595. Definition of compounding a felony.-Compounding a felony consists of knowing that a felony has been committed and forbearing to prosecute the felon in consideration of some reward.

§ 596. Requisites of the crime.-The three essentials of this crime are the following: (1) Knowledge that a felony has been committed; (2) agreement not to prosecute; (3) the receiving of some reward.

§ 597. Scope of the crime.-A common illustration of compounding a felony is where the owner of stolen goods agrees to forbear prosecuting the thief in consideration that the goods be returned.1 It is to be observed, however, that anyone, who has knowledge of the felony and who agrees not to prosecute in consideration of a reward, is guilty of this crime. The crime is not committed, however, where the owner of the stolen goods merely takes the goods back without any inducement made to the thief, for the gist of the offense is the agreement to take compensation for forbearing

1 Commonwealth v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91.

to prosecute. Receiving a promissory note constitute a sufficient consideration for forbearing to prosecute although the note is never paid.2 The fact that the defendant subsequently prosecuted the felon is no defense to the prosecution for compounding the felony.3 Nor the fact that the felon was acquitted. Nor the fact that the consideration for forbearing to prosecute was received by the defendant for the benefit of a third party.5 Nor the fact that the defendant corruptly acted under the instructions of a superior officer. It is said that there can be no conviction unless it is charged and proved that a felony was committed.

§ 598. Compounding a misdemeanor.-Compounding a misdemeanor of a private nature, as an assault or private cheat, is not a crime at common law. On the other hand, compounding a misdemeanor of a public nature is a crime at common law. Thus, where the defendant informed a liquor dealer that he had a case against him for illegally selling liquor; that he would forbear prosecuting him if the latter would pay him thirty dollars, which amount was so paid, the defendant was convicted of compounding a misdemeanor and the conviction was sustained.8 In this case the court stated: "The bargain and acceptance of the reward makes the crime. And in such a case, the party may be convicted though no offense liable to a penalty has been committed by the person from whom the reward is taken."9

7 State v. Hodge, 142 N. Car. 665, 55 S. E. 626, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 709n, 9 Ann. Cas. 563.

8 State v. Carver, 69 N. H. 216, 39 Atl. 973.

9 State v. Carver, 69 N. H. 216, 39 Atl. 973. See also People v. Buckland, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 592; Reg. v. Best, 9 Car. & P. 368, 38 E. C. L. 368; Rex v. Gotley, Russ. & Ry. 84; 1 Russ. Crimes (9th Am. ed.) 195; Arch. Crim. Pr. & Pl. 623.

§ 599. Definition of misprision of felony.-Misprison of felony is a criminal neglect either to prevent a felony from being committed, or to bring to justice the offender after its commission.10

§ 600. Offender distinguished from an accessory or principal. One who merely neglects either to prevent a felony or to bring the offender to justice is not an accessory to the felony. On the other hand, if he encourages or aids the felon he is either an accessory or a principal. "As to the receiving, relieving, and assisting one known to be a felon, it may be said in general terms, that any assistance given to one known to be a felon in order to hinder his apprehension, trial or punishment, is sufficient to make a man accessory after the fact; as that he concealed him in the house, or shut the door against his pursuers, until he should have an opportunity to escape; *** or supplied him with money, a horse or other necessaries in order to enable him to escape; or that the principal was in prison, and the jailor was bribed to let him escape; or conveyed instruments to him to enable him to break prison and escape. This and such like assistance to one known to be a felon, would constitute a man accessory after the fact. *** But merely suffering the principal to escape, will not make the party accessory after the fact; for it amounts at most but to a mere omission. *** Or if he agree for money not to prosecute the felon; or if knowing of a felony, fails to make it known to the proper authorities; none of these acts would be sufficient to make the party an accessory after the fact. If the thing done amounts to no more than the compounding a felony, or the misprision of it, the doer will not be an accessory. * * * If, knowing that a felony had been committed, he (the defendant) concealed it, then he is guilty of misprision of felony. If, knowing a felony to

10 Wren v. Commonwealth, 26 Grat. (Va.) 952; 1 Bish. New Crim. L. (8th ed.), § 717.

be committed, he concealed it or forbore to arrest and prosecute the felon, for fee or reward, then he is guilty of compounding a felony. Both of these are grave offenses, but they do not constitute a party an accessory after the fact."11 Misprision of felony at common law is a misdemeanor.

11 Wren v. Commonwealth, 26

Grat. (Va.) 952.

§ 605. Definition.-Contempt of court is said to be a despising of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, and one is guilty of contempt whose acts tend to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties or witnesses during litigation. The power to punish persons guilty of contempt is essential to judicial authority, and inherent in courts.2

Criminal proceedings in contempts are those prosecuted to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the courts and to punish for disobedience of their orders, as distinguished from civil proceedings instituted to preserve and enforce rights of private litigants.3 Direct contempts are those

1 Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102, 48 N. E. 137, 39 L. R. A. 197; People v. Samuel, 199 Ill. App. 294; People v. Friedlander, 199 Ill. App. 300; Adams v. Gardner, 176 Ky. 252, 195 S. W. 412.

2 Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 273n, 19 Ann. Cas. 48; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 16 Am. Rep. 528; Ex parte Adams, 25 Miss. 883, 59 Am. Dec. 234; Burnett v. State,

8 Okla. Cr. 639, 129 Pac. 1110, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1175n; People v. Samuel, 199 Ill. App. 294; In re Anderson, 97 Wash. 683, 167 Pac. 70; People v. Seymour, 272 III. 295, 111 N. E. 1008; People v. Hoyne, 195 Ill. App. 272; Platnauer v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 463, 163 Pac. 237.

3 Clay v. Waters, 178 Fed. 385, 21 Ann. Cas. 897n; Rothchild &c. Co. v. Steger &c. Co., 256 III. 196,