CHAPTER XXIII. SEDUCTION Section Section 456. Admissions of the female. 458. The inducement must be ade- 459. Female under age of consent 460. Effect of subsequent marriage. 464. Corroboration essential. § 445. Definition.-Seduction consists in having sexual intercourse with a previously chaste unmarried woman, with her consent, obtained by means of adequate inducement, usually a promise of marriage. Bouvier defines seduction as, "The act of a man in inducing a woman to commit unlawful sexual intercourse with him." While this definition has been approved by some courts, it is faulty, nevertheless, in that it omits the element of chastity of the female and also is too general as to the 1 Bouvier's Law Dict. 2 Patterson v. Hayden, 17 Ore. 238, 21 Pac. 129, 3 L. R. A. 529, 11 Am. St. 822; Robinson v. Powers, 129 Ind. 480, 28 N. E. 1112. element of inducement. Seduction has been also defined as "the wrong or crime of inducing a woman to consent to unlawful sexual intercourse, by the use of some influence, promise, art, or enticement, which overcomes her scruples or reluctance."3 § 446. Seduction not indictable at common law. While offenses contra bonos mores are in general indictable at common law, fornication, adultery, seduction and the like are not. At common law an indictment or information will not lie either for simple incontinence or for incontinence produced by means of deception, inveiglement or enticement. It is said that a case of slander may display as much baseness and malignity of purpose, as much falsehood in its perpetration, as ruinous effects in its consequences, and as pernicious an example in its dissemination, as a case of seduction. And yet none would think of prosecuting it criminally.5 § 447. Statutes not harmonious.-In almost all of the states statutes have been enacted making seduction a criminal offense. The phraseology of these statutes, however, varies so much that a uniform definition of the crime is impracticable. Most of them require that the female be chaste in fact, while others require that she be of "good repute." Most of them require that the inducement be a promise of marriage. Some, however, do not. While still others require some artifice or persuasion in addition to a promise of marriage. A few require that the female all of them, however, do not. fendant be an unmarried man. 3 25 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. 190. 4 Rex v. Lord Grey, 9 State Trials (Cobbet's ed.) 127; Rex v. Sir Francis Blake Delaval, 3 Burr. 1434. become pregnant. Nearly Some require that the deMost of them, however, do 5 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 5 Rand. (Va.) 627, 16 Am. Dec. 776. not. 5a It is to be observed, however, that a woman can not be seduced by means of a promise to marry when she has knowledge at the time that the man is legally the husband of another woman. Many statutes require that the female be under a certain specified age, usually twenty-one years. Many others, however, are silent upon this point. § 448. Certain English statutes not applicable.—Certain English statutes, which relate to the taking, conveying and enticing away of females from persons having charge of them, for purposes of prostitution, do not apply to the crime of seduction. Nor do similar statutes which obtain in this country.8 § 449. Chastity of the female.-The statutes very generally provide that to constitute seduction the female must be of previously chaste character. Sa When a statute is silent upon this point, the courts hold that the requisite of chastity is implied, the reasoning being that the legislature never intended to send a man to the penitentiary for having had illicit connection with a prostitute or a woman of easy virtue, where she had consented even under a promise of marriage. In a prosecution for adultery, or fornication, chastity of the female is not essential to a conviction; but in a prosecution for seduction the rule is otherwise.10 Moreover, in a prosecution for seduction the statutory prerequisite in this regard must be alleged in the indictment.11 5a Smedley v. State, 130 Ark 149, 197 S. W. 275. 6 See note to 8 Am. St. 870, 872. 74 & 5 Wm. & M., ch. 8, § 2; 9 Geo. IV, ch. 31, § 20; 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, 55. 8 People v. Roderigas, 49 Cal. 9. 8a Gaddis v. Commonweath, 175 Ky. 183, 193 S. W. 1052. 9 Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482, 48 Am. Rep. 17. See also People v. 10 People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267, 3 N. W. 927, 36 Am. Rep. 438. 11 State v. Gates, 27 Minn. 52, 6 N. W. 404; State v. Stogdel, 13 § 450. Meaning of the term "chaste character.”—The term "chaste character" means more than reputation for chastity. It means actual personal virtue as a moral and physical fact. 12 In the statutes the term "character" is used in its accurate sense and as signifying that which the person really is, in distinction from that which she may be reported to be.13 § 451. Views conflicting as to meaning of term "personal virtue.”—As regards the meaning of the term “personal virtue," however, the decisions are conflicting. Some restrict it to abstinence from sexual intercourse, while others do not. Those which favor the former view hold that, although a female may, from ignorance or other causes, have so low a standard of delicacy and propriety as to commit or permit indelicate acts or familiarities, yet if she have enough of the womanly instinct or sense of virtue that she would not surrender her person, unless seduced to do so under promise of marriage, she can not be said to be a woman of unchaste character.14 "There are women in whose presence every evil thought stands abashed. They are guarded by their innocence and purity and need no other protection. They stand invulnerable in their own virtue. There are others whose dispositions are more easy and complaisant, but who would have perhaps escaped irretrievable ruin had not their confidence been secured, and their apprehensions put at rest, by a Ind. 565; 3 Whart. Crim. L. (11th ed.), § 2109. 12 People v. Nelson, 153 N. Y. 90, 46 N. E. 1040, 60 Am. St. 592. See also Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177; Andre v. State, 5 Iowa 389, 68 Am. Dec. 708; State v. Prizer, 49 Iowa 531, 31 Am. Rep. 155. 13 Andre v. State, 5 Iowa 389, 68 Am. Dec. 708. See also note to 76 Am. St. 678. 14 People v. Kehoe, 123 Cal. 224, 55 Pac. 911, 69 Am. St. 52; Thomas v. State, 19 Ga. App. 104, 91 S. E. 247. promise of marriage. To shield and save them from the arts of the seducer was the object of the law. It would be but a mockery to extend its protecting care only to those who have no need of its assistance. It should be here and ever the refuge and support of those who need its protection."15 On the other hand, some decisions hold that the term "personal virtue" includes purity of mind and innocence of heart; and that a lascivious woman, who has been guilty of obscenity of language, indecency of conduct, undue familiarity with men, and the like, may not come within the meaning of the term. Under this construction of the statute, the manners and actions of the woman have more weight than under the other view. They serve to indicate the true character; they become exponents of it; and a defendant is not punished for an act with one whose conversation and manners may even have suggested the thought and opened the way to him, as he would be for the same act with one innocent in mind and manners.16 § 452. Reformation of the female.-The fact that an unmarried female, at some time in the past, was guilty of sexual intercourse, does not prove conclusively that she is not of "previously chaste character." It may be that she has reformed. Moreover, when a reasonable time has elapsed after her unchaste act a presumption may arise in favor of her reformation.17 § 453. Presumption of chastity-Burden of proof-Conflicting views.-Upon the questions of presumption and bur 15 Mills V. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 815, 22 S. E. 863. 16 Andre v. State, 5 Iowa 389, 68 Am. Dec. 708n. 17 People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112. See also Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 192, 15 Am. Rep. 664; Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177; State v. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 151, 51 Am. Rep. 234; State v. Carron, 18 Iowa 372, 87 Am. Dec. 401. |