which prevents it entertaining in the particular instance, criminal intent. A statute, providing that insanity shall not be a defense to a charge of crime, is unconstitutional.2 § 56. Classification of insanity.-Insanity, in the broad sense of the term, is divided into four general classes. These four classes are as follows: (1) Idiocy; (2) Imbecility; (3) Mania; (4) Dementia.3 Other classifications are total and partial insanity, and permanent and temporary insanity. § 57. Idiocy.-The term idiocy means the state of being an idiot. An idiot is a person having no mind, and therefore no reasoning power, and who has been a fool from his birth. A fool is not necessarily an idiot, but an idiot is always a fool. The former may intentionally violate common sense in his actions, whereas the latter is unable to do so. A buffoon is an artificial fool, whereas an idiot is a natural fool. Blackstone's definition is, "An idiot, or natural fool, is one that hath had no understanding from his nativity."4 § 58. Imbecility-Debility-Stupidity.-Imbecility is the state of being an imbecile. An imbecile is a person who is mentally or physically weak.5 Cases relating to imbecility often present very puzzling questions to a court and jury. Imbecility differs from debility. Imbecility is always constitutional, and pertains more particularly to the mind. Debility may be otherwise than constitutional, and always pertains to the body. Imbecility also differs from stupidity. An imbecile is very changeable in his views and very vacillating in his purposes; whereas a stupid person is very persistent in his views and in the resolutions he makes. Imbecility bears the same relation to stupidity that genius bears to talent. That which in 2 State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 917. 3 Ray on Insanity (3d ed.), § 104; Stew. Leg. Med., § 146. 41 Bl. Comm. 302. 5 Ray on Insanity, (3d ed.), § 104. See also Pettigrew v. State, 12 Tex. App. 225, Derby's Cases 188. its highest form is genius, in its lowest form is imbecility; and that which in its highest form is talent, in its lowest form is stupidity. § 59. Mania-Intellect-Monomania.-Mania, or madness, is a state or condition of the mind which renders the person a maniac. A maniac is a person who, owing to a diseased mind, has a disordered intellect which renders him insane. Intellect is a generic term. A person may have intellect without talent or genius; but he can not have either talent or genius without intellect. A maniac has intellect, but an idiot has none. The former has a diseased mind, whereas the latter has no mind at all. Monomania is a state of madness, or derangement of the mind, with respect to one subject only. Homicidal mania is an insane impulse to kill; pyromania is an insane impulse to burn buildings; and kleptomania is an insane impulse to steal. A person, therefore, may be insane and irresponsible as to one subject and at the same time sane and responsible as to others. He may be punished unless impelled to crime by his monomania. But many courts hold that monomania, causing an irresistible impulse to crime is no defense when the offender knew the act was wrong." § 60. Dementia.-The term dementia means loss or feebleness of the mental faculties. It ranges from mere failing memory to utter fatuity. Like mania, it is produced by lesion of the faculties subsequent to their development; whereas idiocy and imbecility result from defective development of the faculties. Senile dementia is loss or feebleness of the faculties produced by age. § 61. Emotional insanity-Moral insanity-The so-called emotional insanity is, in reality, no insanity at all. It is 6 Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. St. 264, 6 Pa. L. J. 90. 7 Lowe v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 224, 70 S. W. 206, Derby's Cases 189. 8 People v. Mortimer, 48 Mich. 37, 11 N. W. 776; People v. Foy, 138 N. Y. 664, 34 N. E. 396; Garner v. State, 112 Miss. 317, 73 So. 50. merely an excited condition of the mind produced by anger, jealousy or some other exciting cause, and constitutes no defense to a criminal charge. Nor is the so-called moral insanity, which consists in a perverted condition of the moral system, produced by excessive and unrestrained indulgence in viciousness, any defense." It has been held, however, that it may reduce a homicide from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree.10 This view is somewhat doubtful to say the least.11 § 62. Tests of criminal responsibility.-To be held criminally responsible for his acts, a person must have intelligence and capacity enough to have a criminal intent and purpose. One not a responsible moral agent is not liable to punishment for criminal acts.12 It is the conclusion, however, of many eminent authorities that no satisfactory test of criminal responsibility exists.13 The chief tests which have been recognized, at different times, are the following: (1) The child test; (2) the wild beast test; (3) the test of knowledge of right and wrong in the abstract; (4) the test of knowledge of right and wrong as to the particular act committed; and (5) the power of control test. § 63. The child test.