mit perjury. At common law it is an accessorial offense, but in many states it has been made by statute a separate and distinct crime.51 To sustain an indictment for subornation of perjury it must be averred and proved that the witness alleged to have been suborned actually committed perjury,52 that the defendant induced or procured him to do so,' and that the defendant believed he would do so.54 51 Stone v. State, 118 Ga. 705, 45 S. E. 630, 98 Am. St. 145. (In this case Justice Lamar says: "In perjury and subornation of perjury the act of the two offenders is concurrent, parallel, and closely related in point of time and conduct. The two crimes both culminate in the delivery of false testimony. Still the offenses are dual, each having in it elements not common to the other. There is sufficient inherent difference between the two to warrant the law-making power in separating the act into its component parts, making that of the sub 53 orner a new and independent offense, punishable with greater or less severity than that inflicted on the perjurer." See also, People v. Teal, 196 N. Y. 372, 89 N. E. 1086, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 120n, 17 Ann. Cas. 1175n. 52 Smith v. State, 125 Ind. 440, 25 N. E. 598; Garrett v. State, 18 Ga. App. 360, 89 S. E. 380. 53 Smith v. State, 125 Ind. 440, 25 N. E. 598; Commonwealth v. Douglass, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 241. 54 Coyne v. People, 124 Ill. 17, 14 N. E. 668, 7 Am. St. 324; Stewart v. State, 22 Ohio St. 477. § 640. Definition and essentials.-The crime of receiving stolen goods is the act of taking into one's possession, animo furandi, personal property of another with actual or constructive knowledge that it is stolen property. It is essential not only that the property has been stolen, but also that it possess the character of stolen property at the time it is received into the possession of the accused. He must have actual or constructive knowledge when he acquires possession of it that it is stolen property, and must receive it animo furandi and with the consent of the other party. § 641. A statutory offense.-At common law, receiving stolen goods is probably not even a substantive misdemeanor. In 1691 a statute was passed in England which provided "That if any person or persons shall buy or receive any goods or chattel that shall be feloniously taken or stolen from any other person, knowing the same to be stolen, he or they shall be taken and deemed an accessory or accessories to such felony after the fact, and shall incur the same punishment, as an accessory or accessories to the felony after the felony committed."1 13 Wm. & M., ch. 9, § 4. In 1827 another statute was passed which provided "That if any person shall receive any chattel, money, valuable security or other property whatsoever, the stealing or taking whereof will amount to a felony either at common law, or by virtue of this act, such person knowing the same to have been feloniously stolen or taken, every such receiver shall be guilty of felony, and may be indicted and convicted as an accessory after the fact, or for a substantive felony." It will be observed that under the former of these statutes the offense was only an accessorial crime, whereas under the latter it was also a substantive crime. Hence under the former statute it was essential that the property be received from the thief while under the latter it was not. In this country, statutes have been enacted in probably all the states making the offense a substantive crime. Under these statutes it is not essential that the property be received from the thief. The contrary, however, has been held, but this view is not correct upon principle, nor in harmony with the great weight of authority. Some statutes make it a crime to receive goods animo furandi which have been embezzled or obtained by false pretenses.5 These statutes are separate and distinct from those which make it a crime to receive stolen goods. It has been held that one who participates in the larceny may not be convicted also of the offense of receiving stolen goods. On the other hand however, it has been held that a verdict for receiving stolen goods will 27 & 8 Geo. IV, ch. 29, § 54. 3 State v. Ives, 35 N. Car. 338; United States v. De Bare, Fed. Cas. No. 14935, 6 Biss. (U. S.) 358. 4 Levi v. State, 14 Nebr. 1, 14 N. W. 543; Smith v. State, 59 Ohio St. 350, 52 N. E. 826; Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 43 L. ed. 890; Anderson v. State, 38 Fla. 3, 20 So. 765; Curran v. State, 12 Wyo. 553, 76 Pac. 577; Campbell v. 5 Commonwealth v. Leonard, 140 Mass. 473, 4 N. E. 96, 54 Am. Rep. 485. 6 Adams v. State, 60 Fla. 1, 53 So. 451, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1209; Bloch v. State (Tex. Cr.), 193 S. W. 303. not be set aside because the evidence would have justified a verdict for the separate offense of larceny.6a § 642. The act must be felonious.-The act of receiving the property must be felonious. It is essential, therefore, that the thing received be stolen property. This attribute must exist at the time the property is received. Thus, where the defendant was convicted of receiving stolen goods, and the proof showed that they had been found in the pockets of the thief by the owner; that with the view of catching the receiver of such goods (brass castings) the owner returned them to the thief and directed him to sell them to the defendant, which was accordingly done, the conviction was set aside because the goods, when received by the defendant, had ceased to be stolen property, and were sold to the defendant with the consent of the owner. Again, in another case, the defendant was convicted of receiving a parcel of postage stamps, of the value of one hundred fifty dollars which had been stolen. The proof showed that the stamps were stolen at Unionville, Mo., and sent by the thief, by express, to Milwaukee, Wis., addressed to the defendant; that the thief was arrested at Quincy, Ill., and that he gave an order to the postmaster there on the express agent at Milwaukee by which that postmaster acquired possession of the parcel; that the United States authorities ordered the postmaster to enclose them in the same wrapper and forward them as first directed; that this order was carried out and that the parcel was received at Milwaukee by the defendant. On appeal, the conviction was set aside and a new trial granted on the ground that the stamps when received by the defendant had lost their character as stolen property. "The ownership of these stamps was in the United States. The 6а People v. Thompson, 274 Ill. 214, 113 N. E. 322. 7 Reg. v. Dolan, 6 Cox Cr. C. 449, Dears. Cr. C. 436. See also People v. Jaffe, 185 N. Y. 497, 78 Quincy postmaster was the agent of the owner. When Crawford (the thief) surrendered them to this agent they were reclaimed property that had been stolen, but their character as stolen property ceased in the hands of the postmaster, so far as the subsequent receiver was concerned. The moral turpitude of a receiver under such circumstances may be as great as in case the property comes directly from the hands of the thief, because the criminal intent on his part exists equally in both cases. But to create the offense which the law punishes, the property when received, must, in fact, and in a legal sense, be stolen property. If these stamps were received by the defendant, they did not, when received, upon the proof made, bear this character. They had been captured from the thief by the owner, and the act of forwarding them to the alleged receiver was the act of the owner. 998 § 643. Consent of the other party essential.----Possession of the property must be obtained with the consent of the party from whom it is received. If acquired by trespass the offense is larceny." § 644. Guilty knowledge of the recipient.-It is also essential that the recipient possess guilty knowledge as to the character of the property. And this guilty knowledge must exist at the time he receives it. It can be constructive, however, as well as actual; and, it has been held, may be implied from the receipt of goods under circumstances sufficient to satisfy a man of ordinary intelligence and caution that they were stolen. 10 Other jurisdictions hold that knowl 8 United States v. De Bare, Fed. Cas. No. 16935, 6 Biss. (U. S.) 358. See also Reg. v. Schmidt, 10 Cox Cr. C. 172, L. R. 1 C. C. 15, 35 L. J. M. C. 94, 12 Jur. (N. S.) 149. 9 Reg. v. Wade, 1 Car. & K. 739. 10 Huggins v. People, 135 I11. 243, 25 N. E. 1002, 25 Am. St. 357; State v. Feuerhaken, 96 Iowa 299, 65 N. W. 299; Luery v. State, 116 Md. 284, 81 Atl. 681, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 161; State v. D'Adame, 84 N. J. L. 386, 86 Atl. 414, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1109; Murio v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. |