is to injure another party by preventing other persons from doing business with him through fear of incurring the displeasure, persecution and vengeance of the conspirators.75

The term had its origin in Ireland during the premiership of William Ewart Gladstone. Captain Boycott, an Englishman, and agent of Lord Earne, who was owner of an estate in Ireland, was ostracized by his neighbors. "The population of the region for miles round resolved not to have anything to do with him, and as far as they could prevent it, not to allow any one else to have anything to do with him. His life appeared to be in danger-he had to claim police protection. His servants fled from him as servants flee from their masters in some plague-stricken city."76

It is to be observed, therefore, that the term originally signified violence. In many instances boycotts in our own country have been attended by violence and indeed it is a natural tendency when a boycott is instituted by ignorant or vicious persons to attempt by force to make it successful."

§ 285. Legality of act depends upon means employed.It is often said that, "What one man may lawfully do singly, two or more may lawfully agree to do jointly. The number who unite to do the act cannot change its character from lawful to unlawful."78 A workman may refuse to trade with any party he chooses, absolutely or conditionally. It follows, therefore, that many may do likewise, and an agreement by them so to do is not unlawful.79

75 Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119, 21 L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St. 319; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 76, 8 Atl. 890, 3 Am. St. 23.

76 "England Under Gladstone," by Justin McCarthy. See also State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 Atl. 890, 3 Am. St. 23.

77 State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 76, 8 Atl. 890, 3 Am. St. 23.

78 Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119, 40 Am. St. 319.

79 Longshore Printing Co. V. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547, 28 L. R. A. 464, 46 Am. St. 640; State v. Van Pelt, 136 N. Car. 633, 49 S. E. 177, 68 L. R. A. 760, 1 Ann. Cas. 495n.

Whether a combination to boycott a third party is lawful or not depends upon the means to be employed to carry it into effect. Peaceable persuasion in deterring others from dealing with that party and the withdrawal of their own patronage from him are lawful acts.80 On the other hand, if violence is contemplated the combination is unlawful.81

When the act contemplated has a necessary tendency to prejudice the public or oppress individuals by unjustly subjecting them to the power of the confederates and giving effect to the purpose of the latter, whether of extortion or mischief, the combination is unlawful.82 Thus, a combination by members of a typographical union to compel a firm of printers to make their office a "union office", and upon the refusal of the firm so to do, to boycott the firm, and send circulars to many of its customers notifying them that such firm is boycotted, and that the names of all persons who continue to patronize the firm will be published in a blacklist, and that such persons will be boycotted until they agree not to patronize such firm, is an unlawful combination.83 And a combination of union workmen whose purpose is to intimidate and drive non-union workmen away from their employment by threatening that unless they quit the service of their employer their names will be published in the "scab list" in the journal of the union workmen, and that they will be shunned and not allowed to work with

80 Dominion Steamship Co. v. M'Kenna, 30 Fed. 48; Elliott Contracts, 2694, and cases there cited.

81 State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 9 Atl. 559, 59 Am. Rep. 710n; State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227, 58 Atl. 769, 107 Am. St. 28, Derby's Cases 91; People v. McFarlin, 43 Misc. 591, 89 N. Y. S. 527, 18 N. Y. Cr. R. 412; State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R. I. 254, 70 Atl. 1, 132 Am. St. 817, 17 Ann. Cas. 96; Aikens v.

Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 49 L. ed. 154, 25 Sup. Ct. 3. See also Elliott Contracts, § 2695, and cases there cited.

82 Hailey v. Brooks (Tex. Civ. App.), 191 S. W. 781; Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620, 6 N. Y. Cr. 342, 10 Am. St. 895; State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N. W. 1046, 62 L. R. A. 700.