-Since children under fourteen years of age are prima facie incapable of crime, the test was proposed that imbeciles or persons mentally deficient ought not to be held responsible criminally unless of capacity equal 9 State v. Terry, 173 N. C. 761, 92 S. E. 154; Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307, 1 Ky. L. 285, 35 Am. Rep. 20; State v. Lawrence, 57 Maine 574; People v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487, 29 N. W. 109; State v. Potts, 100 N. Car. 457, 6 S. E. 657. 10 Andersen v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 21 Am. Rep. 669. 11 United States V. Lee, 4 Mackey (15 D. C.) 489, 54 Am. 12 Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458. 13 1 Bish. New Crim. L. (8th ed.), § 381; Ray on Insanity (3rd ed.), § 24; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193; State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591. to that of an ordinary child of fourteen years.14 The objection is that the workings of an insane mature mind and a sane immature one are very different.15 Owing to the vagueness and uncertainty of this test for practical application it has been abandoned. § 64. The wild beast test.This test originated with Justice Tracy in 1724. He instructed the jury that a man, to be criminally irresponsible, "must be a man that is totally deprived of his reason and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast."16 This test has never been recognized in this country, and long ago became obsolete in England. § 65. Test of right and wrong in the abstract.—This test originated with Lord Mansfield in 1812.17 It became obsolete in England in 1843, and is obsolete in this country. § 66. Test of right and wrong as to the particular act.This test had its origin in England in 1843, and is the only test recognized in that country today. It is also recognized in this country universally;18 but it is not the sole test recognized here. This test grew out of the celebrated McNaghten McNaghten, intending to kill Sir Robert Peel, the case. 141 Hale P. C. 30; State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591. 151 Bish. New Crim. L. (8th ed), § 376, par. 3. For the different workings referred to, see Ray on Insanity (3d ed.), § 8. 16 Arnold's Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 764. 17 Bellingham's Case, Coll. on Lun. 630. 18 Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161; Hornish v. People, 142 Ill. 620, 32 N. E. 677, 18 L. R. A. 237; Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106, 28 S. W. 312; State v. Hockett, 70 Iowa 442, 30 N. W. 742; Smith v. State, 95 Miss. 786, 49 So. 945, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 23n; State v. Riddle, 245 Mo. 451, 150 S. W. 1044, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 884; Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467, 11 Am. Rep. 731; Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146; Alberty v. State, 10 Okla. Cr. 616, 140 Pac. 1025, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 248; Commonwealth V. Wireback, 190 Pa. St. 138, 42 Atl. 542, 70 Am. St. 625; State V. Levelle, 24 S. Car. 120, 13 S. E. 319, 27 Am. St. 799; Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966, Derby's Cases 185; Owen v. State, 13 Okla. Cr. 195, 163 Pac. 548; State v. Rose, 271 Mo. 17, 195 S. W. 1013. premier of England, and mistaking the premier's private secretary for Sir Robert, killed the secretary. Upon a charge of murder his defense was insanity. His acquittal aroused much public discussion, and the question of insanity as a defense to a criminal charge was debated in the House of Lords. Growing out of this debate, the lords submitted certain questions to the judges. The judges replied that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. 19 This test, however, is an imperfect one, and it has been condemned by the great current of modern medical authorities, who believe it to be "founded on an ignorant and imperfect view of the disease;"20 many of whom assert that the power of distinguishing right and wrong exists, at least to some extent, among most, if not all, lunatics.21 "The memorials of our jurisprudence are written all over with cases in which those who are now understood to have been insane have been executed as criminals."22 As previously stated, however, this test is the only one recognized in England, and it is universally recognized in this country. The courts, unfortunately, have not kept abreast of scientific investigations; and the English courts have not been willing to consider insanity as a disease.23 The existence of such a cerebral disease, however, is earn 19 McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott N. R. 595; Beale's Cases 231; Derby's Cases 172. 20 Encyc. Brit., (9th ed.), title, Insanity. 21 Judicial Aspects of Insanity (Ordrouaux, 1877) 427; Reynolds on "The Scientific Value of the Legal Tests of Insanity"; Buck nill Crim. Lun. 59; Sixteenth Annual Report Ala. Insane Hospital (1876), 22; Biennial Report (1886), 12-18; Guy & F. on Forensic Med. 220. 22 1 Bish. New Crim. L. (8th ed.), § 390. 23 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193. |