is something different;47 a conspiracy fraudulently to acquire from a county a certain sum of money;48 a conspiracy to get possession of land by means of an extorted deed in favor of the lawful owner;49 a conspiracy to obtain another's goods or money by false pretenses;50 a conspiracy to stifle competition at an auction sale;51 a conspiracy between a female servant and a man to perpetrate a fraud upon her master's relatives by the man personating her master and marrying her as such, with the view of defrauding the master's relatives out of part of his property;52 a conspiracy to defraud another by inducing him to bet on a horse race which the conspirators know is to be fraudulently run;53 a conspiracy to obtain money from a street car company by fraudulently representing that a certain person was a passenger on a car and injured by its derailment,54 and a conspiracy to attempt to deceive the general public by conducting "materializing seances," and masquerading as spirits of the dead55 have all been held indictable offenses. § 279.-Conspiracy to slander or extort money from another. A conspiracy to injure another's reputation by slandering him is, as a general rule, at least, an indictable offense. Some authorities, however, hold that there are exceptions to this rule, and "that the mere conspiracy to slander a man will not be sufficient, but there must be, combined with it, the imputation of a crime cognizable either by the 47 Reg. v. Skirret, 1 Sid. 312. 48 People v. Butler, 111 Mich. 483, 69 N. W. 734. See also Commonwealth v. Warren, 6 Mass. 74; Reg. v. Hudson, 8 Cox Cr. C. 305, Beale's Cases 158. 49 State v. Shooter, 8 Rich. (S. Car.) 72. See also People v. Richards, 1 Mich. 217, 51 Am. Dec. 75. 50 Johnson v. People, 22 Ill. 314; Orr v. People, 63 Ill. App. 305. 51 Reg. v. Lewis, 11 Cox Cr. C. 404; Levi v. Levi, 6 Car. & P. 239. 52 Rex v. Robinson, 1 Leach Cr. C. 44, 2 East P. C. 1010. 53 Reg. v. Orbell, 6 Mod. 42. 54 State v. Bacon, 27 R. I. 253, 61 Atl. 653, Derby's Cases 87. 55 People v. Gilman, 121 Mich. 187, 80 N. W. 4, 46 L. R. A. 218, 80 Am. St. 490. temporal or ecclesiastical courts; or else an intent, by means of such false charges, to extort money from the party.56 All the authorities agree that a conspiracy falsely to charge another with the commission of a crime is an indictable offense.57 Moreover, in an indictment for a conspiracy to accuse another of a crime it is not essential to allege that the defendants procured, or intended to procure, an indictment or other legal process.' 58 It is also well settled that a conspiracy to extort money from another is indictable. Thus, as heretofore stated, a conspiracy falsely to charge another with the paternity of a bastard child is a crime.59 § 280. Conspiracy to obstruct or pervert public justice.— Since a wilful obstruction or perversion of public justice is indictable, a conspiracy to accomplish it is also indictable. Thus, it is an indictable offense to conspire to cause a marriage falsely to appear of record, and to obtain for that purpose from a justice of the peace a false certificate thereof, and from other parties false statements that they were witnesses of the ceremony, with intent to prevent a person from contracting another marriage;60 or to conspire to induce a witness to suppress evidence, or give false evidence ;61 or to conspire to pack a jury;62 or to conspire to commit an 561 Gabbett Crim. L. 252; State v. Hickling, 41 N. J. L. 208, 210, 32 Am. Rep. 198. 57 People v. Dyer, 79 Mich. 480. 58 Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 2 Mass. 536. 59 Rex v. Armstrong, 1 Vent. 304; Rex v. Kimbertz, 1 Lev. 62; Rex v. Timberly, 1 Sid. 68. 60 Commonwealth v. Waterman, 122 Mass. 43. 61 People v. Chase, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 495; State v. De Witt, 2 Hill (S. Car.) 282, 27 Am. Dec. 371. 62 O'Donnell v. People, 41 Ill. App. 23. (For a forcible description of the character of the crime of packing juries, and the difficulty experienced in punishing the guilty parties, see Welch v. People, 30 Ill. App. 399.) assault and battery upon a peace officer with the view of preventing him from making a legal arrest. 63 § 281. Labor combinations.-Labor unions are combinations of workmen whose object is the improvement of their industrial conditions. The formation of labor unions for the purpose of mutual protection against unfairness or oppression is not unlawful unless it contemplates accomplishing the objects sought by unlawful means. Moreover, both in England and in this country workmen are encouraged to form associations for their mutual benefit.64 The real status of labor unions and strikes has been the subject of much discussion, both by political economists and by lawyers and jurists, and one upon which eminent jurists have rendered discordant opinions. In a leading English case upon the subject certain journeymen tailors were indicted for conspiring to raise their wages. The proof showed that they had entered into a compact to refuse to work unless their wages were increased to a certain amount. It also showed, however, that the sum demanded was in excess of that allowable under a general act of parliament, and they were convicted on the ground that the object of the combination was unlawful.65 § 282. English statutes.