83 Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E, 620, 10 Am. St. 895.

union workmen engaged in a like occupation, is an unlawful combination.84

§ 286. Picketing-Injunction.--Picketing consists in detailing men by a labor union to watch an employer's place of business and speak to his workmen as they come and go with the view of inducing them to leave his service. It is not unlawful per se,85 but when carried to such an extent as to amount to violence or intimidation it is unlawful.86

In some cases a court of equity will grant an injunction to prevent workmen from doing unlawful acts. Thus, a court of equity will restrain by injunction discharged employés, members of a union, from gathering about their former employer's place of business, from following the workmen whom he has employed in their places, and from interfering with them by threats, menaces, intimidation, opprobrious epithets, ridicule and annoyance on account of their working for the complainant.87 It also will restrain by injunction the maintenance of banners displayed in front of a person's premises with inscriptions calculated to injure his business and to deter workmen from entering into or continuing in his employment.88

When, however, the party injured has an adequate remedy at law an injunction will be denied. Thus, in a complaint for an injunction to restrain a boycott on one's business, allegations that the officers and members of a certain trades union conspire to compel the plaintiff to submit to the dictation of the union upon pain of being boycotted in business; that the executive committee of the union entered his place of business without leave or license and ordered

84 Perkins v. Rogg, 28 Cin. L. Bul. 32, 11 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 585.

85 Perkins v. Rogg, 28 Cin. L. Bul. 32, 11 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 585.

86 Reg. v. Bauld, 13 Cox Cr. C.

282, 15 Moak 316. See also Elliott Contracts, § 2700.

87 Murdock, Kerr & Co. v. Walker, 152 Pa. St. 595, 25 Atl. 492, 34 Am. St. 678.

88 Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307, 9 Am. St. 689.

the union men at work therein to cease work under penalty of being dealt with according to the laws and regulations of the union; that the defendants induced the city council, by threats of boycott at the polls, to reject the plaintiff's bid for the city printing, although it was the lowest made; that defendants threatened to boycott the plaintiff's customers if they patronized him, whereby he lost one customer and would lose another, and that defendants circulated a knowledge of such acts by the posting of notices, all of which acts were committed within a space of about ten months, to the past and future injury of the plaintiff's business, do not justify an injunction, as such acts do not show that the plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law, or that the injury will be irreparable unless enjoined.89

Nor will an injunction be granted to restrain strikers from leaving the service of their employer. This is owing to the fact that a mandatory injunction will not be allowed in any case to compel the performance of personal service.90 Moreover, to grant an injunction in such a case would place the parties enjoined in a condition of involuntary servitude, and, therefore, would be a violation of the United States. Constitution.91

The fact that a threatened irreparable injury if committed would constitute a crime, is no bar to an injunction against the threatened injury.92 It has been held, however that equity will not enjoin the publication of a libel. 93

89 Longshore Printing Co. V. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547, 28 L. R. A. 464, 46 Am. St. 640. 90 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 746.

91 Arthur v. Oaks, 63 Fed. 310. 92 Vegelahn V. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077, 35 L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. 443; Hamilton

Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212, 32 S. W. 1106, 52 Am. St. 622; Consolidated Steel &c. Co. v. Murray, 80 Fed. 811.

93 Mayer v. Journeymen StoneCutters' Assn., 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492; Richter v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, 24 Cin. L. Bul. 189, 11 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 45.

§ 287. Combination to raise prices.-Lord Ellenborough has pertinently observed that every "corner", in the language of the day, whether it be to affect the price of articles of commerce, such as bread-stuffs, or the price of vendible stocks, when accomplished by confederation to raise or depress the price and operate on the markets, is a conspiracy; and that to combine to raise the price of the public funds on a particular day is an indictable offense.94 It also has been held that an agreement by several coal corporations to divide the market for coal, from the two coal regions of which they had control, in certain proportions; to appoint a committee to take charge of the business of all the corporations and to appoint a general sales agent; to deliver coal at such times and to such parties as the committee should, from time to time, direct; that the committee should adjust the prices of coal in the different markets; that the general agent should direct a suspension of shipment or delivery of coal by any of the companies making sales or deliveries beyond its proportion, is against public policy and illegal, and by statute an indictable offense.95 It is to be observed, however, that an agreement in unreasonable retraint of trade is not necessarily an indictable offense at common law. It has been said in a carefully considered opinion, "Contracts that were in unreasonable restraint of trade at common law were not unlawful in the sense of being criminal, or giving rise to a civil action for damages in favor of one prejudicially affected thereby, but were simply void, and not enforced by the courts."96

It has been held that a combination of insurance companies to fix insurance rates is not indictable, either at com

94 Rex v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 68.

95 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173, 8 Am. Rep. 159.

96 United States v. Addyston

Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 46 L. R. A. 122. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 55 L. ed. 619, 31 Sup. Ct. 502, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 834, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 734.