; Commonwealth v. Beam, 117 Mass. 141; Rex v. Richardson, 6 Car. & P. 335. See also State v. Pirkey, 22 S. Dak. 550, 118 N. W. 1042, 18 Ann. Cas. 192.

15 People v. Reynolds, 2 Mich. 422.

16 State v. Smith, 88 Iowa 1, 55 N. W. 16.

17 Aldrich v. People, 101 III. 16.

property.18 In one of the cases the defendant was convicted of knowingly receiving a stolen watch. His contention was that there was no proof that he had possession of it. The judge instructed the jury that if the defendant knew that the watch was stolen, that H had it, that the defendant could make him deliver it, and had absolute control over him, they would be justified in finding him guilty. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed. Again, where C stole goods and took them to the defendant's store, and the defendant ordered her servant to take them to a pawnshop and bring back the money received for them and give it to C, which order was carried out, the conviction, on appeal, was sustained,19 since it was virtually as much a receiving of stolen goods by the defendant as if her own hand, and not that of her servant, had received them. It is enough to aid in the concealment of the goods, knowing them to be stolen.20

§ 647. Subsequent adoption of wife's act.-Where the thief leaves the stolen goods with the wife of the accused, and she pays him part of the price, and her husband subsequently meets him, agrees on the price and pays him the balance, the husband is guilty of receiving stolen goods.21 The act of receiving the goods is incomplete until the husband meets the thief and they agree to the terms.

§ 648. Depriving the owner permanently of possession.The term "permanently," in its application to the crime of receiving stolen goods, has the same restricted meaning that it has in its application to the crime of larceny. Where the defendant was convicted of receiving stolen goods, and he contended that the conviction should be quashed because the

18 Reg. v. Smith, Dears. Cr. C. 494, 6 Cox Cr. C. 554, 3 W. R. 484, 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 531.

19 Reg. v. Miller, 6 Cox Cr. C. 353.

20 State v. Conklin, 153 Iowa 216,

133 N. W. 119, Derby's Cases 518.

21 Reg. v. Woodward, 9 Cox Cr. C. 95, Leigh & C. 122, 31 L. J. M. C. 91, 5 L. T. 686, 10 W. R. 298, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 104, Derby's Cases 513.

proof showed that he did not intend to deprive the owner of the property of his ownership in it; that he intended to return it upon receiving a reward for so doing, the court held that if the jury believed from the evidence, as they well might, that the defendant concealed from the owner the fact that he had the property, intending to defraud him into paying a reward for it, the crime was established.22

§ 649. Recent possession of stolen goods.-The recent possession of stolen goods, unexplained, is a circumstance from which the jury may infer the possessor's guilt.28 But it does not raise a presumption of guilt as a matter of law.24

22 Baker v. State, 58 Ark. 513, 25 S. W. 603. See also, Commonwealth v. Mason, 105 Mass. 163, 7 Am. Rep. 507; Berry v. State, 37 Ohio St. 227; Reg. v. O'Donnell, 7 Cox Cr. C. 337.

23 Kinard v. State, 19 Ga. App. 624, 91 S. E. 941.

24 Kinard v. State, 19 Ga. App. 624, 91 S. E. 941.

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§ 650. Obstructing justice.—Wilfully obstructing the administration of justice is a crime at common law. It has been held criminal to destroy a dead body to prevent an inquest,2 to wilfully destroy public records,3 to cause another to be falsely convicted of a crime, to refuse as a jailer to deliver over prisoners on proper order, or generally, to obstruct an officer in the execution of his office. The crime. must be committed with knowledge that justice is being administered. Tampering with witnesses is a crime.s

§ 651. Resisting an officer.-One who resists the acts of an officer in making a legal arrest, or who prevents or hinBradshaw, 53 Mont. 96, 161 Pac. 710.

11 Bish. New Crim. L. (8th ed.), §§ 465, 467. See also, United States v. Tinklepaugh, Federal Case No. 16525, 3 Blatch. (U. S.) 425; Bosselman v. United States, 239 Fed. 82, 152 C. C. A. 132.

2 Reg. v. Stephenson, 13 Q. B. Div. 331.

3 United States v. De Groat, 30 Fed. 764.

4 United States v. Kindred, 5 Fed. 43, 4 Hughes (U. S.) 493.

5 United States v. Martin, 17 Fed. 150, 2 Sawy. (U. S.) 90.

Brooker v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 175; State v. Bradshaw, 53 Mont. 96, 161 Pac. 710. 7 Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 37 L. ed. 419; State v.

8 People v. Brown, 74 Cal. 306, 16 Pac. 1; Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 14 Gray (Mass.) 87, 74 Am. Dec. 665; State v. Ames, 64 Maine 386; State v. Cole, 107 S. Car. 285, 92 S. E. 624; State v. Wingard, 92 Wash. 219, 158 Pac. 725.

9 State v. Scott, 123 La. 1085, 49 So. 715, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 199n; Commonwealth v. Foster, 1 Mass. 488; People v. Haley, 48 Mich. 495, 12 N. W. 671; Bryant v. State, 16 Nebr. 651, 21 N. W. 406; State v. Scammon, 22 N. H. 44; State v. Bradshaw, 53 Mont. 96; 161 Pac. 710.

ders the execution of a lawful civil process, 10 may be con victed of crime. The officer resisted must have been within

his jurisdiction, acting under a lawful warrant.11

Resistance to an officer serving civil process, who is acting unlawfully and without authority, is not a crime,12 for wrongful intent is necessary to the crime. One who prevents an officer from taking exempt property of his wife on an exemption issued against him, is not guilty.13 One who has no knowledge of the official character of the person resisted is not guilty.14 Mere threats,15 or refusal to give information to an officer,16 are insufficient to support conviction. But threats coupled with present ability and apparent intent to execute them, thus preventing service of process, may constitute the offense.17

10 State v. Morrison, 46 Kans. 679, 27 Pac. 133; Commonwealth v. McHugh, 157 Mass. 457, 32 N. E. 650; Braddy v. Hodges, 99 N. Car. 319, 5 S. E. 17.

11 See § 811.

12 Agee v. State, 64 Ind. 340; People v. Hopson, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 574.

13 People v. Clements, 68 Mich. 655, 36 N. W. 792, 13 Am. St. 373.

14 State v. Garrett, 80 Iowa 589, 46 N. W. 748; People v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487, 29 N. W. 109.

15 State v. Welch, 37 Wis. 196. 16 Reg. v. Green, 8 Cox Cr. C. 441.

17 Reed v. State, 103 Ark. 391, 147 S. W. 76, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 811n; Slim and Shorty v. State, 123 Ark. 583, 186 S. W. 308.

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