-Statutes have been enacted in England which make it a crime to molest and obstruct a workman with the view of coercing him to quit his employ 63 People v. Donahoe, 279 Ill. 411, 117 N. E. 105; State v. Noyes, 25 Vt. 415. See also, State v. McNally, 34 Maine 210, 56 Am. Dec. (50. 64 People v. Fisher, 28 Am. Dec. 501, 508. See also Reg. v. Rowlands, 5 Cox Cr. C. 436; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 8 Am. Rep. 287; 2 Whart. Cr. L., § 1366; 65 Rex v. Journeymen Tailors of ment. They also make it a crime to molest and obstruct an employer with the view of coercing him to change his mode of carrying on business. The statute of 22 Vict. enacts, among other things, that "no workmen or other person, by reason merely of his entering into an agreement with any workman, or by reason merely of his endeavoring, peaceably and in a reasonable manner, and without threat or intimidation, direct or indirect, to persuade others to cease or abstain from work, shall be guilty of molestation' or 'obstruction,' within the meaning of the said act of 6 Geo. IV."67 The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875 enacts that a combination of two or more persons to do or procure to be done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen shall not constitute an indictable conspiracy unless such act committed by one person shall constitute a crime. § 283. Combinations to force other employés to quit work.-Strikers may combine to persuade other workmen to leave the service of their employer. Their endeavors, however, must be peaceable and reasonable.68 If, however, the purpose of the combination is to control the free agency, or overcome the free will, of the fellow workmen by force or intimidation, the combination is a crime. Actual violence, however, is not essential.69 Thus, where employés of a railroad company that is in the hands of a receiver are dissatisfied with the wages paid them they may abandon 666 Geo. IV, ch. 129; 22 Vict., ch. 34; Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1875, and the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875. 67 22 Vict., ch. 34; 6 Geo. IV, ch. 129. 68 Richter v. Journeymen Tai lors' Union, 24 Cin. L. Bul. 189, 11 Ohio Dec. (reprint) 49. 69 State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 Atl. 890, 3 Am. St. 23; American Steel &c. Co. v. Wire Drawers' &c. Union, 90 Fed. 608; Newman v. Commonwealth, 8 Sad. (Pa.) 127, 7 Atl. 132. See also Elliott Contracts, 2698. the employment, and by persuasion or argument induce other employés to do the same; but if they resort to threats or violence to induce the others to leave, or accomplish their purpose, without actual violence, by overawing the others by preconcerted demonstrations of force, and thus prevent the receiver from operating the road, they may be punished for their unlawful acts.70 It has been held that where employés agree to quit work simultaneously, in large numbers and by preconcerted action, unless their employer discharge certain of their fellow workmen, the agreement constitutes an indictable offense.71 On the other hand, it has been recently held that, under the modern rule it is not unlawful for workmen, with the view of increasing their wages, to agree to quit work simultaneously and by preconcerted action.72 It is well settled that workmen may form themselves into a society and agree not to work for any person who shall employ a non-union workman, after notice given him to discharge such person.73 § 284. Boycotting - Definition - Origin of term. — The meaning of the term "boycotting" is somewhat vague. The word is not easily defined. It is frequently spoken of as passive merely-a let-alone policy—a withdrawal of all business relations, intercourse and fellowship.74 It may be defined, however, as a combination of persons whose purpose 73 Commonwealth V. Hunt, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346, Beale's Cases 821; Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119, 21 L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St. 319. See also Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 21 Q. B. Div. 544. 74 State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 76, 8 Atl. 890, 3 Am. St. 23. See also Elliott Contracts, § 2699. |